Narrative:

Airborne we got a lgciu 2 ECAM. No reference action associated. The flight manual was referenced and indicated no number 2 thrust reverser would be available (checklist was a little confusing). We could not find a weight penalty associated. Called dispatch and they informed me that there was a weight penalty and that the required landing distance was only two hundred feet short of the entire runway length available at sna. We have a system fault reset in our book that is applicable on the ground but not in flight. Maintenance said that we could cycle the circuit breaker (circuit breaker) in the air; but obviously; as we already were aware; this constitutes using captain's emergency authority. I did not deem this an emergency from the information I had as it appeared to be only an issue with the runway length in sna (checklist again very lacking in complete systems lost). Dispatch; maintenance and I conferred and I decided that with the information I had at this point going to lax (our designated alternate) would be a suitable safe option and make the stopping distance a non issue. I realized we still had 2.5 hours or so to consider our options. I still wanted the MEL information. I wanted all possible information; so I asked dispatch to have the MEL for the issue to be sent to the aircraft. Upon receiving the MEL it was quite lengthy; involved numerous items lost once on the ground (reference MEL for LGCIU2 inoperative). With this further information; I determined that no matter where we landed that the situation would have negative consequences on safety; even just taxiing in at our destination. With this in mind; and after getting assurance from maintenance that there were no additional consequences that would be generated by cycling the lgciu 2 circuit breaker I opted to use my captain's emergency authority and did so. The circuit breaker was uneventfully cycled; the system was fully recovered; and we opted to continue to our original destination of sna. As a caveat I can only assume that the cycling of cbs in flight being deemed a use of captains emergency authority was generated with some specific instances in mind. The criteria is entirely too broad. This was a simple reset procedure that should not have required me to judge whether to use this authority or not. I feel the emergency authority to recycle cbs in flight designation should be reviewed. As pilots it appears to be a simple; obvious procedure in this instance that generated a gray area for us to operate in. I understand that there are cbs that influence numerous systems. This circuit breaker just dealt with lgciu 2 which was inoperative already with the commensurate repercussions. The entire legality exercise was wholly unnecessary.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Captain experiences an LGCIU 2 ECAM at FL380 and learns that this failure will render the number 2 thrust reverser inoperative. The destination runway is short and Maintenance offers a circuit breaker reset procedure if the Captain elects to exercise his emergency authority. This is successfully accomplished.

Narrative: Airborne we got a LGCIU 2 ECAM. No reference action associated. The Flight Manual was referenced and indicated no number 2 thrust reverser would be available (checklist was a little confusing). We could not find a weight penalty associated. Called Dispatch and they informed me that there was a weight penalty and that the required landing distance was only two hundred feet short of the entire runway length available at SNA. We have a system fault reset in our book that is applicable on the ground but not in flight. Maintenance said that we could cycle the Circuit Breaker (CB) in the air; but obviously; as we already were aware; this constitutes using Captain's emergency authority. I did not deem this an emergency from the information I had as it appeared to be only an issue with the runway length in SNA (checklist again very lacking in complete systems lost). Dispatch; Maintenance and I conferred and I decided that with the information I had at this point going to LAX (our designated alternate) would be a suitable safe option and make the stopping distance a non issue. I realized we still had 2.5 hours or so to consider our options. I still wanted the MEL information. I wanted all possible information; so I asked Dispatch to have the MEL for the issue to be sent to the aircraft. Upon receiving the MEL it was quite lengthy; involved numerous items lost once on the ground (reference MEL for LGCIU2 inoperative). With this further information; I determined that no matter where we landed that the situation would have negative consequences on safety; even just taxiing in at our destination. With this in mind; and after getting assurance from Maintenance that there were no additional consequences that would be generated by cycling the LGCIU 2 CB I opted to use my Captain's emergency authority and did so. The CB was uneventfully cycled; the system was fully recovered; and we opted to continue to our original destination of SNA. As a caveat I can only assume that the cycling of CBs in flight being deemed a use of Captains Emergency Authority was generated with some specific instances in mind. The criteria is entirely too broad. This was a simple reset procedure that should not have required me to judge whether to use this authority or not. I feel the emergency authority to recycle CBs in flight designation should be reviewed. As pilots it appears to be a simple; obvious procedure in this instance that generated a gray area for us to operate in. I understand that there are CBs that influence numerous systems. This CB just dealt with LGCIU 2 which was inoperative already with the commensurate repercussions. The entire legality exercise was wholly unnecessary.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.