Narrative:

On this occasion I was pilot in command with copilot occupying the right seat and two passengers in the rear. We were returning from a 30 minute evaluation flight which would clear the aircraft for transfer to the new owner. The 30 minute flight was to culminate with a practice ILS 18 approach to ZZZ. This is our normal procedure to evaluate the functioning of aircraft instrument systems. The copilot was also conducting a practice approach since the ILS 18 approach has not been available during his tenure due to system down time.we requested a practice ILS approach and were advised of the usual VFR clearance stipulations and cautioned that the ILS was notamed down. We acknowledged and were granted permission for a practice approach. We took an easterly heading and activated the ILS autopilot coupling. The system received the localizer and began a turn to intercept the inbound track. The controller advised of traffic northwest of our position approximately 5 miles; and I asked if the traffic was also on approach. No answer was received; which is not unusual. As we approached the FAF and began our descent; I again queried approach about the traffic's intentions with no response. As we crossed the FAF; I informed control that we were switching to tower and was cleared to tower frequency. The approach continued normally until we were abeam [the OM]; when the tower screamed 'you can't do that; you can't shoot an approach here without contacting the tower.' he was very excited and obviously hostile to me as the offender.I was scolded for making an approach with jet traffic behind me. Not knowing what he was referring to; I informed him that we had just been handed off by approach and told to switch to tower. I had in fact switched to tower frequency at the FAF and contacted the tower. During the tower's lecture; I attempted to request a sidestep to land on echo southbound at hotel taxiway as is our normal routine; again there was confusion and the tower was totally preoccupied with the well being of a training aircraft which I discovered was rapidly closing on my 6 o'clock position. As we approached the threshold of runway 18; we were provided with a show of airmanship by a training aircraft that was impressive but reckless and irresponsible! The aircraft had closed to within 'a mile of my tail and sidestepped to taxiway echo south. He conducted a hi-speed pass in this position at approximately 50-100 ft AGL; and then proceeded to make an aggressive correction back to the runway centerline; using a 60 to 80 degree bank; again within a mile of my aircraft. The tower again expressed his concern for the training aircraft's well being and was told by the pilot that he was 'frustrated.' the tower assured him that that all was well and cleared him back to his base. Had we conducted our normal sidestep to land on taxiway echo southbound at hotel; the result could have been a deadly midair! This childish stunt could have been deadly for 6 people. This incident (potential accident) was the result of three simple mistakes; either of which alone was a non event. But when coupled in the 'rule of threes' they produced the ingredients of a potential accident. The events were as I saw them: 1) approach control failed to inform me that the reported traffic was on approach to ZZZ and then failed to answer my request for this information on two further occasions. 2) approach failed to inform the tower of both my approach and hand-off at the FAF. It appears he also failed to inform tower of the trainer's approach. 3) the tower 'lost his cool' and instead of issuing a simple 'go-around' order to either me or the training aircraft spent valuable time reprimanding me over the air; instead of a professional 'call me over the land line when you're on the ground.' the training aircraft pilot's errors are almost too numerous to enumerate; but they included: a.) when reported traffic is in close proximity under VFR; with no separation provided; it is prudent to go around if you don't have the traffic in sight; even if you are a 'jet' and the reported traffic is a 'lowly helicopter.' B.) the proper procedure for a go around is a pull-up and reentry to downwind; not a knife-edge-pass down the adjacent taxiway. C.) it is never acceptable to conduct a high speed; low level pass on an aircraft that is in the landing pattern.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A helicopter pilot on a practice ILS reported traffic confliction with a training aircraft which overtook him and then overflew the airport in a show of frustration. There is no report of ATC guidance during this event.

Narrative: On this occasion I was pilot in command with copilot occupying the right seat and two passengers in the rear. We were returning from a 30 minute evaluation flight which would clear the aircraft for transfer to the new owner. The 30 minute flight was to culminate with a practice ILS 18 approach to ZZZ. This is our normal procedure to evaluate the functioning of aircraft instrument systems. The copilot was also conducting a practice approach since the ILS 18 approach has not been available during his tenure due to system down time.We requested a practice ILS approach and were advised of the usual VFR clearance stipulations and cautioned that the ILS was NOTAMed down. We acknowledged and were granted permission for a practice approach. We took an easterly heading and activated the ILS autopilot coupling. The system received the LOC and began a turn to intercept the inbound track. The Controller advised of traffic northwest of our position approximately 5 miles; and I asked if the traffic was also on approach. No answer was received; which is not unusual. As we approached the FAF and began our descent; I again queried Approach about the traffic's intentions with no response. As we crossed the FAF; I informed Control that we were switching to Tower and was cleared to Tower frequency. The approach continued normally until we were abeam [the OM]; when the Tower screamed 'you can't do that; you can't shoot an approach here without contacting the Tower.' He was very excited and obviously hostile to me as the offender.I was scolded for making an approach with jet traffic behind me. Not knowing what he was referring to; I informed him that we had just been handed off by Approach and told to switch to Tower. I had in fact switched to Tower frequency at the FAF and contacted the Tower. During the Tower's lecture; I attempted to request a sidestep to land on Echo southbound at Hotel taxiway as is our normal routine; again there was confusion and the Tower was totally preoccupied with the well being of a training aircraft which I discovered was rapidly closing on my 6 o'clock position. As we approached the threshold of Runway 18; we were provided with a show of airmanship by a training aircraft that was impressive but reckless and irresponsible! The aircraft had closed to within 'a mile of my tail and sidestepped to Taxiway Echo south. He conducted a hi-speed pass in this position at approximately 50-100 FT AGL; and then proceeded to make an aggressive correction back to the runway centerline; using a 60 to 80 degree bank; again within a mile of my aircraft. The Tower again expressed his concern for the training aircraft's well being and was told by the pilot that he was 'frustrated.' The Tower assured him that that all was well and cleared him back to his base. Had we conducted our normal sidestep to land on Taxiway Echo southbound at Hotel; the result could have been a deadly midair! This childish stunt could have been deadly for 6 people. This incident (potential accident) was the result of three simple mistakes; either of which alone was a non event. But when coupled in the 'rule of threes' they produced the ingredients of a potential accident. The events were as I saw them: 1) Approach Control failed to inform me that the reported traffic was on approach to ZZZ and then failed to answer my request for this information on two further occasions. 2) Approach failed to inform the Tower of both my approach and hand-off at the FAF. It appears he also failed to inform Tower of the trainer's approach. 3) The Tower 'lost his cool' and instead of issuing a simple 'go-around' order to either me or the training aircraft spent valuable time reprimanding me over the air; instead of a professional 'call me over the land line when you're on the ground.' The training aircraft pilot's errors are almost too numerous to enumerate; but they included: A.) When reported traffic is in close proximity under VFR; with no separation provided; it is prudent to go around if you don't have the traffic in sight; even if you are a 'jet' and the reported traffic is a 'lowly helicopter.' B.) The proper procedure for a go around is a pull-up and reentry to downwind; not a knife-edge-pass down the adjacent taxiway. C.) It is never acceptable to conduct a high speed; low level pass on an aircraft that is in the landing pattern.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.