Narrative:

On the SEAVU2 arrival into lax prior to konzl; ATC set our speed at 290 and gave us clearance to 'descend via the SEAVU2; at seavu; cleared the ILS 25L.' after luvyn we were issued slow to 250. Between dymmo and fuelr socal issued slow to 230. Inbound to gaate socal announced: 'traffic 10 o'clock; 6;000 ft; heavy 767 will be turning in front of you.' I don't recall the 767's runway assignment. After confirming with me; pilot not flying called: 'traffic in sight.' pilot not flying and I discussed the need to be prepared to go-around. Socal: 'speed 180; caution; wake turbulence; following heavy 767; maintain visual separation; cleared visual 2-5 left.' pilot not flying: 'cleared the visual 2-5 left; we'll be slowing. Prior to hunda.' socal asked: 'do you have the traffic?' to which the pilot not flying stated: 'traffic in sight; we're slowing.' TCAS on the 10-mile nd scale indicated the heavy 767 less than 3 NM ahead; 500 ft below. I slowed and configured. I selected the 5-mile range on the nd to get a more accurate depiction -- the TCAS distance was less than 2.5 NM. Viewed out the windshield; the heavy 767 appeared directly ahead and slightly right-of-course. I was fully configured (gear down; flaps 30) 3 NM prior to the FAF and slowed to vref plus approximately 10 KTS trying to gain more separation on the heavy. At about 2;800 ft; socal asked: 'what is your speed?' pm replied: '150;' at which socal said: 'I thought I gave you 180.' pilot not flying said: 'you cleared us for the visual approach. I don't want to get too close to the heavy 767.' socal responded: 'and you won't. Cancel approach clearance; maintain 2;500.' I initiated the go-around; continuing the descent to 2;500 ft (raising the gear in a descent is a first for me). We were given a south vector; climb to 4;000 ft; and subsequent vectors to intercept the 25L localizer. We re-accomplished the before landing checklist and performed an uneventful approach and landing. Lax ground control read off the telephone number for socal TRACON and instructed us to call. After deplaning; the pilot not flying and I met in flight operations to affirm our actions were in accordance with proper procedure. Flight manual part I states: by accepting a visual approach; the flight crew assumes responsibility for terrain and obstacle clearance; and landing at the correct runway. If the flight crew has the airport in sight but cannot see the aircraft to be followed; ATC may clear the aircraft for a visual approach; however; ATC retains separation responsibility. When visually following a preceding aircraft; acceptance of a visual approach clearance constitutes acceptance of flight crew responsibility for maintaining a safe approach interval and adequate wake turbulence separation (aim). That last sentence confirms we followed proper procedure. The captain called company and spoke to the duty manager. The captain then called TRACON and spoke to the supervisor (who did not have first-hand knowledge of the situation). The TRACON supervisor said the involved controller was off shift at the time of the phone call.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Air Carrier crew on a visual to LAX 25L were issued 180 KT speed by SCT but they slowed to 150 KTS and were closing within 2.5 miles on a heavy aircraft ahead so SCT issued the crew a go around.

Narrative: On the SEAVU2 arrival into LAX prior to KONZL; ATC set our speed at 290 and gave us clearance to 'Descend via the SEAVU2; at SEAVU; cleared the ILS 25L.' After LUVYN we were issued Slow to 250. Between DYMMO and FUELR SoCal issued Slow to 230. Inbound to GAATE SoCal announced: 'Traffic 10 o'clock; 6;000 FT; Heavy 767 will be turning in front of you.' I don't recall the 767's runway assignment. After confirming with me; pilot not flying called: 'Traffic in sight.' Pilot not flying and I discussed the need to be prepared to go-around. SoCal: 'Speed 180; caution; wake turbulence; following Heavy 767; maintain visual separation; cleared visual 2-5 left.' pilot not flying: 'Cleared the visual 2-5 left; we'll be slowing. Prior to HUNDA.' SoCal asked: 'Do you have the traffic?' To which the pilot not flying stated: 'Traffic in sight; we're slowing.' TCAS on the 10-mile ND scale indicated the Heavy 767 less than 3 NM ahead; 500 FT below. I slowed and configured. I selected the 5-mile range on the ND to get a more accurate depiction -- the TCAS distance was less than 2.5 NM. Viewed out the windshield; the Heavy 767 appeared directly ahead and slightly right-of-course. I was fully configured (gear down; flaps 30) 3 NM prior to the FAF and slowed to VREF plus approximately 10 KTS trying to gain more separation on the Heavy. At about 2;800 FT; SoCal asked: 'What is your speed?' PM replied: '150;' at which SoCal said: 'I thought I gave you 180.' Pilot not flying said: 'You cleared us for the visual approach. I don't want to get too close to the Heavy 767.' SoCal responded: 'And you won't. Cancel approach clearance; maintain 2;500.' I initiated the go-around; continuing the descent to 2;500 FT (raising the gear in a descent is a first for me). We were given a south vector; climb to 4;000 FT; and subsequent vectors to intercept the 25L localizer. We re-accomplished the Before Landing Checklist and performed an uneventful approach and landing. LAX Ground Control read off the telephone number for SoCal TRACON and instructed us to call. After deplaning; the pilot not flying and I met in Flight Operations to affirm our actions were in accordance with proper procedure. Flight Manual Part I states: By accepting a visual approach; the flight crew assumes responsibility for terrain and obstacle clearance; and landing at the correct runway. If the flight crew has the airport in sight but cannot see the aircraft to be followed; ATC may clear the aircraft for a visual approach; however; ATC retains separation responsibility. When visually following a preceding aircraft; acceptance of a visual approach clearance constitutes acceptance of flight crew responsibility for maintaining a safe approach interval and adequate wake turbulence separation (AIM). That last sentence confirms we followed proper procedure. The Captain called Company and spoke to the Duty Manager. The Captain then called TRACON and spoke to the supervisor (who did not have first-hand knowledge of the situation). The TRACON supervisor said the involved Controller was off shift at the time of the phone call.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.