A B757 EICAS alerted le slat asym after takeoff so the crew referenced a new unfamiliar QRH procedur...

Narrative:

Shortly after take off we received a 'le slat asym' EICAS message accompanied by the 'leading edge' warning light. The QRH was referenced. However; unfamiliarity with the checklist due to having received no training in the actual execution of this required us to enter holding. We spent approximately 30 minutes in holding. Neither of us had had ever seen this particular checklist and it turns out the procedures in this checklist were vastly different from the checklist that we had been extensively trained on both in the classroom as well as the simulator at the training center. It took all of 30 minutes to figure out that after I completed step 10; where it said 'checklist complete' I needed to go back to step 3 where it told me to configure the aircraft using the alternate flaps and to use flaps 20 for landing. I don't think this was intuitive. We both figured this out in spite of having received no training in the actual use of this checklist. The checklist was handed back and forth until we were sure that was what it wanted us to do. After we were satisfied we had correctly performed the procedures; I took control of the aircraft. First officer read the approach descent checklist from the cockpit card which I responded to. Then; I realized we needed to use the approach descent checklist from the QRH which was now called 'deferred items.' this mistake was not surprising since neither of us received any training in the actual execution of this checklist and this was the first time either of us had done this procedure. Landing and roll out were uneventful. We had declared an emergency and fire trucks were there to meet us. Cockpit and cabin crews worked very well to prepare for the emergency and to keep the cabin informed of our status. Support from the flight office and mechanics was excellent. I can't stress enough how inadequate training - and read that as none - exacerbated the stress level of what I feel should have been a routine emergency. The cockpit is not the place to be interpreting procedures nor figuring out what they mean. Both me and my first officer are trained professionals with tens of thousands of hours in worldwide experience. We deserve more support. We shouldn't have to figure out what a checklist means while holding at 7;000 ft.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 EICAS alerted LE SLAT ASYM after takeoff so the crew referenced a new unfamiliar QRH procedure which caused stress and frustration while completing what should have been a simple procedure.

Narrative: Shortly after take off we received a 'LE SLAT ASYM' EICAS message accompanied by the 'LEADING EDGE' warning light. The QRH was referenced. However; unfamiliarity with the Checklist due to having received no training in the actual execution of this required us to enter holding. We spent approximately 30 minutes in holding. Neither of us had had ever seen this particular Checklist and it turns out the procedures in this checklist were vastly different from the Checklist that we had been extensively trained on both in the classroom as well as the simulator at the training center. It took all of 30 minutes to figure out that after I completed step 10; where it said 'Checklist Complete' I needed to go back to step 3 where it told me to configure the aircraft using the alternate flaps and to use flaps 20 for landing. I don't think this was intuitive. We both figured this out in spite of having received no training in the actual use of this checklist. The Checklist was handed back and forth until we were sure that was what it wanted us to do. After we were satisfied we had correctly performed the procedures; I took control of the aircraft. First Officer read the Approach Descent Checklist from the cockpit card which I responded to. Then; I realized we needed to use the Approach Descent Checklist from the QRH which was now called 'Deferred items.' This mistake was not surprising since neither of us received any training in the actual execution of this checklist and this was the first time either of us had done this procedure. Landing and roll out were uneventful. We had declared an emergency and fire trucks were there to meet us. Cockpit and cabin crews worked very well to prepare for the emergency and to keep the cabin informed of our status. Support from the flight office and mechanics was excellent. I can't stress enough how inadequate training - and read that as none - exacerbated the stress level of what I feel should have been a routine emergency. The cockpit is not the place to be interpreting procedures nor figuring out what they mean. Both me and my First Officer are trained professionals with tens of thousands of hours in worldwide experience. We deserve more support. We shouldn't have to figure out what a checklist means while holding at 7;000 FT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	975909
Time
Date	201110
Local Time Of Day	0601-1200
Place
Locale Reference	ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference	US
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Initial Climb
Flight Plan	IFR
Component
Aircraft Component	Leading Edge Slat
Person 1
Function	Captain Pilot Not Flying
Qualification	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 400 Flight Crew Total 18000 Flight Crew Type 10000
Events
Anomaly	Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A B757 EICAS alerted le slat asym after takeoff so the crew referenced a new unfamiliar QRH procedure which caused stress and frustration while completing what should have been a simple procedure.