Narrative:

The visibility for takeoff was excellent (it was night); and we had a light left-quartering headwind. A reduced thrust takeoff was briefed and performed. The takeoff was routine until just after gear retraction (before flap retraction); when I noted a quick; subtle yaw sensation that I initially attributed to a gear door hang-up; but I had no instrument indication of such. Seconds later; at approximately 1;500 ft AGL; we received indications of a left engine fire (master warning indication associated aural warning; EICAS message and associated fire lights.) I immediately directed the first officer to declare an emergency with ATC and obtain clearance to return; which he did. We leveled off at 4;000 ft MSL; roughly coincidental with our downwind turn. We performed the engine fire checklist; eventually shutting down the left engine and firing both engine fire bottles in accordance with the procedure. I directed the first officer to make a PA to the passengers that the aircraft was flying safely and that we were returning. I directed the first officer to brief the flight attendants via interphone that we were immediately returning to the airport and to expect an emergency evacuation on the runway using the right side only. Due to the expedited approach; no notification was given to the company dispatchers. There was time only to finish the QRH non-normal procedures and the landing checklist; I believe we were airborne a total of about 9 minutes. Due to the urgency of the situation (the fact that the fire warning did not abate after completing the engine fire checklist); I was intent upon keeping our speed up; and in doing so; inadvertently exceeded the flaps 5 maximum speed limit (our maximum attained speed was about 238; to the best of my knowledge). I flew a visual approach; backed up with the ILS; which was hand-flown. The landing was unremarkable and I stopped the aircraft on the runway and set the brakes. I directed the first officer to make a PA for passengers to remain seated while we ran the evacuation checklist. I personally repeated these instructions a few moments later. There was a delay while the first officer was locating the correct checklist; but we did find and accomplish it. I delayed the shut-down of the APU until most of the passengers had egressed; suspecting that the ensuing darkness would slow the evacuation and possibly cause panic or injury. The evacuation was successfully accomplished. I was the last person to egress the aircraft. The post-evacuation situation was relatively incident free; and the fire fighters did an excellent job both extinguishing the fire and handling passengers. I immediately checked on my crew to ensure their safety and proceeded to help the fire fighters in keeping passengers from wandering onto the taxiways; as there was restlessness amongst the passengers while waiting for company representatives to help them. I thanked the group for their cooperation; and after all passengers had been accounted for and transported to the terminal; my crew was given transportation back to the terminal. My personal observations following this event: my first officer was new to the company and seemed very unfamiliar with our checklists and our procedures. I was not aware that he was new until after our event. From my 24 years of experience; this is the first time I have flown with anyone not intimately familiar with the use of our non-normal procedures and checklists. I was frustrated with his slowness in accomplishing the engine fire and evacuation checklists; especially considering the engine fire had not abated after running the checklists and firing both fire suppression bottles. Had I known this prior to the event; I would have considered allowing him to fly while I accomplished the checklists; as it was; my communication with him probably came across as was somewhat harsh; since I didn't understand his situation at the time! I was simply under the impression he was in so much shock that he was blanking out; and felt that raising my voice would snap him back into reality. I fault my company's training (or lack of it) for not ensuring his familiarity. Another thing I would have done differently is to have accomplished the 'evacuate' call; even though we were well aware the evacuation was already underway. This would have prompted the one flight attendant who really was waiting for the command to open his door; further expediting the evacuation. All in all; I think the situation was well handled; despite the snafus.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 Captain describes the events surrounding an engine fire on takeoff and the return; leading to an uncommanded evacuation on the runway.

Narrative: The visibility for takeoff was excellent (it was night); and we had a light left-quartering headwind. A reduced thrust takeoff was briefed and performed. The takeoff was routine until just after gear retraction (before flap retraction); when I noted a quick; subtle yaw sensation that I initially attributed to a gear door hang-up; but I had no instrument indication of such. Seconds later; at approximately 1;500 FT AGL; we received indications of a left engine fire (Master Warning indication associated aural warning; EICAS message and associated Fire lights.) I immediately directed the First Officer to declare an emergency with ATC and obtain clearance to return; which he did. We leveled off at 4;000 FT MSL; roughly coincidental with our downwind turn. We performed the Engine Fire Checklist; eventually shutting down the left engine and firing both engine fire bottles in accordance with the procedure. I directed the First Officer to make a PA to the passengers that the aircraft was flying safely and that we were returning. I directed the First Officer to brief the flight attendants via interphone that we were immediately returning to the airport and to expect an emergency evacuation on the runway using the right side only. Due to the expedited approach; no notification was given to the company dispatchers. There was time only to finish the QRH non-normal procedures and the landing checklist; I believe we were airborne a total of about 9 minutes. Due to the urgency of the situation (the fact that the fire warning did not abate after completing the Engine Fire Checklist); I was intent upon keeping our speed up; and in doing so; inadvertently exceeded the flaps 5 maximum speed limit (our maximum attained speed was about 238; to the best of my knowledge). I flew a visual approach; backed up with the ILS; which was hand-flown. The landing was unremarkable and I stopped the aircraft on the runway and set the brakes. I directed the First Officer to make a PA for passengers to remain seated while we ran the Evacuation checklist. I personally repeated these instructions a few moments later. There was a delay while the First Officer was locating the correct checklist; but we did find and accomplish it. I delayed the shut-down of the APU until most of the passengers had egressed; suspecting that the ensuing darkness would slow the evacuation and possibly cause panic or injury. The evacuation was successfully accomplished. I was the last person to egress the aircraft. The post-evacuation situation was relatively incident free; and the fire fighters did an excellent job both extinguishing the fire and handling passengers. I immediately checked on my crew to ensure their safety and proceeded to help the fire fighters in keeping passengers from wandering onto the taxiways; as there was restlessness amongst the passengers while waiting for company representatives to help them. I thanked the group for their cooperation; and after all passengers had been accounted for and transported to the terminal; my crew was given transportation back to the terminal. My personal observations following this event: My First Officer was new to the company and seemed very unfamiliar with our checklists and our procedures. I was not aware that he was new until after our event. From my 24 years of experience; this is the first time I have flown with anyone not intimately familiar with the use of our non-normal procedures and checklists. I was frustrated with his slowness in accomplishing the engine fire and evacuation checklists; especially considering the engine fire had not abated after running the checklists and firing both fire suppression bottles. Had I known this prior to the event; I would have considered allowing him to fly while I accomplished the checklists; as it was; my communication with him probably came across as was somewhat harsh; since I didn't understand his situation at the time! I was simply under the impression he was in so much shock that he was blanking out; and felt that raising my voice would snap him back into reality. I fault my company's training (or lack of it) for not ensuring his familiarity. Another thing I would have done differently is to have accomplished the 'Evacuate' call; even though we were well aware the evacuation was already underway. This would have prompted the one flight attendant who really was waiting for the command to open his door; further expediting the evacuation. All in all; I think the situation was well handled; despite the snafus.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.