Narrative:

On initial climb out from dsm we received clearance to climb and a clearance to turn on course involving a 180 degree turn to intercept an arwy. The clearance was received, as happens many times, on the initial radio check in with departure control. We were at approximately 2500' AGL during flight regime when the aircraft is changing confign (flap confign change and accelerating). The captain acknowledged the climb with what I believe was a readback for 11000' and set 11000' in the altitude alert window. Through 10000 for 11000', I called out '10 for 11' and began transition to level off. At exactly 10700' MSL captain said, 'air carrier 11XY about to level at 11,' the genteel request for higher altitude. Controller replied 'air carrier 11XY, maintain 1-0-thousand as assigned.' contributing factors: it is apparent to me after considerable thought (about which I will elaborate further later) that initial climb out is a much higher psychological workload environment that is perceived. We received a clearance with several components, components which appeared in the following order: a steep turn, a heading and an altitude. In assimilating information exchange, we all subconsciously prioritize the information. A course reversal of 180 degrees which I am mentally about to execute is a much bigger deal than continuing to climb to an altitude some 7000' and several mins away. Thus, that is what my brain focused on. Contributing to our faulty acknowledgement was the fact that the altitude as received from the controller did not register with me. My internalization was derived from the captain's faulty readback, not the actual clearance issuance. Further our callsign was '11XY,' further complicating the old psychological mind trick confusion that ASRS picked out early in your program. The disproportionately high number of altitude mistakes involving 10000 and 11000'. As you pointed out in a 'callback' bulletin many yrs ago, many old time controllers (not many of them left these days) always issue clrncs to 10000 or 11000' with a redundant clearance: 'air carrier 11XY climb and maintain 10, 1-0-thousand,' or 'climb and maintain 11, 1-1-thousand.' ever since reading that, I have made it standard procedure for myself to acknowledge clrncs in exactly that manner. Perhaps thought should be given to make controllers' procedures conform to that usage. After flying with this guy for 2 days it is clear I need to personally back up all cockpit activities. It's my fault too--I should be doing that 100.1% of the time anyway. Trust is great, but we're all human and some airmen are more human than others. This month will be great captain training for me. To add to above--I never thought climb out was psychologically overloading, but by definition it must be. Before becoming a professional airman, I was a professional radio-telegraph operator at the third busiest marine radio station in the world. I simply never miss radio calls even when we're engaged in cockpit conversation--except on reflection, I note that when I'm PF, I miss initial radio call altitude assignment, as in this incident, fully 1/4-1/3 of the time. If I do it that often, then most guys who don't have the benefit of my background, must miss it 50% of the time. I will be doubly attentive in the future during this phase of flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT MISUNDERSTOOD CLRNC AND CLBED ABOVE ASSIGNED ALT.

