Narrative:

I was working the local control 2 position. We had several departures waiting (4). Two at [runway] xxr; two at [runway] xxl; and two additional aircraft were inbound for landing both tagged for runway xxr. I had crossed the first aircraft over runway xxr to depart xxl. My plan was to depart three aircraft off of xxl while the first aircraft on final landed runway xxr. Then; depart the last aircraft off runway xxr while the second aircraft on final landed runway xxl. The first aircraft on final; aircraft X; called and I cleared him to land runway xxr. I commenced to clear the sequence of three aircraft for takeoff runway xxl using visual separation. The second aircraft on final; aircraft Y; checked in on a four mile final. I changed aircraft Y to runway xxl; 'cleared to land.' I told him about the traffic that would be holding in position for departure and amended the data tag to indicate runway xxl. As I put the third aircraft into position for departure runway xxl; I scanned the stars scope and noticed that aircraft X; on short final now; had a data tag that indicated runway xxl. My heart dropped into my stomach as I did a mental evaluation of what went wrong. When the cabin attendant supervisor told me that he changed the data tag on aircraft X; I changed the tag on aircraft X back to the correct runway; runway xxr. Aircraft X landed runway xxr; aircraft Y landed runway xxl. My heart returned to its normal operating position. After the event; I talked with the supervisor who told me that it's his right to do whatever he sees necessary to the data tags. I realize that the supervisor in this situation was trying to help. The problem is that he didn't have all the information or may have thought he did; but didn't. The supervisor's actions of changing the data tag of aircraft X created confusion and a potentially dangerous situation. Data tag should never be changed by anyone other than the controller working the position or the controller assisting the position.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Local Controller described a confused runway assignment event when a Supervisor; trying to help; elected to change the landing runway in the data block.

Narrative: I was working the Local Control 2 position. We had several departures waiting (4). Two at [Runway] XXR; two at [Runway] XXL; and two additional aircraft were inbound for landing both tagged for Runway XXR. I had crossed the first aircraft over Runway XXR to depart XXL. My plan was to depart three aircraft off of XXL while the first aircraft on final landed Runway XXR. Then; depart the last aircraft off Runway XXR while the second aircraft on final landed Runway XXL. The first aircraft on final; aircraft X; called and I cleared him to land Runway XXR. I commenced to clear the sequence of three aircraft for takeoff Runway XXL using visual separation. The second aircraft on final; aircraft Y; checked in on a four mile final. I changed aircraft Y to Runway XXL; 'cleared to land.' I told him about the traffic that would be holding in position for departure and amended the data tag to indicate Runway XXL. As I put the third aircraft into position for departure Runway XXL; I scanned the STARS scope and noticed that aircraft X; on short final now; had a data tag that indicated Runway XXL. My heart dropped into my stomach as I did a mental evaluation of what went wrong. When the CAB Supervisor told me that he changed the data tag on aircraft X; I changed the tag on aircraft X back to the correct runway; Runway XXR. Aircraft X landed Runway XXR; aircraft Y landed Runway XXL. My heart returned to its normal operating position. After the event; I talked with the Supervisor who told me that it's his right to do whatever he sees necessary to the data tags. I realize that the Supervisor in this situation was trying to help. The problem is that he didn't have all the information or may have thought he did; but didn't. The Supervisor's actions of changing the data tag of aircraft X created confusion and a potentially dangerous situation. Data tag should never be changed by anyone other than the Controller working the position or the Controller assisting the position.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.