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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 954276 |
Time | |
Date | 201106 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.ARTCC |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Fighting Falcon F16 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | B717 (Formerly MD-95) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Enroute Instructor |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
I was conducting on the job training at the sector. At the time of the event; an outbound departure rush from an airport was underway. Complexity and traffic volume was moderate to high due to the rush and several VOR outages required non-GPS equipped aircraft to be on vectors. Also complicating matters was a special military operation. My trainee was competently working the outbound rush when the controller from the low sector behind me tapped me on the shoulder and handed me a flight progress strip on a flight of 4 F16's. He said they wanted clearance out of the military airspace and would be checking on our frequency momentarily. I gave the flight progress strip to the trainee who had difficulty getting a track started. I tried to assist the trainee and; using the cid; tried to start a track and noticed another sector had track control. Thinking that the inbound track had been dropped by the low sector; I /ok'd the cid and started the track. Much to my surprise; the track that appeared belonged to another aircraft. Fortunately; we had just handed that aircraft off to an adjoining sector. I re-tracked that aircraft and started the hand off again. I checked the flight plan readout for the flight and found that no flight plan was stored. At this point a d-side had joined us; the trainee was getting behind due to the problems we were having with the flight track start and the flight kept calling for clearance. At this point; I took control of the frequency; noticed an aircraft that the trainee had cleared up through an over-flight at FL260. I stopped the departure at FL250 and then began to work the military flight issue. From my position standing behind the trainee; I noticed the flight was orbiting in the southwest corner of the airspace at FL300. I instructed the trainee to start a track using the call sign and I verbally confirmed with the flight that they were all at FL300 and were tied together in standard formation and were a flight of two; not four. They appeared to be well inside the airspace whose boundary was at least 5 NM from the departure SID route that any potential conflicting traffic was using. I cleared the military flight to fly heading 270; thinking that I had vertical and lateral separation from the departures that were climbing on a SID to FL290. The d-side then advised us that the flight was non-rvsm; something I was unaware of. I instructed the two departures that were close to stop their climb at FL280 and the lead aircraft a B717; responded that he was already through it and I instructed him to descend now to FL280. I then told the flight to climb to FL320. The B717 then advised us he was responding to a TCAS RA. When asked what it was; he stated he was descending to FL280; which was what I'd instructed him to do before the RA. Throughout these events; I believed that we had maintained lateral separation and at least 1;500 ft of vertical. We all thought that although we nearly had two operational errors; we had prevented both. Unfortunately; several hours later I was informed that I had an operational error with the military flight. Recommendation; the whole event was a controlled situation. Normally; military aircraft exiting the airspace in question are below FL180 so rvsm didn't enter my mind initially. Since this airspace is only used once or twice a year; exit procedures and filed flight plans should be established to conform to the normal exit altitudes/routings we are all used to.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Enroute Controller providing OJT described a loss of separation event involving a flight of non RVSM military fighters leaving restricted airspace.
Narrative: I was conducting on the job training at the sector. At the time of the event; an outbound departure rush from an airport was underway. Complexity and traffic volume was moderate to high due to the rush and several VOR outages required non-GPS equipped aircraft to be on vectors. Also complicating matters was a special military operation. My trainee was competently working the outbound rush when the controller from the low sector behind me tapped me on the shoulder and handed me a flight progress strip on a flight of 4 F16's. He said they wanted clearance out of the military airspace and would be checking on our frequency momentarily. I gave the flight progress strip to the trainee who had difficulty getting a track started. I tried to assist the trainee and; using the CID; tried to start a track and noticed another sector had track control. Thinking that the inbound track had been dropped by the low sector; I /OK'd the CID and started the track. Much to my surprise; the track that appeared belonged to another aircraft. Fortunately; we had just handed that aircraft off to an adjoining sector. I re-tracked that aircraft and started the hand off again. I checked the flight plan readout for the flight and found that no flight plan was stored. At this point a D-Side had joined us; the trainee was getting behind due to the problems we were having with the flight track start and the flight kept calling for clearance. At this point; I took control of the frequency; noticed an aircraft that the trainee had cleared up through an over-flight at FL260. I stopped the departure at FL250 and then began to work the military flight issue. From my position standing behind the trainee; I noticed the flight was orbiting in the southwest corner of the airspace at FL300. I instructed the trainee to start a track using the call sign and I verbally confirmed with the flight that they were all at FL300 and were tied together in standard formation and were a flight of two; not four. They appeared to be well inside the airspace whose boundary was at least 5 NM from the departure SID route that any potential conflicting traffic was using. I cleared the military flight to fly heading 270; thinking that I had vertical and lateral separation from the departures that were climbing on a SID to FL290. The D-Side then advised us that the flight was non-RVSM; something I was unaware of. I instructed the two departures that were close to stop their climb at FL280 and the lead aircraft a B717; responded that he was already through it and I instructed him to descend now to FL280. I then told the flight to climb to FL320. The B717 then advised us he was responding to a TCAS RA. When asked what it was; he stated he was descending to FL280; which was what I'd instructed him to do before the RA. Throughout these events; I believed that we had maintained lateral separation and at least 1;500 FT of vertical. We all thought that although we nearly had two operational errors; we had prevented both. Unfortunately; several hours later I was informed that I had an operational error with the military flight. Recommendation; the whole event was a controlled situation. Normally; military aircraft exiting the airspace in question are below FL180 so RVSM didn't enter my mind initially. Since this airspace is only used once or twice a year; exit procedures and filed flight plans should be established to conform to the normal exit altitudes/routings we are all used to.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.