Aus controllers provided a witness account of a near midair collision noting 'visual separation' pro...

Narrative:

I witnessed a near mid-air collision (near midair collision) today due to a controller not ensuring separation; and also due to a misapplication of visual separation. The radar east (re) controller had a commander flying north-south circuits taking pictures. A MD88 departed aus; was turned east; and was issued a climb to 12;000. At some point re issued traffic to the commander on the MD88; and then instructed the commander to 'maintain visual separation' from the MD88. The aircraft were wired on intersecting courses. The MD88 was beneath the commander and climbing above the commander. The conflict alert (ca) went off. I started to say something; but heard re acknowledging the RA from the MD88. When the ca sounded; and I noticed this event; the aircraft were at the same altitude with less than 1/2 mile lateral separation. It appeared that the commander took evasive action in order to 'maintain visual separation' from the MD88. This event was logged as a 'Q' entry; but I informed management that this was a near midair collision that should get a little more scrutiny. This is a common practice at aus: 1) turn aircraft right at each other; 2) issue the low aircraft an altitude that is above the level aircraft; 3) issue the slow; level; and least maneuverable aircraft traffic and 'maintain visual separation'; and 4) this essentially requires the aircraft to take evasive action to avoid the climbing air carrier. I have provided previous examples of this; but I have yet to see any action taken at the local level regarding the misapplication of visual separation or the absence of ensured separation 'before and after' the application of visual separation. I wonder what the airlines would think about this situation. Or the passengers that were aboard the MD88 this morning? Why are we (the FAA) allowing controllers to play russian roulette with aircraft full of passengers? Recommendation; enforce the proper use and application of visual separation. Ensure separation before and after the use of visual separation. Quit training new employees the technique that was witnessed this morning.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AUS Controllers provided a witness account of a NMAC noting 'visual separation' procedures used by some controllers at the facility are misapplied; creating a safety situation.

Narrative: I witnessed a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) today due to a Controller not ensuring separation; and also due to a misapplication of Visual Separation. The RADAR East (RE) Controller had a Commander flying north-south circuits taking pictures. A MD88 departed AUS; was turned east; and was issued a climb to 12;000. At some point RE issued traffic to the Commander on the MD88; and then instructed the Commander to 'maintain visual separation' from the MD88. The aircraft were wired on intersecting courses. The MD88 was beneath the Commander and climbing above the Commander. The Conflict Alert (CA) went off. I started to say something; but heard RE acknowledging the RA from the MD88. When the CA sounded; and I noticed this event; the aircraft were at the same altitude with less than 1/2 mile lateral separation. It appeared that the Commander took evasive action in order to 'maintain visual separation' from the MD88. This event was logged as a 'Q' entry; but I informed management that this was a NMAC that should get a little more scrutiny. This is a common practice at AUS: 1) turn aircraft right at each other; 2) issue the low aircraft an altitude that is above the level aircraft; 3) issue the slow; level; and least maneuverable aircraft traffic and 'maintain visual separation'; and 4) this essentially requires the aircraft to take evasive action to avoid the climbing Air Carrier. I have provided previous examples of this; but I have yet to see any action taken at the local level regarding the misapplication of Visual Separation or the absence of ensured separation 'before and after' the application of Visual Separation. I wonder what the airlines would think about this situation. Or the passengers that were aboard the MD88 this morning? Why are we (the FAA) allowing Controllers to play Russian Roulette with aircraft full of passengers? Recommendation; enforce the proper use and application of Visual Separation. Ensure separation before and after the use of Visual Separation. Quit training new employees the technique that was witnessed this morning.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	988258
Time
Date	201201
Local Time Of Day	0001-0600
Place
Locale Reference	AUS.Airport
State Reference	TX
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	MD-88
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Climb
Route In Use	Vectors
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Make Model Name	Rockwell Aero Commander Twin Turboprop Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight Phase	Cruise
Route In Use	None
Flight Plan	VFR
Person 1
Function	Approach Enroute
Qualification	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Person 2
Function	Approach Departure
Qualification	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Events
Anomaly	ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict

Aus controllers provided a witness account of a near midair collision noting 'visual separation' procedures used by some controllers at the facility are misapplied; creating a safety situation.