Narrative:

Notified maintenance that the green hydraulic system appeared over-serviced. Maintenance came out; after a delay; and confirmed over-service. Their procedure was to station one mechanic in the cockpit to monitor ECAM quantity; operate yellow pump and ptu; communicating via walkie-talkie with mechanic at left main landing gear who bled hydraulic fluid from the 'appropriate' system. A fluid spill inevitably occurred; twice; and it is likely the wrong system was first serviced; due to inconsistencies concerning how the mechanic in the cockpit had to come down to the main gear to talk with the mechanic servicing the systems; despite both having an operating radio and talking with each other. Company management appears more concerned with an 'on-time' departure than encouraging front-line employees to do procedures in a correct manner. This behavior is reinforced from the executive level. The attitude expressed by one of the mechanics (a supervisor) who stated to me that it was okay to go with the quantity indicating all the way up to the shut-off valve indication on the ECAM. I told him that our procedure was only to notify maintenance and not to diagnose the problem. The fact that maintenance went ahead and lowered the hydraulic quantity tells me that he did not fully understand why maintenance was performed; much less knowing the correct procedure. I observed the correct procedure on the same issue accomplished the previous day. Lower gear doors and correct over-service at the reservoir; minimizing risk of bleeding wrong system and spillage. Time to do it right: ten minutes; time to do it wrong: twenty-five minutes; minimum.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Captain reports a hydraulic fluid spill after informing Maintenance that the Green Hydraulic system is over serviced; maintenance attempts to 'bleed' the system.

Narrative: Notified Maintenance that the green hydraulic system appeared over-serviced. Maintenance came out; after a delay; and confirmed over-service. Their procedure was to station one mechanic in the cockpit to monitor ECAM quantity; operate Yellow pump and PTU; communicating via walkie-talkie with mechanic at left main landing gear who bled hydraulic fluid from the 'appropriate' system. A fluid spill inevitably occurred; twice; and it is likely the wrong system was first serviced; due to inconsistencies concerning how the mechanic in the cockpit had to come down to the main gear to talk with the mechanic servicing the systems; despite both having an operating radio and talking with each other. Company management appears more concerned with an 'on-time' departure than encouraging front-line employees to do procedures in a correct manner. This behavior is reinforced from the executive level. The attitude expressed by one of the mechanics (a supervisor) who stated to me that it was okay to go with the quantity indicating all the way up to the shut-off valve indication on the ECAM. I told him that our procedure was only to notify maintenance and not to diagnose the problem. The fact that maintenance went ahead and lowered the hydraulic quantity tells me that he did not fully understand why maintenance was performed; much less knowing the correct procedure. I observed the correct procedure on the same issue accomplished the previous day. Lower gear doors and correct over-service at the reservoir; minimizing risk of bleeding wrong system and spillage. Time to do it right: ten minutes; Time to do it wrong: twenty-five minutes; minimum.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.