Narrative:

Ongoing safety and regulatory hazard at jra heliport in manhattan; nyc:1) windsock lighting inoperative for weeks; not NOTAM'd nor repaired as of [report date]2) wind azimuth reporting equipment; or at least the line service personnel's broadcast of same over the CTAF; is typically in error by 60 to 100 degrees3) heliport obstruction lighting inoperative for at least two weeks; not NOTAM'd nor repaired as of report date. This is a safety hazard since pilots could mistakenly make a downwind approach to land; and not know it visually until the last moments when the windsock becomes visible at short range; or not be able to recover from settling with power and contact the pier surface somewhere other than the intended point of landing. Although reported over the air to heliport personnel; and in person verbally; no repair has been made to the azimuth reporting. This is a regulatory hazard for part 135 operators; who require a lighted wind indicator for ops in darkness. Such operators would not know of the condition until arriving with passengers or taking off with them; essentially forcing them to violate the rules since they were not aware from NOTAM's that the lights are inoperative. Hazard reported to company a week ago; dir of operations promised to contact heliport but no further information has been provided on the situation; no NOTAM has appeared; and the lights are still inoperative. Fuel tank and perhaps other obstruction lights are not working and not NOTAM'd.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Helicopter First Officer reports inoperative obstruction and windsock lighting at JRA Heliport; with no NOTAMs issued.

Narrative: Ongoing safety and regulatory hazard at JRA heliport in Manhattan; NYC:1) windsock lighting inoperative for weeks; not NOTAM'd nor repaired as of [report date]2) wind azimuth reporting equipment; or at least the line service personnel's broadcast of same over the CTAF; is typically in error by 60 to 100 degrees3) heliport obstruction lighting inoperative for at least two weeks; not NOTAM'd nor repaired as of report date. This is a safety hazard since pilots could mistakenly make a downwind approach to land; and not know it visually until the last moments when the windsock becomes visible at short range; or not be able to recover from settling with power and contact the pier surface somewhere other than the intended point of landing. Although reported over the air to heliport personnel; and in person verbally; no repair has been made to the azimuth reporting. This is a regulatory hazard for Part 135 operators; who require a lighted wind indicator for ops in darkness. Such operators would not know of the condition until arriving with passengers or taking off with them; essentially forcing them to violate the rules since they were not aware from NOTAM's that the lights are inoperative. Hazard reported to company a week ago; Dir of Operations promised to contact heliport but no further information has been provided on the situation; no NOTAM has appeared; and the lights are still inoperative. Fuel tank and perhaps other obstruction lights are not working and not NOTAM'd.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.