Narrative:

I departed bwi to ferry the aircraft (empty part 91) to the company hub in columbus, oh. I used the opportunity to practice single engine operations as there was very little if any traffic at that time in the morning. On climb out, I reduced power on the left engine and slowly climbed out with the gear down to study the performance (aircraft known for poor southeast performance). The departure controller asked if I had a problem. I informed him that I had the power reduced on the left engine and was just ferrying the aircraft. (I did not inform him that I was training.) I did say that the power reduction was not a problem. I practiced fuel xfeeding & took notes of the different configns and performance (working for a part 135 operation and flying nightly scheduled runs, there is not much opportunity for southeast training. This afforded an excellent chance to train VFR, empty and in no rush). After approximately 45 mins I increased the power on the left engine and it only came up to 19' mp. (Later found to be a frayed throttle cable hanging up in a gromet.) as 18.20' mp is long range cruise on the small transport I set 19' mp in both engines and continued. I did not feel it was a good idea to return to bwi during the airline rush. Shortly after this the controller requested a good rate climb for traffic. I informed him I was doing the best I could. He then gave me a vector for the traffic. As the WX was very VFR, and everything working fine at long range cruise, I cancelled IFR and continued VFR to columbus so as to reduce controller workload. At columbus, I requested VFR vectors for a southeast ILS approach, shut down the left engine (for more practice) and shot the ILS approach and landing. I taxied of the runway, started up the left engine and taxied into the FBO. Due to a call from dulles departure, 2 members of the columbus GADO met me at the aircraft with the belief that I was heavily overloaded. I was in fact empty, doing practice southeast training, and flying at long range cruise. I have been informed by my chief pilot that the GADO has taken exception to my actions but GADO will not discuss it with me. Problems: if I had better informed the controller of my training actions, he would have been less concerned. If the controller had questioned had my actions a little more instead of making false conclusions, he would have been less concerned. If the GADO would take more time to discuss problems with pilots, instead of jumping to legal actions. The pilots would be better informed with less animosity to the FAA.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SINGLE PLT GA SMT CONDUCTED SINGLE ENGINE CLIMB AND CRUISE WITHOUT NOTIFYING ATC. POOR ACFT PERFORMANCE CAUSED ATC TO REPORT FLT VARIATION TO LOCAL GADO FOR INVESTIGATION.

Narrative: I DEPARTED BWI TO FERRY THE ACFT (EMPTY PART 91) TO THE COMPANY HUB IN COLUMBUS, OH. I USED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRACTICE SINGLE ENG OPS AS THERE WAS VERY LITTLE IF ANY TFC AT THAT TIME IN THE MORNING. ON CLBOUT, I REDUCED PWR ON THE LEFT ENG AND SLOWLY CLBED OUT WITH THE GEAR DOWN TO STUDY THE PERFORMANCE (ACFT KNOWN FOR POOR SE PERFORMANCE). THE DEP CTLR ASKED IF I HAD A PROB. I INFORMED HIM THAT I HAD THE PWR REDUCED ON THE LEFT ENG AND WAS JUST FERRYING THE ACFT. (I DID NOT INFORM HIM THAT I WAS TRNING.) I DID SAY THAT THE PWR REDUCTION WAS NOT A PROB. I PRACTICED FUEL XFEEDING & TOOK NOTES OF THE DIFFERENT CONFIGNS AND PERFORMANCE (WORKING FOR A PART 135 OPERATION AND FLYING NIGHTLY SCHEDULED RUNS, THERE IS NOT MUCH OPPORTUNITY FOR SE TRNING. THIS AFFORDED AN EXCELLENT CHANCE TO TRAIN VFR, EMPTY AND IN NO RUSH). AFTER APPROX 45 MINS I INCREASED THE PWR ON THE LEFT ENG AND IT ONLY CAME UP TO 19' MP. (LATER FOUND TO BE A FRAYED THROTTLE CABLE HANGING UP IN A GROMET.) AS 18.20' MP IS LONG RANGE CRUISE ON THE SMT I SET 19' MP IN BOTH ENGS AND CONTINUED. I DID NOT FEEL IT WAS A GOOD IDEA TO RETURN TO BWI DURING THE AIRLINE RUSH. SHORTLY AFTER THIS THE CTLR REQUESTED A GOOD RATE CLB FOR TFC. I INFORMED HIM I WAS DOING THE BEST I COULD. HE THEN GAVE ME A VECTOR FOR THE TFC. AS THE WX WAS VERY VFR, AND EVERYTHING WORKING FINE AT LONG RANGE CRUISE, I CANCELLED IFR AND CONTINUED VFR TO COLUMBUS SO AS TO REDUCE CTLR WORKLOAD. AT COLUMBUS, I REQUESTED VFR VECTORS FOR A SE ILS APCH, SHUT DOWN THE LEFT ENG (FOR MORE PRACTICE) AND SHOT THE ILS APCH AND LNDG. I TAXIED OF THE RWY, STARTED UP THE LEFT ENG AND TAXIED INTO THE FBO. DUE TO A CALL FROM DULLES DEP, 2 MEMBERS OF THE COLUMBUS GADO MET ME AT THE ACFT WITH THE BELIEF THAT I WAS HEAVILY OVERLOADED. I WAS IN FACT EMPTY, DOING PRACTICE SE TRNING, AND FLYING AT LONG RANGE CRUISE. I HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY MY CHIEF PLT THAT THE GADO HAS TAKEN EXCEPTION TO MY ACTIONS BUT GADO WILL NOT DISCUSS IT WITH ME. PROBS: IF I HAD BETTER INFORMED THE CTLR OF MY TRNING ACTIONS, HE WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS CONCERNED. IF THE CTLR HAD QUESTIONED HAD MY ACTIONS A LITTLE MORE INSTEAD OF MAKING FALSE CONCLUSIONS, HE WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS CONCERNED. IF THE GADO WOULD TAKE MORE TIME TO DISCUSS PROBS WITH PLTS, INSTEAD OF JUMPING TO LEGAL ACTIONS. THE PLTS WOULD BE BETTER INFORMED WITH LESS ANIMOSITY TO THE FAA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.