Narrative:

During this session; very busy; with an emergency; multiple aircraft; who don't speak english very well; multiple request for practice approaches; difficult situations standard for this position; keyboard malfunction; in which caused my entry into at least 4 to 6 data blocks to be incorrect and had to be fixed; and it was my last position for the day; after a quick turn around. I was extremely tired. Aircraft X was north bound and needed to be descended to 9;000 by the next controller. When I left him at 13;000; I thought that that might be a problem; however; it is not a mandatory thing that the south controller descend him. Finally relief arrived; during the briefing; lear departed and I elect to turn him north to proceed west; point out to the north controller and climbed him to 13;000; give the briefing to the receiving controller and I totally forgot about the northbound aircraft X; then cleared the lear left westbound; I got out of the position and let the receiving controller take over; still forgetting about aircraft X and then the north controller said 'hey watch out for aircraft Y'; the receiving controller did what he could but we only had 2.8 m between them. This was my fault; completely for not checking for all the aircraft that were in my airspace and completely forgetting about aircraft X; however after a session like that at the end of a long 36 hours; I was in too much of a hurry to get out. I believe that supervision at our facility needs to pay more attention to the rotation of who needs a break first; and not to leave anyone longer than an hour; even if it is only 5 minutes break. Recommendation; double check your airspace and don't be in a hurry to stand up. Supervisors need to pay more attention to who has had the roughest time in the last hour and get them some relief as soon as possible; even if it is only long enough to go to the restroom and grab a cup of coffee.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TRACON Controller described a loss of separation event listing multiple factors that led the event; fatigue; following a quick turn around; as the predominate factor.

Narrative: During this session; very busy; with an emergency; multiple aircraft; who don't speak English very well; multiple request for practice approaches; difficult situations standard for this position; keyboard malfunction; in which caused my entry into at least 4 to 6 data blocks to be incorrect and had to be fixed; and it was my last position for the day; after a quick turn around. I was extremely tired. Aircraft X was north bound and needed to be descended to 9;000 by the next controller. When I left him at 13;000; I thought that that might be a problem; however; it is not a mandatory thing that the South Controller descend him. Finally relief arrived; during the briefing; Lear departed and I elect to turn him north to proceed west; point out to the North Controller and climbed him to 13;000; give the briefing to the receiving controller and I totally forgot about the northbound Aircraft X; then cleared the Lear left westbound; I got out of the position and let the receiving controller take over; still forgetting about Aircraft X and then the North Controller said 'hey watch out for Aircraft Y'; the receiving controller did what he could but we only had 2.8 m between them. This was my fault; completely for not checking for all the aircraft that were in my airspace and completely forgetting about Aircraft X; however after a session like that at the end of a long 36 hours; I was in too much of a hurry to get out. I believe that supervision at our facility needs to pay more attention to the rotation of who needs a break first; and not to leave anyone longer than an hour; even if it is only 5 minutes break. Recommendation; DOUBLE CHECK your airspace and don't be in a hurry to stand up. Supervisors need to pay more attention to who has had the roughest time in the last hour and get them some relief ASAP; even if it is only long enough to go to the restroom and grab a cup of coffee.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.