Narrative:

This leg was both the captain's and my first leg using the new procedures. I have had additional training because I did not feel comfortable after the cbt alone; the captain has not; although he had requested it before this trip. On taxi out; when we got to 'autothrottles' on the checklist; the captain seemed confused that the auto-throttle switch was already on. I saw his confusion and explained the switch is now left on all the time. I did not pick that up myself during the cbt; it was something I was told during my additional training. The captain was truly surprised and wondered what else he had missed in his cbt training. This is a short leg; so we didn't have much time for discussion; but I did point out some of the things I had learned that were somewhat buried in the procedures. For example; I pointed out that the auto-throttle switch is not turned off on a windshear recovery. We discussed the new go-around procedures and call outs and the new callouts on approaches. We noted that at GS intercept; the book doesn't address what altitude to set. The more we talked; the more concerned and distracted the captain became. On arrival into the destination area; we had to shoot a non-precision approach to the localizer 27. The cloud deck on the descent was about 2;000 ft; so while still VFR at the field; we were shooting an actual localizer for part of the approach (vs. A visual). There was conversation in the descent as the captain tried to ascertain what the callouts were; when the checklists were supposed to be started and finished; new checklist responses; reviewing the new go-around procedure; all the while shooting an approach. He was clearly uncomfortable. As I said; I received additional training; so I felt reasonably confident that I knew the new procedures. The captain had lots of questions; as he had only had the cbt training; and we both became distracted on the approach. It is a very short taxi from the runway to the gate in this city. I tried to accomplish all my after landing and parking flows as expeditiously and correctly as possible. I had made myself index cards to back myself up once the aircraft was parked and was using those as well. Of note; the flight manager who gave me the additional training recommended that I fly with the new flow charts out. That idea made me uncomfortable. It doesn't seem I should be reading a flow chart as I'm doing a flow. It seems to me to defeat the purpose of a 'flow.' once we parked and completed the parking checklist; the captain stated in no uncertain terms that he could not safely continue on the trip. He felt he definitely needed additional training. I elected to continue on the trip as I had received additional training and I felt reasonably confident in my knowledge. An important point to note; which was made abundantly clear to me on this leg; is the huge impact seemingly small changes have in the cockpit environment. Pilots use switches (such as the auto-throttle switch and the lights) as memory joggers for certain things (cleared for takeoff or cleared to land; for example). If you take away that switch for that pilot without allowing him to figure out a new memory-jogger; you have distracted him. Seemingly minor changes in callouts or checklists are distractions. Suddenly; all attention is focused on that distraction and the big picture starts to fade out of view. Cadences are also very important for pilots. We practice them over and over and over so we can do critical procedures effortlessly; focusing on the greater issue at hand (which probably led to the critical procedure; as in a go-around.) if we have to focus on the new cadence we are losing sight of the big picture. If we don't practice these events as a crew; as we have always done at the previous air carrier up to this point (in my time here); we are losing valuable training. The flight manager had told me and others; (paraphrasing) 'don't worry; you're not going to bend metal over these changes. You know how tofly the airplane just fly like you always have.' but the reality is that attempting to implement these changes can lead to distractions; and distractions are often causal factors in mishaps. That is something for me to worry about.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 crew reported feeling ill prepared to safely fly their aircraft after completing only CBT training in merged air carrier procedures which were vastly different from previous procedures.

Narrative: This leg was both the Captain's and my first leg using the new procedures. I have had additional training because I did not feel comfortable after the CBT alone; the Captain has not; although he had requested it before this trip. On taxi out; when we got to 'autothrottles' on the checklist; the Captain seemed confused that the auto-throttle switch was already on. I saw his confusion and explained the switch is now left on all the time. I did not pick that up myself during the CBT; it was something I was told during my additional training. The Captain was truly surprised and wondered what else he had missed in his CBT training. This is a short leg; so we didn't have much time for discussion; but I did point out some of the things I had learned that were somewhat buried in the procedures. For example; I pointed out that the auto-throttle switch is not turned off on a windshear recovery. We discussed the new go-around procedures and call outs and the new callouts on approaches. We noted that at GS intercept; the book doesn't address what altitude to set. The more we talked; the more concerned and distracted the Captain became. On arrival into the destination area; we had to shoot a non-precision approach to the LOC 27. The cloud deck on the descent was about 2;000 FT; so while still VFR at the field; we were shooting an actual localizer for part of the approach (vs. a visual). There was conversation in the descent as the Captain tried to ascertain what the callouts were; when the checklists were supposed to be started and finished; new checklist responses; reviewing the new go-around procedure; all the while shooting an approach. He was clearly uncomfortable. As I said; I received additional training; so I felt reasonably confident that I knew the new procedures. The Captain had lots of questions; as he had only had the CBT training; and we both became distracted on the approach. It is a very short taxi from the runway to the gate in this city. I tried to accomplish all my after landing and parking flows as expeditiously and correctly as possible. I had made myself index cards to back myself up once the aircraft was parked and was using those as well. Of note; the Flight Manager who gave me the additional training recommended that I fly with the new flow charts out. That idea made me uncomfortable. It doesn't seem I should be reading a flow chart as I'm doing a flow. It seems to me to defeat the purpose of a 'flow.' Once we parked and completed the parking checklist; the Captain stated in no uncertain terms that he could not safely continue on the trip. He felt he definitely needed additional training. I elected to continue on the trip as I had received additional training and I felt reasonably confident in my knowledge. An important point to note; which was made abundantly clear to me on this leg; is the huge impact seemingly small changes have in the cockpit environment. Pilots use switches (such as the auto-throttle switch and the lights) as memory joggers for certain things (cleared for takeoff or cleared to land; for example). If you take away that switch for that pilot without allowing him to figure out a new memory-jogger; you have distracted him. Seemingly minor changes in callouts or checklists are distractions. Suddenly; all attention is focused on that distraction and the big picture starts to fade out of view. Cadences are also very important for pilots. We practice them over and over and over so we can do critical procedures effortlessly; focusing on the greater issue at hand (which probably led to the critical procedure; as in a go-around.) If we have to focus on the new cadence we are losing sight of the big picture. If we don't practice these events as a crew; as we have always done at the previous air carrier up to this point (in my time here); we are losing valuable training. The Flight Manager had told me and others; (paraphrasing) 'Don't worry; you're not going to bend metal over these changes. You know how tofly the airplane just fly like you always have.' But the reality is that attempting to implement these changes can lead to distractions; and distractions are often causal factors in mishaps. That is something for me to worry about.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.