Narrative:

En route to our planned destination; we inadvertently landed at a similar looking airport short of our intended destination. I was pilot in command and the pilot flying. My first officer was the pilot not flying. The flight was uneventful until about 70 DME from the VOR flying at 9;000 ft; when ATC asked us to slow to 210 KTS for an aircraft in our vicinity. We complied and I briefed the visual approach to [runway] 15 backed up by the ILS [runway] 15. At about 60 DME; ATC ordered us to descend to 7;000 ft. The first officer read back the descent; requested and was granted permission to resume normal speed. He set 7;000 ft in the altitude alerter and I confirmed it. He stated he would be off the ATC frequency to make the cabin descent announcement. I acknowledged and monitored ATC. As we passed through 8;000 ft; he returned to the ATC communications. I stated; 'no changes; 8 for 7.' center called with a frequency change. My first officer read back; changed frequency; and checked in. The controller issued a descent to 3;000 ft at pilot's discretion. I continued the descent and called for the descent checklist; which the first officer completed. At approximately 30 DME from airport or 23 NM from VOR; I saw what I believed was runway 15 at my destination. The approach lights were lit and the runway lights were set to medium intensity. I began slowing the aircraft and stated; 'I have the field; when you are ready; and you can call the field.' my first officer advised ATC we had field in sight. We were cleared for a visual approach to our destination; advised; 'no known or observed traffic in the area; radar service is terminated. Report IFR cancellation this frequency; or; if unable; through flight service. Frequency change approved.' the first officer read back the clearance and I turned on the wing light (to note approach clearance). I then ordered 1;600 ft (pattern altitude) to be set in the altitude alerter and my first officer did. At 22 DME from the airport; 15 NM from the VOR; we set the navigation radios to the localizer frequency. I asked for; and we completed; the approach checklist. At that moment; our DME showed 13 NM from i-lch and our speed was about 180 KTS. I said; 'let them (CTAF traffic) know we are 7 out.' in my head; I was still subtracting 7 NM from the DME value as if we were still set on the VOR. My first officer made the call stating our position and our intentions to overfly to join a left downwind for [runway] 15. An unidentified aircraft asked us to repeat the call and the first officer did. The aircraft did not reply; so first officer queried him. The aircraft report he was 2 miles west of the field; at 1;200 ft; on left downwind for runway 33. I did not see any aircraft outside or on TCAS. Believing we were only 3 to 4 miles apart laterally and less than 500 ft above; I initiated a left turn to get away from the traffic. The other aircraft stated he was 'heading south' and would let us 'go first.' I rolled out heading 330. Since we were already positioned for a downwind; I told my first officer I would make right traffic for [runway] 15; which he announced on CTAF. I called for flaps 15 and gear down while on the downwind. At the 45 degree point; I called for; 'flaps 20; before landing checklist leaving pattern altitude.' first officer set the flaps and completed the checklist as I rolled out on base. On base; at about 1;100 ft; the aircraft was fully configured; on speed (vapr; 121 KIAS); vertical speed 800-900 FPM. My HSI was showing full scale 'fly left' as was expected for right traffic. It also showed an erratic 'fly up' indication. Flying perpendicular to the final approach course and above the glide slope (had I been on final); I believed I was getting a false glide slope indication as the PAPI still showed me above glide slope. I turned final slightly early and rolled out on a 5-10 degree intercept. The HSI still indicated 'fly left' with the erratic glide slope. The aircraft was still in a position to landby making normal corrections. Fully aligned at 600 ft; I was on speed; on the PAPI's glide slope; vsi 700 FPM. I saw the runway numbers and continued. On rollout; after locking the controls; first officer said; 'this isn't our destination.' I began looking for the turn off and noted there were no 'high speed' taxiways. At that moment I knew we had landed at the wrong airport. I taxied clear onto the parallel taxiway and called for the after landing checklist. The ramp was unlit and without marshals; so I chose to remain on the taxiway. The first officer consulted the chart and determined we were at a nearby airport. I set the parking brake; and called flight service. I told fight service we were on the ground; that it was the incorrect airport; and canceled IFR. My next call was to dispatch to inform them. I kept the passengers on the aircraft while dispatch worked out the logistics for the passengers. Many phone calls were made between dispatch; the chief pilot; and me. We made at least three pas to the passengers and; with guidance from the chief pilot; I also went into the cabin to talk to the passengers directly. An hour later we had taxied onto the ramp; offloaded the bags; and began de-planing the passengers. On scene to assist were at least two airport ramp workers. Factors that contributed to my error include: 1) similar airport layouts -- both have runway 15; ramps; and rotating beacon similarly located. 2) no radar service below 3;000 ft. 3) standard routing has aircraft flying within 1 to 2 miles [of] this airport at low altitude. 4) unexpected traffic in the pattern; traffic which presumably had turned on the lights and this airport's runway lights were illuminated. 5) my confusion regarding the DME distance.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A flight crew reported landing at an incorrect airport at night after they confused the airports; because of runway orientation; lighting; and no recent night landings at the destination.

