Narrative:

Our flight was approaching lax; with the weather 1/2 mile fog; variable 200 ft ceiling; 5;000 RVR. We elected to do an autoland since the weather could potentially have worsened. This was the first time we tried to use the new procedures for CAT III autoland. We had both read the autoland procedures but still were uncomfortable doing so to a non-visual approach. Prior to smo we were given 25L. We briefed for this approach; but shortly after crossing smo; ATC changed the runway to 24R. We reconfigured and briefed again for this approach. About the time we expected a right base for the approach; we were again changed to 24L. We told ATC we needed to have a delaying vector to reinstall this approach plus; we thought at the time; there was a NOTAM saying 24L was closed. We proceeded downwind several miles while we briefed; finally letting him give us a right base turn. We could not receive an ident on the ILS and asked ATC if the runway was open and if we could do an autoland. ATC was overloaded (he was controlling both approach sectors) and didn't respond immediately. When asked again; he said that 24L was not going to work and asked if we could intercept 24R. At that point; we asked for re-sequencing which we were given. Then we were given 25L again. We briefed for that; were cleared for the approach to 25L and did an autoland. However; on short final; the #1 center electric hydraulic pump failed; adding to the distractions. We elected to land in this configuration; with a normal autoland and taxi off. During this whole situation; I was distracted by trying to remember my call outs for the new procedures. This sounds like minor stuff; but there is no muscle memory for doing the new approach. Every other time we changed procedures to this degree we practiced them in the simulator. Now; we were doing this for real in a really challenging environment for the first time. I find this lowered the level of safety to an extraordinary degree. I thought we were put in a very compromised position to complete this approach doing new procedures for the first time. Those of you who signed off on this 'virtual' training for these new procedures; should be ashamed of yourselves. This training is not training at all but checking to sign us off in order to meet some nebulous timeline. I have never felt so unprepared and so unsupported by my company to handle the task before me. I feel this is a failure of flight operations management in conjunction with the FAA.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 Captain expressed concern that the Flight Crew's attempts to employ newly instituted SOPs were a distraction during a complex IMC CAT III approach and autoland. The Captain believed the lack of any hands on simulator training using the new SOPs and callouts; etc. degraded the level of safety when their first use of them was under actual conditions. Several approach and runway reassignments plus the failure of a Center Hydraulic System electric pump late in the approach added to the confusion.

Narrative: Our flight was approaching LAX; with the weather 1/2 mile fog; variable 200 FT ceiling; 5;000 RVR. We elected to do an autoland since the weather could potentially have worsened. This was the first time we tried to use the new procedures for CAT III autoland. We had both read the autoland procedures but still were uncomfortable doing so to a non-visual approach. Prior to SMO we were given 25L. We briefed for this approach; but shortly after crossing SMO; ATC changed the runway to 24R. We reconfigured and briefed again for this approach. About the time we expected a right base for the approach; we were again changed to 24L. We told ATC we needed to have a delaying vector to reinstall this approach plus; we thought at the time; there was a NOTAM saying 24L was closed. We proceeded downwind several miles while we briefed; finally letting him give us a right base turn. We could not receive an ident on the ILS and asked ATC if the runway was open and if we could do an autoland. ATC was overloaded (he was controlling both approach sectors) and didn't respond immediately. When asked again; he said that 24L was not going to work and asked if we could intercept 24R. At that point; we asked for re-sequencing which we were given. Then we were given 25L again. We briefed for that; were cleared for the approach to 25L and did an autoland. However; on short final; the #1 center electric hydraulic pump failed; adding to the distractions. We elected to land in this configuration; with a normal autoland and taxi off. During this whole situation; I was distracted by trying to remember my call outs for the new procedures. This sounds like minor stuff; but there is no muscle memory for doing the new approach. Every other time we changed procedures to this degree we practiced them in the simulator. Now; we were doing this for real in a really challenging environment for the first time. I find this lowered the level of safety to an extraordinary degree. I thought we were put in a very compromised position to complete this approach doing new procedures for the first time. Those of you who signed off on this 'virtual' training for these new procedures; should be ashamed of yourselves. This training is not training at all but checking to sign us off in order to meet some nebulous timeline. I have never felt so unprepared and so unsupported by my company to handle the task before me. I feel this is a failure of Flight Operations Management in conjunction with the FAA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.