37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 99171 |
Time | |
Date | 198811 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : hnl |
State Reference | HI |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 10000 msl bound upper : 10000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zhn tower : sfo |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Widebody, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng |
Navigation In Use | Other |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | enroute : pacific |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : flight engineer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 11000 flight time type : 850 |
ASRS Report | 99171 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
Going through 10000' on climb out, second officer reported fluid loss on system C hydraulic. This was followed by pressure loss in the system. Captain was flying and continued climb out while evaluation of circumstances proceeded. Captain decided to continue to mainland. Flight continued to destination west/O further incident, although equipment was called on landing and tow to gate was necessary (nose wheel steering on system C). My problem with this instance is 2-FOLD. First is the captain's decision to continue based solely on economic and convenience factors. Secondly, the incident should not have occurred since the same problem surfaced (same aircraft, exactly same part failed) 3 days previously, and was given a cheap, expedient fix, which was known at the time would fail again. Both of these factors point to a common cause. Our airline, like many others, is taxed to the limit economically. Operational decisions are being made increasingly on the basis of expense, scheduling reliability, effect on market share, etc, rather than on what is the safest course of action. Pilots are being made to feel real pressure not to write up defects and to continue with unsatisfactory aircraft. Specifically, one pilot was suspended (and would have been fired except for union intervention) for writing up a defect 'too close to departure time.' a direct quote from the vp-operations (said during the effected pilot's job hearing): 'any pilot who writes up a plane and delays a flight will be fired, and I'll make sure they don't get another job in aviation.' this was said before at least 6 people during a formal hearing (instance occurred within last month). This kind of operational environment is just totally unsatisfactory. My only solution to this sort of unsound practice is to re-regulate the airline industry. Passenger may pay more, but then they will get what they pay for.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE, CONTINUED TO DESTINATION.
Narrative: GOING THROUGH 10000' ON CLBOUT, S/O RPTED FLUID LOSS ON SYS C HYD. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY PRESSURE LOSS IN THE SYS. CAPT WAS FLYING AND CONTINUED CLBOUT WHILE EVALUATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES PROCEEDED. CAPT DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO MAINLAND. FLT CONTINUED TO DEST W/O FURTHER INCIDENT, ALTHOUGH EQUIP WAS CALLED ON LNDG AND TOW TO GATE WAS NECESSARY (NOSE WHEEL STEERING ON SYS C). MY PROB WITH THIS INSTANCE IS 2-FOLD. FIRST IS THE CAPT'S DECISION TO CONTINUE BASED SOLELY ON ECONOMIC AND CONVENIENCE FACTORS. SECONDLY, THE INCIDENT SHOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED SINCE THE SAME PROB SURFACED (SAME ACFT, EXACTLY SAME PART FAILED) 3 DAYS PREVIOUSLY, AND WAS GIVEN A CHEAP, EXPEDIENT FIX, WHICH WAS KNOWN AT THE TIME WOULD FAIL AGAIN. BOTH OF THESE FACTORS POINT TO A COMMON CAUSE. OUR AIRLINE, LIKE MANY OTHERS, IS TAXED TO THE LIMIT ECONOMICALLY. OPERATIONAL DECISIONS ARE BEING MADE INCREASINGLY ON THE BASIS OF EXPENSE, SCHEDULING RELIABILITY, EFFECT ON MARKET SHARE, ETC, RATHER THAN ON WHAT IS THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION. PLTS ARE BEING MADE TO FEEL REAL PRESSURE NOT TO WRITE UP DEFECTS AND TO CONTINUE WITH UNSATISFACTORY ACFT. SPECIFICALLY, ONE PLT WAS SUSPENDED (AND WOULD HAVE BEEN FIRED EXCEPT FOR UNION INTERVENTION) FOR WRITING UP A DEFECT 'TOO CLOSE TO DEP TIME.' A DIRECT QUOTE FROM THE VP-OPS (SAID DURING THE EFFECTED PLT'S JOB HEARING): 'ANY PLT WHO WRITES UP A PLANE AND DELAYS A FLT WILL BE FIRED, AND I'LL MAKE SURE THEY DON'T GET ANOTHER JOB IN AVIATION.' THIS WAS SAID BEFORE AT LEAST 6 PEOPLE DURING A FORMAL HEARING (INSTANCE OCCURRED WITHIN LAST MONTH). THIS KIND OF OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IS JUST TOTALLY UNSATISFACTORY. MY ONLY SOLUTION TO THIS SORT OF UNSOUND PRACTICE IS TO RE-REGULATE THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY. PAX MAY PAY MORE, BUT THEN THEY WILL GET WHAT THEY PAY FOR.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.