Narrative: ON INITIAL CLBOUT FROM DSM WE RECEIVED CLRNC TO CLB AND A CLRNC TO TURN ON COURSE INVOLVING A 180 DEG TURN TO INTERCEPT AN ARWY. THE CLRNC WAS RECEIVED, AS HAPPENS MANY TIMES, ON THE INITIAL RADIO CHK IN WITH DEP CTL. WE WERE AT APPROX 2500' AGL DURING FLT REGIME WHEN THE ACFT IS CHANGING CONFIGN (FLAP CONFIGN CHANGE AND ACCELERATING). THE CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLB WITH WHAT I BELIEVE WAS A READBACK FOR 11000' AND SET 11000' IN THE ALT ALERT WINDOW. THROUGH 10000 FOR 11000', I CALLED OUT '10 FOR 11' AND BEGAN TRANSITION TO LEVEL OFF. AT EXACTLY 10700' MSL CAPT SAID, 'ACR 11XY ABOUT TO LEVEL AT 11,' THE GENTEEL REQUEST FOR HIGHER ALT. CTLR REPLIED 'ACR 11XY, MAINTAIN 1-0-THOUSAND AS ASSIGNED.' CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: IT IS APPARENT TO ME AFTER CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT (ABOUT WHICH I WILL ELABORATE FURTHER LATER) THAT INITIAL CLBOUT IS A MUCH HIGHER PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKLOAD ENVIRONMENT THAT IS PERCEIVED. WE RECEIVED A CLRNC WITH SEVERAL COMPONENTS, COMPONENTS WHICH APPEARED IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER: A STEEP TURN, A HDG AND AN ALT. IN ASSIMILATING INFO EXCHANGE, WE ALL SUBCONSCIOUSLY PRIORITIZE THE INFO. A COURSE REVERSAL OF 180 DEGS WHICH I AM MENTALLY ABOUT TO EXECUTE IS A MUCH BIGGER DEAL THAN CONTINUING TO CLB TO AN ALT SOME 7000' AND SEVERAL MINS AWAY. THUS, THAT IS WHAT MY BRAIN FOCUSED ON. CONTRIBUTING TO OUR FAULTY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WAS THE FACT THAT THE ALT AS RECEIVED FROM THE CTLR DID NOT REGISTER WITH ME. MY INTERNALIZATION WAS DERIVED FROM THE CAPT'S FAULTY READBACK, NOT THE ACTUAL CLRNC ISSUANCE. FURTHER OUR CALLSIGN WAS '11XY,' FURTHER COMPLICATING THE OLD PSYCHOLOGICAL MIND TRICK CONFUSION THAT ASRS PICKED OUT EARLY IN YOUR PROGRAM. THE DISPROPORTIONATELY HIGH NUMBER OF ALT MISTAKES INVOLVING 10000 AND 11000'. AS YOU POINTED OUT IN A 'CALLBACK' BULLETIN MANY YRS AGO, MANY OLD TIME CTLRS (NOT MANY OF THEM LEFT THESE DAYS) ALWAYS ISSUE CLRNCS TO 10000 OR 11000' WITH A REDUNDANT CLRNC: 'ACR 11XY CLB AND MAINTAIN 10, 1-0-THOUSAND,' OR 'CLB AND MAINTAIN 11, 1-1-THOUSAND.' EVER SINCE READING THAT, I HAVE MADE IT STANDARD PROC FOR MYSELF TO ACKNOWLEDGE CLRNCS IN EXACTLY THAT MANNER. PERHAPS THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO MAKE CTLRS' PROCS CONFORM TO THAT USAGE. AFTER FLYING WITH THIS GUY FOR 2 DAYS IT IS CLEAR I NEED TO PERSONALLY BACK UP ALL COCKPIT ACTIVITIES. IT'S MY FAULT TOO--I SHOULD BE DOING THAT 100.1% OF THE TIME ANYWAY. TRUST IS GREAT, BUT WE'RE ALL HUMAN AND SOME AIRMEN ARE MORE HUMAN THAN OTHERS. THIS MONTH WILL BE GREAT CAPT TRNING FOR ME. TO ADD TO ABOVE--I NEVER THOUGHT CLBOUT WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY OVERLOADING, BUT BY DEFINITION IT MUST BE. BEFORE BECOMING A PROFESSIONAL AIRMAN, I WAS A PROFESSIONAL RADIO-TELEGRAPH OPERATOR AT THE THIRD BUSIEST MARINE RADIO STATION IN THE WORLD. I SIMPLY NEVER MISS RADIO CALLS EVEN WHEN WE'RE ENGAGED IN COCKPIT CONVERSATION--EXCEPT ON REFLECTION, I NOTE THAT WHEN I'M PF, I MISS INITIAL RADIO CALL ALT ASSIGNMENT, AS IN THIS INCIDENT, FULLY 1/4-1/3 OF THE TIME. IF I DO IT THAT OFTEN, THEN MOST GUYS WHO DON'T HAVE THE BENEFIT OF MY BACKGROUND, MUST MISS IT 50% OF THE TIME. I WILL BE DOUBLY ATTENTIVE IN THE FUTURE DURING THIS PHASE OF FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.