Narrative:

Flight was day two of a three-day pairing; last leg. The flight was delayed approximately one hour and 20 minutes due to an unscheduled aircraft swap. The first officer was pilot flying. Right at rotation; the left engine compressor stalled with the associated loud bang. We initially thought it was a blown tire until the engine stalled several more times during the initial climb out. The first officer continued to fly as we accomplished the immediate action items for the engine limit/surge/stall checklist and the compressor stalls ceased with the throttle at mid range. We told tower we were an immediate return with an engine malfunction and requested an easterly heading and climb. Tower advised they saw what appeared to be fire/flame from the right engine area. However; I was convinced the #1 engine was the culprit. As the pilot not flying; I never saw an engine over temperature or rollback. The fire and overheat circuits checked good and we elected to leave the engine running in idle and make a single engine landing per the QRH. ATC accommodated a return to runway 25R since it was the longest runway available. Winds were out of the north at eight knots and we were fairly light. I made several pas to the passengers about securing the engine and our intentions to return. The first officer set up for a flaps 15 visual and made a nice approach and landing. Total airborne time was 16 minutes. After landing; I shut down the engine and had the emergency crews check for aircraft damage. No damage was discovered and we taxied to the gate where the passengers deplaned normally.there were several lessons I learned from this event. First; it was very similar to a V1 cut during a pc; night; right at rotation; loud bang etc. However; we weren't in that pc mindset. We were relaxed; last leg; day two; comfortable flying together and definitely not expecting anything unusual. When the bang occurred right at rotation; we thought we had blown a tire. The first officer had recently experienced a blown tire on takeoff and didn't call for the gear; which seemed like the right thing to do at the time. Once we were certain it was an engine problem; we raised the gear. Second; tower's radio call that they saw fire/flame from the right engine added to the initial confusion as to what had happened. When the engine banged a second and third time; I could see a glow from my left window that convinced me we at least had a #1 engine problem; but did we have a dual engine stall or possible FOD? There was a small helmet fire starting in the left seat but the first officer was doing just what he should maintaining aircraft control. We were climbing; so we went with what we knew and took the proper action from there. We ran the checklist for the engine stall and elected to leave the engine running since it was in limits and running. Third; the first officer is experienced and was doing a great job so I let him fly. The fom says the captain will land if an engine is shut down; however; the engine was running in idle. The first officer had everything under control; so I elected to let him continue with the approach and landing. Fourth; communicate with the cabin. We were busy! Right after takeoff a flight attendant rang the cockpit four times wanting to know what was happening. I elected to pass information to the flight attendants and passengers via the PA to save time and brain bites. During my debrief with the flight attendants; I asked them if they felt comfortable and informed with the way I handled the situation; and they said yes. However; this is now something I include in my briefing to them; i.e. How they can expect to get information in a time crunch situation such as right after takeoff.finally; be ready for the unexpected. I found I probably wasn't at the top of my game after a long airport sit before the last leg of the day. It's easy to get complacent. This is the first engine problem I've had outside the simulator after 14 years on line. Analyze the situation/problem. Even though ATC may try and help too much; go with what you know after a thorough discussion with the other pilot; and then take the appropriate action.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 flight crew encountered some confusion and distraction when an engine experienced compressor stalls right at rotation at night. Well intentioned but flawed observations from the Tower Controller contributed to the complexity of resolving the issues as they suggested there may have been problems with both engines.

Narrative: Flight was day two of a three-day pairing; last leg. The flight was delayed approximately one hour and 20 minutes due to an unscheduled aircraft swap. The First Officer was pilot flying. Right at rotation; the left engine compressor stalled with the associated loud bang. We initially thought it was a blown tire until the engine stalled several more times during the initial climb out. The First Officer continued to fly as we accomplished the immediate action items for the Engine Limit/Surge/Stall Checklist and the compressor stalls ceased with the throttle at mid range. We told Tower we were an immediate return with an engine malfunction and requested an easterly heading and climb. Tower advised they saw what appeared to be fire/flame from the right engine area. However; I was convinced the #1 engine was the culprit. As the pilot not flying; I never saw an engine over temperature or rollback. The fire and overheat circuits checked good and we elected to leave the engine running in idle and make a single engine landing per the QRH. ATC accommodated a return to Runway 25R since it was the longest runway available. Winds were out of the north at eight knots and we were fairly light. I made several PAs to the passengers about securing the engine and our intentions to return. The First Officer set up for a flaps 15 visual and made a nice approach and landing. Total airborne time was 16 minutes. After landing; I shut down the engine and had the emergency crews check for aircraft damage. No damage was discovered and we taxied to the gate where the passengers deplaned normally.There were several lessons I learned from this event. First; it was very similar to a V1 cut during a PC; night; right at rotation; loud bang etc. However; we weren't in that PC mindset. We were relaxed; last leg; day two; comfortable flying together and definitely not expecting anything unusual. When the bang occurred right at rotation; we thought we had blown a tire. The First Officer had recently experienced a blown tire on takeoff and didn't call for the gear; which seemed like the right thing to do at the time. Once we were certain it was an engine problem; we raised the gear. Second; Tower's radio call that they saw fire/flame from the right engine added to the initial confusion as to what had happened. When the engine banged a second and third time; I could see a glow from my left window that convinced me we at least had a #1 engine problem; but did we have a dual engine stall or possible FOD? There was a small helmet fire starting in the left seat but the First Officer was doing just what he should maintaining aircraft control. We were climbing; so we went with what we knew and took the proper action from there. We ran the checklist for the engine stall and elected to leave the engine running since it was in limits and running. Third; the First Officer is experienced and was doing a great job so I let him fly. The FOM says the Captain will land if an engine is shut down; however; the engine was running in idle. The First Officer had everything under control; so I elected to let him continue with the approach and landing. Fourth; communicate with the cabin. We were busy! Right after takeoff a flight attendant rang the cockpit four times wanting to know what was happening. I elected to pass information to the flight attendants and passengers via the PA to save time and brain bites. During my debrief with the flight attendants; I asked them if they felt comfortable and informed with the way I handled the situation; and they said yes. However; this is now something I include in my briefing to them; i.e. how they can expect to get information in a time crunch situation such as right after takeoff.Finally; be ready for the unexpected. I found I probably wasn't at the top of my game after a long airport sit before the last leg of the day. It's easy to get complacent. This is the first engine problem I've had outside the simulator after 14 years on line. Analyze the situation/problem. Even though ATC may try and help too much; go with what you know after a thorough discussion with the other pilot; and then take the appropriate action.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.