Narrative: En route to our planned destination; we inadvertently landed at a similar looking airport short of our intended destination. I was pilot in command and the pilot flying. My First Officer was the pilot not flying. The flight was uneventful until about 70 DME from the VOR flying at 9;000 FT; when ATC asked us to slow to 210 KTS for an aircraft in our vicinity. We complied and I briefed the visual approach to [Runway] 15 backed up by the ILS [Runway] 15. At about 60 DME; ATC ordered us to descend to 7;000 FT. The First Officer read back the descent; requested and was granted permission to resume normal speed. He set 7;000 FT in the altitude alerter and I confirmed it. He stated he would be off the ATC frequency to make the cabin descent announcement. I acknowledged and monitored ATC. As we passed through 8;000 FT; he returned to the ATC communications. I stated; 'No changes; 8 for 7.' Center called with a frequency change. My First Officer read back; changed frequency; and checked in. The Controller issued a descent to 3;000 FT at pilot's discretion. I continued the descent and called for the descent checklist; which the First Officer completed. At approximately 30 DME from airport or 23 NM from VOR; I saw what I believed was Runway 15 at my destination. The approach lights were lit and the runway lights were set to medium intensity. I began slowing the aircraft and stated; 'I have the field; when you are ready; and you can call the field.' My First Officer advised ATC we had field in sight. We were cleared for a visual approach to our destination; advised; 'No known or observed traffic in the area; radar service is terminated. Report IFR cancellation this frequency; or; if unable; through Flight Service. Frequency change approved.' The First Officer read back the clearance and I turned on the wing light (to note approach clearance). I then ordered 1;600 FT (pattern altitude) to be set in the altitude alerter and my First Officer did. At 22 DME from the airport; 15 NM from the VOR; we set the NAV radios to the LOC frequency. I asked for; and we completed; the approach checklist. At that moment; our DME showed 13 NM from I-LCH and our speed was about 180 KTS. I said; 'Let them (CTAF traffic) know we are 7 out.' In my head; I was still subtracting 7 NM from the DME value as if we were still set on the VOR. My First Officer made the call stating our position and our intentions to overfly to join a left downwind for [Runway] 15. An unidentified aircraft asked us to repeat the call and the First Officer did. The aircraft did not reply; so First Officer queried him. The aircraft report he was 2 miles west of the field; at 1;200 FT; on left downwind for Runway 33. I did not see any aircraft outside or on TCAS. Believing we were only 3 to 4 miles apart laterally and less than 500 FT above; I initiated a left turn to get away from the traffic. The other aircraft stated he was 'heading south' and would let us 'go first.' I rolled out heading 330. Since we were already positioned for a downwind; I told my First Officer I would make right traffic for [Runway] 15; which he announced on CTAF. I called for flaps 15 and gear down while on the downwind. At the 45 degree point; I called for; 'Flaps 20; before landing checklist leaving pattern altitude.' First Officer set the flaps and completed the checklist as I rolled out on base. On base; at about 1;100 FT; the aircraft was fully configured; on speed (Vapr; 121 KIAS); vertical speed 800-900 FPM. My HSI was showing full scale 'fly left' as was expected for right traffic. It also showed an erratic 'fly up' indication. Flying perpendicular to the final approach course and above the glide slope (had I been on final); I believed I was getting a false glide slope indication as the PAPI still showed me above glide slope. I turned final slightly early and rolled out on a 5-10 degree intercept. The HSI still indicated 'fly left' with the erratic glide slope. The aircraft was still in a position to landby making normal corrections. Fully aligned at 600 FT; I was on speed; on the PAPI's glide slope; VSI 700 FPM. I saw the runway numbers and continued. On rollout; after locking the controls; First Officer said; 'This isn't our destination.' I began looking for the turn off and noted there were no 'high speed' taxiways. At that moment I knew we had landed at the wrong airport. I taxied clear onto the parallel taxiway and called for the after landing checklist. The ramp was unlit and without marshals; so I chose to remain on the taxiway. The First Officer consulted the chart and determined we were at a nearby airport. I set the parking brake; and called Flight Service. I told Fight Service we were on the ground; that it was the incorrect airport; and canceled IFR. My next call was to Dispatch to inform them. I kept the passengers on the aircraft while Dispatch worked out the logistics for the passengers. Many phone calls were made between Dispatch; the Chief Pilot; and me. We made at least three PAs to the passengers and; with guidance from the Chief Pilot; I also went into the cabin to talk to the passengers directly. An hour later we had taxied onto the ramp; offloaded the bags; and began de-planing the passengers. On scene to assist were at least two airport ramp workers. Factors that contributed to my error include: 1) Similar airport layouts -- both have Runway 15; ramps; and rotating beacon similarly located. 2) No radar service below 3;000 FT. 3) Standard routing has aircraft flying within 1 to 2 miles [of] this airport at low altitude. 4) Unexpected traffic in the pattern; traffic which presumably had turned on the lights and this airport's runway lights were illuminated. 5) My confusion regarding the DME distance.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.