Narrative:

Aircraft returned to gate in las for APU bleed leak and right wing leak. Once at the gate maintenance took time to trouble shoot aircraft and indicated that they needed parts to make repair. Time was spent trying to locate parts in las. We were told that if parts could not be located in las that they would have to be flown in from and would not arrive until xa:00 local time the next morning. Later we were informed parts had been found in las and repairs were being made. When I received the log book back and the new release I found that repairs had not been made; that the parts located were not correct parts and that an MEL was being placed on the right pack to clear the write up(s). I could find no maintenance corrective procedures to clear the APU bleed leak other than signing it off as part of the right pack MEL. After passengers were boarded and the door closed for push back we received an APU bleed leak ECAM. We called the jetway back as well as maintenance. During the maintenance trouble shooting a passenger disruption ensued. After some time maintenance came back with grounding the aircraft and seeking another aircraft for the flight. The original desire to dispatch the aircraft with minimal maintenance input and a lack of correct parts seems to be at the root of what happened. Several bits of incorrect information filtered its way to the crew and passengers (via the company through dispatch and maintenance control) as to what was really happening to the aircraft. In the end; maintenance control's desire to defer and dispatch seems to have back fired on them. Additionally; in light of the current court order to not interrupt the company's operations; as well as recent chief pilot interviews for maintenance write ups I felt undue intimidation and pressure to not question a supposed 'legal aircraft' which has resulted in pilot suspensions and loss of pay as a result of questioning maintenance sign offs and or procedures. The sign off for the APU bleed leak turned out to be an issue not resolved by the MEL of a pack but a separate issue not addressed by maintenance and most likely the result of a bleed management computer problem. I do not think line maintenance had anything to do with the decision not to repair; MEL or otherwise keep the aircraft in service. They were under pressure as well; I believe; from higher ups to keep the metal moving. Left to themselves and without pressure to keep things moving; our maintenance personnel do a good job. This is a systemic problem at our company that starts with upper managements desire to maximize revenues while paying lip service to safety issues. Any subordinate concern for safety is met with intimidation; harassment and threats to one's livelihood. There is no partnership in safety here; it is only threats and intimidation that starts at the highest levels of management!the causes of this situation are numerous. The loss of captain's authority. The lack of a safety culture. The existence of a threatening; harassing and intimidating management style the likes of which I have not seen in my 30 plus years as a professional aviator!I suggest this company lacks a sincere desire to work as safety partners with the pilots and maintenance personnel. Such a spirit is needed as soon as possible. We need to restore confidence in management that they have safety as a top priority in actions and spirit--not just in words or lip service.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A321 Captain utilized an attempt to dispatch his aircraft with unresolved pneumatic system anomalies as a springboard to address what he believes to be an overreaching culture of intimidation and demands to dispatch aircraft against the professional judgment of the flight crews and maintenance personnel.

Narrative: Aircraft returned to gate in LAS for APU Bleed Leak and Right Wing Leak. Once at the gate maintenance took time to trouble shoot aircraft and indicated that they needed parts to make repair. Time was spent trying to locate parts in LAS. We were told that if parts could not be located in LAS that they would have to be flown in from and would not arrive until XA:00 local time the next morning. Later we were informed parts had been found in LAS and repairs were being made. When I received the log book back and the new release I found that repairs had not been made; that the parts located were not correct parts and that an MEL was being placed on the Right Pack to clear the write up(s). I could find no maintenance corrective procedures to clear the APU Bleed Leak other than signing it off as part of the Right Pack MEL. After passengers were boarded and the door closed for push back we received an APU Bleed Leak ECAM. We called the jetway back as well as maintenance. During the maintenance trouble shooting a passenger disruption ensued. After some time maintenance came back with grounding the aircraft and seeking another aircraft for the flight. The original desire to dispatch the aircraft with minimal maintenance input and a lack of correct parts seems to be at the root of what happened. Several bits of incorrect information filtered its way to the crew and passengers (via the company through dispatch and Maintenance Control) as to what was really happening to the aircraft. In the end; Maintenance Control's desire to defer and dispatch seems to have back fired on them. Additionally; in light of the current court order to not interrupt the company's operations; as well as recent Chief Pilot interviews for maintenance write ups I felt undue intimidation and pressure to not question a supposed 'legal aircraft' which has resulted in pilot suspensions and loss of pay as a result of questioning maintenance sign offs and or procedures. The sign off for the APU Bleed leak turned out to be an issue not resolved by the MEL of a Pack but a separate issue not addressed by maintenance and most likely the result of a Bleed Management Computer problem. I do not think line maintenance had anything to do with the decision not to repair; MEL or otherwise keep the aircraft in service. They were under pressure as well; I believe; from higher ups to keep the metal moving. Left to themselves and without pressure to keep things moving; our maintenance personnel do a good job. This is a systemic problem at our company that starts with upper managements desire to maximize revenues while paying lip service to safety issues. Any subordinate concern for safety is met with intimidation; harassment and threats to one's livelihood. There is no partnership in safety here; it is only threats and intimidation that starts at the highest levels of management!The causes of this situation are numerous. The loss of Captain's authority. The lack of a safety culture. The existence of a threatening; harassing and intimidating management style the likes of which I have not seen in my 30 plus years as a professional aviator!I suggest this company lacks a sincere desire to work as safety partners with the pilots and maintenance personnel. Such a spirit is needed ASAP. We need to restore confidence in management that they have safety as a top priority in actions and spirit--not just in words or lip service.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.