Narrative:

Passengers arrived 45 minutes late for proposed mid afternoon departure. No pressure from passenger although he was going to be late for an appointment at his final destination. Crew briefed the dalton departure for 19 and was prepared for it; but on departure received the RUUDY2 departure off runway 24. Crew briefed the departure headings; bearings and altitude restrictions. I was pilot flying and after rotation and liftoff; I reduced power below mcr; as is normal in this aircraft. The initial climb on a heading of 240 was limited to 1;500 MSL and an intercept of the 260 course to wentz before turning and continuing climb. At the 400 ft call by the pilot not flying; I called for the flaps up and after takeoff flow; and as we did this; we both missed the 1;000 ft to go call. The sun was in my eyes right after rotation from the left side of the windshield and I raise my right hand to block the sun to see the primary display. I had my sunglasses on and with the sun on the left in the climb attitude; it was nearly impossible to see the display. After completing the after takeoff flow; the pilot not flying called out 'altitude'. I immediately brought my right hand back to the thrust levers; reduced thrust to idle and lowered the nose to stop the climb. I stopped the climb at 2;000 MSL and immediately returned to 1;500 MSL before reaching the 260 course intercept point to wentz. After wentz; we continued the climb per the departure. Having my hand up and off the thrust levers slowed my reaction time to further reduce throttle lever angle after my initial reduction; which would have been prudent due to the aggressive climb rate of the this aircraft. In reviewing the situation; we both determined it would have been best to stay in the to configuration; other than raising the gear. This would have kept both our heads up to better monitor the altitude restrictions; particularly since the initial restriction was so low. We could then have completed the after takeoff flow after instructed to climb further into the departure procedure. I also should have paid more attention to the position of the sun on departure. Had I done that; I would have worn a hat or visor for protection. The major factors in this event; was our lack of making the 1;000 ft to go call due to the simultaneous calling of the flaps up and after takeoff flow; and the distraction from the sun blocking my vision of the display which delayed my further reduction of the thrust right after the initial climb. In the future; more time will be taken to discuss any possible external influences that might affect a particular phase of flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A high performance aircraft departed on the TEB RUUDY 2 departure and exceeded 1;500 FT after becoming overloaded with after takeoff tasks and the sun angle directly in the Captain's eyes.

Narrative: Passengers arrived 45 minutes late for proposed mid afternoon departure. No pressure from passenger although he was going to be late for an appointment at his final destination. Crew briefed the DALTON departure for 19 and was prepared for it; but on departure received the RUUDY2 departure off Runway 24. Crew briefed the departure headings; bearings and altitude restrictions. I was pilot flying and after rotation and liftoff; I reduced power below MCR; as is normal in this aircraft. The initial climb on a heading of 240 was limited to 1;500 MSL and an intercept of the 260 course to WENTZ before turning and continuing climb. At the 400 FT call by the pilot not flying; I called for the flaps up and after takeoff flow; and as we did this; we both missed the 1;000 FT to go call. The sun was in my eyes right after rotation from the left side of the windshield and I raise my right hand to block the sun to see the primary display. I had my sunglasses on and with the sun on the left in the climb attitude; it was nearly impossible to see the display. After completing the after takeoff flow; the pilot not flying called out 'Altitude'. I immediately brought my right hand back to the thrust levers; reduced thrust to idle and lowered the nose to stop the climb. I stopped the climb at 2;000 MSL and immediately returned to 1;500 MSL before reaching the 260 course intercept point to WENTZ. After WENTZ; we continued the climb per the departure. Having my hand up and off the thrust levers slowed my reaction time to further reduce throttle lever angle after my initial reduction; which would have been prudent due to the aggressive climb rate of the this aircraft. In reviewing the situation; we both determined it would have been best to stay in the TO configuration; other than raising the gear. This would have kept both our heads up to better monitor the altitude restrictions; particularly since the initial restriction was so low. We could then have completed the after takeoff flow after instructed to climb further into the departure procedure. I also should have paid more attention to the position of the sun on departure. Had I done that; I would have worn a hat or visor for protection. The major factors in this event; was our lack of making the 1;000 FT to go call due to the simultaneous calling of the flaps up and after takeoff flow; and the distraction from the sun blocking my vision of the display which delayed my further reduction of the thrust right after the initial climb. In the future; more time will be taken to discuss any possible external influences that might affect a particular phase of flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.