Narrative:

While taxiing in first officer shut down engine (1) as instructed by captain. A few seconds later; as we were about to enter ramp; a triple chime with a fire bell was sounded for engine (1). The captain stopped the aircraft; called for the immediate action checklist for engine fire/severe damage. I initially started to read the checklist for engine fire/severe damage in-flight. I quickly realized my mistake and read the checklist for engine fire severe damage on ground. We ran the checklist; the thrust lever was already shut-off and the fuel pumps were already off because the #1 engine had just been secured. I depressed the engine fire push button per the checklist and the fire warning indications ceased. No squibs were discharged. We informed ramp tower of the situation and we were told no smoke or fire was visible coming from our aircraft by another aircraft located next to us on the ramp. Captain taxied the aircraft to the gate; asked a ramp worker who was standing just outside the cockpit to view the #1 engine for fire and/or damage. The ramp worker advised of smoke and possible fuel leaking. We instructed ramp tower to send fire rescue to our location and instructed the passengers and crew to exit the aircraft. Captain and I shut the aircraft down and completed the shutdown checklist. We did not start the APU or hook up to electrical ground power. Maintenance personnel arrived and took control of the aircraft. Getting a fire warning triple chime with the fire bell was not expected after shutting down the #1 engine. Adding to the confusion of running the correct checklist was the fact that the aircraft was just about to enter the ramp and I was in the process of changing frequencies and clearing traffic to the right of the aircraft. We did not declare an emergency or evacuate the aircraft on the ramp. While taxiing to the gate; after the checklist was completed; we had no fire warning indications and the aircraft next to us had not observed any smoke or fire coming from the #1 engine. The captain felt that evacuating on the ramp was more of a threat to the passengers' safety than proceeding to the gate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-701 First Officer reported a fire warning on engine #1 after securing the engine on taxi-in. The procedure was followed; and passengers deplaned through the aircraft door at the gate.

Narrative: While taxiing in First Officer shut down ENG (1) as instructed by Captain. A few seconds later; as we were about to enter ramp; a triple chime with a fire bell was sounded for ENG (1). The Captain stopped the aircraft; called for the Immediate Action Checklist for ENG FIRE/Severe Damage. I initially started to read the checklist for ENG FIRE/Severe Damage IN-FLIGHT. I quickly realized my mistake and read the checklist for ENG FIRE Severe Damage ON GROUND. We ran the checklist; the thrust lever was already SHUT-OFF and the fuel pumps were already OFF because the #1 engine had just been secured. I depressed the ENG FIRE PUSH button per the checklist and the fire warning indications ceased. No squibs were discharged. We informed Ramp Tower of the situation and we were told no smoke or fire was visible coming from our aircraft by another aircraft located next to us on the ramp. Captain taxied the aircraft to the gate; asked a ramp worker who was standing just outside the cockpit to view the #1 engine for fire and/or damage. The ramp worker advised of smoke and possible fuel leaking. We instructed Ramp Tower to send FIRE RESCUE to our location and instructed the passengers and crew to exit the aircraft. Captain and I shut the aircraft down and completed the shutdown checklist. We did not start the APU or hook up to electrical ground power. Maintenance personnel arrived and took control of the aircraft. Getting a Fire Warning triple chime with the fire bell was not expected AFTER shutting down the #1 engine. Adding to the confusion of running the correct checklist was the fact that the aircraft was just about to enter the ramp and I was in the process of changing frequencies and clearing traffic to the right of the aircraft. We did not declare an emergency or evacuate the aircraft on the ramp. While taxiing to the gate; after the checklist was completed; we had no fire warning indications and the aircraft next to us had not observed any smoke or fire coming from the #1 engine. The Captain felt that evacuating on the ramp was more of a threat to the passengers' safety than proceeding to the gate.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.