37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 976253 |
Time | |
Date | 201110 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.TRACON |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Flap/Slat Control System |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
While on a long vector to final approach with the airfield in sight; we were cleared a visual approach very early. At about 230 KTS; I commanded 'below 280; slats extend' and then disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles. The first officer confirmed the airspeed and then moved the flap/slat handle to the '0/extend' position. The slat 'disagree' and 'stall indication failure' lights both illuminated. I called for both checklists and the first officer read through each checklist to completion in a timely manner. From the beginning of this malfunction; I considered a go-around to give us more time before landing. Both checklists were completed and the aircraft stabilized on final approach well before landing. I felt that adding a minimum fuel state to our current situation was unnecessary. I landed the aircraft uneventfully.I should have declared an emergency for this malfunction. I was initially focused on getting the correct checklist run and monitoring our pace to determine if a go-around would be necessary. As the situation progressed; it became clear that there would be no need for extra vectors. We were visual for landing many miles out. Once the checklists were completed and the aircraft stabilized on final; I shifted to concentrating on the landing. The aircraft had no controllability problems. On very short final; I realized we had not declared an emergency; but to do so now would compromise safety by introducing unnecessary distraction at a critical phase of flight. After landing; there was no point in declaring an emergency for a flight control malfunction. I have learned from this experience and in the future I will make sure that this declaration is made in a timely manner.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An MD-80 flight crew reported leading edge slat disagree problem on initial slat extension. The procedures were run and a normal landing ensued; but the Captain regretted not declaring an emergency.
Narrative: While on a long vector to final approach with the airfield in sight; we were cleared a visual approach very early. At about 230 KTS; I commanded 'Below 280; Slats Extend' and then disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles. The First Officer confirmed the airspeed and then moved the Flap/Slat handle to the '0/Extend' position. The slat 'Disagree' and 'Stall Indication Failure' lights both illuminated. I called for both checklists and the First Officer read through each checklist to completion in a timely manner. From the beginning of this malfunction; I considered a go-around to give us more time before landing. Both checklists were completed and the aircraft stabilized on final approach well before landing. I felt that adding a minimum fuel state to our current situation was unnecessary. I landed the aircraft uneventfully.I should have declared an emergency for this malfunction. I was initially focused on getting the correct checklist run and monitoring our pace to determine if a go-around would be necessary. As the situation progressed; it became clear that there would be no need for extra vectors. We were visual for landing many miles out. Once the checklists were completed and the aircraft stabilized on final; I shifted to concentrating on the landing. The aircraft had no controllability problems. On very short final; I realized we had not declared an emergency; but to do so now would compromise safety by introducing unnecessary distraction at a critical phase of flight. After landing; there was no point in declaring an emergency for a flight control malfunction. I have learned from this experience and in the future I will make sure that this declaration is made in a timely manner.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.