Narrative:

Reaching the ramp; we were directed to a parking line for use with aircraft stairs. No gpu was present. We parked the aircraft and both engines were shut down. When it was apparent we were not going to get a ground power unit (gpu); we initiated an APU start from battery power. The aircraft power flickered badly when the start was initiated. Numerous EICAS messages filled the screen when it came back on; and we observed the APU egt rising rapidly. One of the ramp personnel outside the captain's window yelled to get our attention; and gave the fire signal. As we looked back at the EICAS we observed an egt overtemp and ran the APU fire epc; shutting down the APU. We never received an APU fire EICAS message. The ramper that had signaled us went toward the back of the aircraft; and we attempted to get the attention of other personnel to ascertain if they observed any further indications of fire. We could not get the attention of any personnel; and the captain had to strobe a flashlight to get someone to come to the window and talk to us. The individual; whom we later found out to be a mechanic; was not aware of what was going on and told us to 'just start it again.' we tried to express our urgency in getting the stairs pushed up to the aircraft so we could open the cabin door and communicate; and a gpu so we didn't drain the batteries and lose all power with passengers on board. I asked the captain if he wanted me to call crash fire rescue (crash fire rescue equipment); he decided it wasn't necessary since we never received a fire message; and the egt had dropped and did not indicate a fire. Finally; the stairs were pushed up to the aircraft; and we were able to communicate with ramp personnel. If we had received further indication of fire and discharged the APU fire bottle; we still would not have had communication with the ramp; and were discussing the possibility of evacuating out the main cabin and service door without stairs; which certainly would have caused injuries. Ramp personnel informed us they had been trained what to do for engine fires; but not APU fires. The aircraft batteries were clearly unable to perform as expected; despite sufficient voltage indications on the mfd. This may or may not have contributed to a faulty start of the APU; causing flames to exit the APU exhaust pipe. With the indication of fire; ramp personnel should have stopped their tasks and moved away from the baggage compartment of the aircraft; and at least one should have stayed in visual and shouting distance from the cockpit to communicate the continuation of fire; or no further indications. With this kind of emergency; the next task should have been to move the stairs into position to facilitate a potential evacuation of the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An EMB145 APU overheated during start and ground personnel indicated a tail pipe fire but did not established direct communications and as the flight crew completed the emergency checklist they were very confused about the aircraft's status.

Narrative: Reaching the ramp; we were directed to a parking line for use with aircraft stairs. No GPU was present. We parked the aircraft and both engines were shut down. When it was apparent we were not going to get a ground power unit (GPU); we initiated an APU start from battery power. The aircraft power flickered badly when the start was initiated. Numerous EICAS messages filled the screen when it came back on; and we observed the APU EGT rising rapidly. One of the ramp personnel outside the Captain's window yelled to get our attention; and gave the fire signal. As we looked back at the EICAS we observed an EGT overtemp and ran the APU FIRE EPC; shutting down the APU. We never received an APU FIRE EICAS message. The Ramper that had signaled us went toward the back of the aircraft; and we attempted to get the attention of other personnel to ascertain if they observed any further indications of fire. We could not get the attention of any personnel; and the Captain had to strobe a flashlight to get someone to come to the window and talk to us. The individual; whom we later found out to be a mechanic; was not aware of what was going on and told us to 'just start it again.' We tried to express our urgency in getting the stairs pushed up to the aircraft so we could open the cabin door and communicate; and a GPU so we didn't drain the batteries and lose all power with passengers on board. I asked the Captain if he wanted me to call Crash Fire Rescue (CFR); he decided it wasn't necessary since we never received a fire message; and the EGT had dropped and did not indicate a fire. Finally; the stairs were pushed up to the aircraft; and we were able to communicate with ramp personnel. If we had received further indication of fire and discharged the APU fire bottle; we still would not have had communication with the ramp; and were discussing the possibility of evacuating out the main cabin and service door without stairs; which certainly would have caused injuries. Ramp personnel informed us they had been trained what to do for engine fires; but not APU fires. The aircraft batteries were clearly unable to perform as expected; despite sufficient voltage indications on the MFD. This may or may not have contributed to a faulty start of the APU; causing flames to exit the APU exhaust pipe. With the indication of fire; ramp personnel should have stopped their tasks and moved away from the baggage compartment of the aircraft; and at least one should have stayed in visual and shouting distance from the cockpit to communicate the continuation of fire; or no further indications. With this kind of emergency; the next task should have been to move the stairs into position to facilitate a potential evacuation of the aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.