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When; shortly after takeoff; they were cleared direct to cri by the tower while departing jfk via the kennedy SID; canarsie climb; an erj first officer attempted to program and execute the clearance promptly but without confirming it with the captain. Instead; as the FMS was sequencing the SID turn direct cri the first officer inadvertently selected the subsequent fix and executed it causing their turn to bypass cri rather than pass over it.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 982325 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201112 |
| Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | JFK.Airport |
| State Reference | NY |
| Environment | |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | Regional Jet CL65 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Climb Initial Climb |
| Route In Use | SID Kennedy One |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Component | |
| Aircraft Component | FMS/FMC |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
| Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250 Flight Crew Total 18000 Flight Crew Type 5000 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Track / Heading All Types Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
Flight was assigned kennedy one departure; canarsie climb from runway 31L full length. I was the pilot flying. Departure was briefed at gate with no questions. After 'gear in transit' call I called speed and navigation modes while hand flying. Almost immediately after takeoff; at approximately 500 AGL; the tower cleared us direct cri; contact departure. Simultaneously; the FMS directed a turn direct cri. Immediately after the tower gave direct cri clearance; the pilot not flying 'without command'; at approximately 800 AGL; attempted to bring cri up to the next fix position in the FMS and executed it 'without' verification from the other crewmember.direct cri was already in the next fix position; what the non-flying pilot did was bring the fix after cri up to the next position and execute without verification. This caused us to turn early or bypass cri by approximately two miles. Due to the critical and high workload phase of flight and the reconfiguring of the aircraft after takeoff; along with departure instructions to correct transponder code; we were unable to correct the course deviation or correct the FMS entry immediately. As the pilot not flying was unaware of his error the time was not appropriate to explain. We were given a radar vector from departure and the flight continued without incident. ATC never questioned our position or course and no conflict was evident. Once out of 10K I reprogrammed the departure in the FMS and explained the error to the pilot not flying. I also reminded him of our SOP of verifying any and all FMS entries!this is a simple avoidance suggestion. Comply with company SOP! Had the first officer verified FMS entry before execution with other crewmember no course deviation would have occurred.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: When; shortly after takeoff; they were cleared direct to CRI by the Tower while departing JFK via the Kennedy SID; CANARSIE CLIMB; an ERJ First Officer attempted to program and execute the clearance promptly but without confirming it with the Captain. Instead; as the FMS was sequencing the SID turn direct CRI the First Officer inadvertently selected the subsequent fix and executed it causing their turn to bypass CRI rather than pass over it.
Narrative: Flight was assigned Kennedy One Departure; Canarsie climb from Runway 31L full length. I was the pilot flying. Departure was briefed at gate with no questions. After 'gear in transit' call I called SPEED and NAV Modes while hand flying. Almost immediately after takeoff; at approximately 500 AGL; the Tower cleared us direct CRI; contact Departure. Simultaneously; the FMS directed a turn direct CRI. Immediately after the Tower gave direct CRI clearance; the pilot not flying 'without command'; at approximately 800 AGL; attempted to bring CRI up to the next fix position in the FMS and executed it 'without' verification from the other crewmember.Direct CRI was already in the next fix position; what the non-flying pilot did was bring the fix after CRI up to the next position and execute without verification. This caused us to turn early or bypass CRI by approximately two miles. Due to the critical and high workload phase of flight and the reconfiguring of the aircraft after takeoff; along with departure instructions to correct transponder code; we were unable to correct the course deviation or correct the FMS entry immediately. As the pilot not flying was unaware of his error the time was not appropriate to explain. We were given a radar vector from Departure and the flight continued without incident. ATC never questioned our position or course and no conflict was evident. Once out of 10K I reprogrammed the departure in the FMS and explained the error to the pilot not flying. I also reminded him of our SOP of verifying any and all FMS entries!This is a simple avoidance suggestion. Comply with company SOP! Had the First Officer verified FMS entry BEFORE execution with other crewmember no course deviation would have occurred.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.