37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 968987 |
Time | |
Date | 201108 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Dusk |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Landing |
Flight Plan | None |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Main Gear |
Person 1 | |
Function | Instructor |
Qualification | Flight Crew Flight Instructor |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150 Flight Crew Total 3300 Flight Crew Type 66 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
During departure it was noticed that the left main gear light was not showing down and locked. An emergency was declared with approach and a diversion was made to a nearby airport due to the availability of emergency response. Multiple low passes were accomplished in an attempt to ascertain the status of the left main gear. Tower; airport operations; and another pilot transmitted; 'gear appears to be down.' another pilot even went so far as to ask if we had tried to switch out the bulbs (which is listed on the checklist). However; a left gear down and locked light was still not illuminated. After a final attempt and significant yawing of the aircraft; the left main gear light illuminated. We waited for emergency personnel to arrive on scene before attempting the landing. The landing was made without any further incident; except that on taxiing off the runway; it was noted that the left main strut was now exposed through the wing. Apparently; one of the gear mounting bolts had sheared off and caused the failure. It remains unclear as to the ultimate cause of the failure. We surmise that potential fatigue from a previous hard landing(s) had caused damage in the gear mount assembly; but we have no way to confirm this. Human performance considerations in aviation; there is a lot at stake; not the least of which includes operational; career; and also personal liability. I believe that because there is such a fear of potential liability that pilots cover up mistakes that can ultimately lead to problems for others. In my particular case; if there was a previous hard landing that could have damaged the gear; it is very easy to see how a pilot out of fear of consequence; could very easily have left the problem for the next pilot. This fear leads to a less safe operating environment in general. Yes; there needs to be accountability; but not to such an extent that fear of it ultimately leads to everyone looking out for themselves and a system that punishes honesty. The fear of liability is so prevalent that on discussion with other pilots after the incident; a few had even asked why I landed at that particular airport instead of the home airport; where the FSDO is known to be less 'strict.' I had not considered this at all in my decision making sequence; and I am glad that I had not. Imagine the degradation to safety of an operation that now starts to consider the implications of landing at an airport under the jurisdiction of a FSDO with a 'strict' reputation. Dealing with the issue at hand no longer becomes the issue; but rather the implications of the aftermath.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PA28 Flight Instructor described a landing gear failure that resulted in damage to the left wing. A strut mounting bolt had sheared off resulting in an initial unsafe gear indication and the strut punching through the wing during landing.
Narrative: During departure it was noticed that the left main gear light was not showing down and locked. An emergency was declared with Approach and a diversion was made to a nearby airport due to the availability of emergency response. Multiple low passes were accomplished in an attempt to ascertain the status of the left main gear. Tower; Airport Operations; and another pilot transmitted; 'gear appears to be down.' Another pilot even went so far as to ask if we had tried to switch out the bulbs (which is listed on the checklist). However; a left gear down and locked light was still not illuminated. After a final attempt and significant yawing of the aircraft; the left main gear light illuminated. We waited for emergency personnel to arrive on scene before attempting the landing. The landing was made without any further incident; except that on taxiing off the runway; it was noted that the left main strut was now exposed through the wing. Apparently; one of the gear mounting bolts had sheared off and caused the failure. It remains unclear as to the ultimate cause of the failure. We surmise that potential fatigue from a previous hard landing(s) had caused damage in the gear mount assembly; but we have no way to confirm this. Human Performance Considerations In aviation; there is a lot at stake; not the least of which includes operational; career; and also personal liability. I believe that because there is such a fear of potential liability that pilots cover up mistakes that can ultimately lead to problems for others. In my particular case; if there was a previous hard landing that could have damaged the gear; it is very easy to see how a pilot out of fear of consequence; could very easily have left the problem for the next pilot. This fear leads to a less safe operating environment in general. Yes; there needs to be accountability; but not to such an extent that fear of it ultimately leads to everyone looking out for themselves and a system that punishes honesty. The fear of liability is so prevalent that on discussion with other pilots after the incident; a few had even asked why I landed at that particular airport instead of the home airport; where the FSDO is known to be less 'strict.' I had not considered this at all in my decision making sequence; and I am glad that I had not. Imagine the degradation to safety of an operation that now starts to consider the implications of landing at an airport under the jurisdiction of a FSDO with a 'strict' reputation. Dealing with the issue at hand no longer becomes the issue; but rather the implications of the aftermath.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.