Narrative:

Approximately 10 minutes prior to top of descent it was noticed that the yellow low oil pressure light was illuminated. Closer analysis showed that the oil pressure of the left was only slightly lower than the right and the oil temperatures were only slightly higher on the left side compared to the right. However the large difference being the oil quantity on the left side was 0. At this point I pulled the QRH from my bag; and did a transfer of control from captain to first officer occurred turning to the engine tab and page I read aloud the 767 version of the checklist. It was then that the captain and I discussed nearest suitable airport options. It became obvious that our filed destination at this time would be the suitable option. At this time the captain also discussed his thoughts that once the engines steady state condition was altered. It was likely that we would have to proceed with engine shutdown. At this time I got weather for the airport. Because +RA was reported on the ATIS I radioed ahead and got a real time weather observation from operations. Assured that the weather had moved off the field and east we continued. At this time the captain was briefing the flight attendants of the likelihood of an engine shutdown and details of approach and landing. Just before top of descent the captain asked me to declare an emergency with center. I did so; and we were given clearance to descend. With the power reduction came the red annunciator box around the oil pressure indicator; and the engine failure or shutdown checklist was immediately run. A more direct routing was given to us with deviations north (left) as required for weather. The weather at the time was standard fare for this airport with the heaviest portion to the south and east. Notably our escape intentions to the east northeast in the event of a go around were discussed. We were given a clearance to descend from 5;000 to 3;000; and a radio change. Looking back I remember numerous frequency changes interrupting completion of checklists. The localizer was captured at 3;000 ft outside the final approach fix and it was apparent we would enter some IMC conditions during the approach followed by visual conditions before landing. We were cleared for the approach. Final configuration began and I was heads down finishing up checklist requirements. The aircraft was fully configured and stabilized. It was somewhere between 3;000 ft and 1;500 ft that the weather conditions degraded rapidly; and I looked up and began to notice mainly our speed was deteriorating. All concerns were verbalized and as a team the captain and I began to address and react to the situation as rapidly as it was changing. Quite rapidly and suddenly it was apparent that aggressive action to address performance trend was necessary. The captain verbalized why the aircraft hadn't captured glide slope while advancing the throttles and it was then that the speed became critical and I began to follow through on the controls noting that he was struggling. In complete IMC and what seemed like moderate rain; the thought occurred to annunciate 'go around'. However it was my immediate opinion that we were above glide slope; and the change in configuration that would result would only further complicate the process of stabilizing the aircrafts approach. At this point continuing to descend was in our best interest for speed recovery and controllability. Captain realized the autopilot had failed to disengage; and he disengaged it. At this point the dynamics of the recovery began to work in our favor; and although the recovery continued in IMC conditions. Moments later we 'broke out'. Gaining visual recognition of the runway PAPI I noticed all white with the far right light trending to pink. It was then that we both agreed to continue the approach. The approach was continued in a stable fashion and resulted in a safe landing and many thoughts transpired following this flight; notably the disappointment at not recognizing altitude acquire; and autopilot engagement during stabilization effort. Here are some thoughts on details that may have contributed: entering IMC conditions at or near glide slope intercept; accomplishing checklist duties and frequency management averting my attention from the navigation display during glide slope. My basic concern for pitch attitude; airspeed; and localizer tracking averted my attention from noticing autopilot annunciation during event. Captain and I both agreed that perhaps hand flying approach would have prevented altitude capture and subsequent speed degradation. My recommendation would be that both pilot flying and pilot not flying be required to call out 'glide slope capture' during single engine procedures. It's just too critical a juncture to allow checklist completion or frequency management to avert attention away from its recognition. In conclusion CRM between the captain and myself was exceptional. I am grateful to the check airmen who conducted my last checkride. His interest in making that training events single engine work extremely non routine and challenging without a doubt attributed to my performance capabilities and safe completion of this flight today. Also I would gladly and without hesitation look forward to joining this captain in flight operations duties at anytime in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 crew shut an engine down for low oil pressure as they began their approach descent and because of high workload missed the autopilot's failure to capture the glideslope which resulted in an unstabilized approach with a low airspeed. The crew rectified the errors and landed safely.

Narrative: Approximately 10 minutes prior to top of descent it was noticed that the yellow low oil pressure light was illuminated. Closer analysis showed that the oil pressure of the left was only slightly lower than the right and the oil temperatures were only slightly higher on the left side compared to the right. However the large difference being the oil quantity on the left side was 0. At this point I pulled the QRH from my bag; and did a transfer of control from Captain to First Officer occurred turning to the ENG Tab and page I read aloud the 767 version of the checklist. It was then that the Captain and I discussed nearest suitable airport options. It became obvious that our filed destination at this time would be the suitable option. At this time the Captain also discussed his thoughts that once the engines steady state condition was altered. It was likely that we would have to proceed with ENGINE SHUTDOWN. At this time I got weather for the airport. Because +RA was reported on the ATIS I radioed ahead and got a real time weather observation from Operations. Assured that the weather had moved off the field and EAST we continued. At this time the Captain was briefing the flight attendants of the likelihood of an ENGINE SHUTDOWN and details of approach and landing. Just before top of descent the Captain asked me to declare an Emergency with Center. I did so; and we were given clearance to descend. With the power reduction came the RED annunciator box around the oil pressure indicator; and the ENGINE FAILURE or SHUTDOWN Checklist was immediately run. A more direct routing was given to us with deviations north (left) as required for weather. The weather at the time was standard fare for this airport with the heaviest portion to the south and east. Notably our escape intentions to the EAST NORTHEAST in the event of a GO AROUND were discussed. We were given a clearance to descend from 5;000 to 3;000; and a radio change. Looking back I remember numerous frequency changes interrupting completion of checklists. The localizer was captured at 3;000 FT outside the final approach fix and it was apparent we would enter some IMC conditions during the approach followed by visual conditions before landing. We were cleared for the approach. Final configuration began and I was heads down finishing up checklist requirements. The aircraft was fully configured and stabilized. It was somewhere between 3;000 FT and 1;500 FT that the weather conditions degraded rapidly; and I looked up and began to notice mainly our speed was deteriorating. All concerns were verbalized and as a team the Captain and I began to address and react to the situation as rapidly as it was changing. Quite rapidly and suddenly it was apparent that aggressive action to address performance trend was necessary. The Captain verbalized why the aircraft hadn't captured GLIDE SLOPE while advancing the throttles and it was then that the speed became critical and I began to follow through on the controls noting that he was struggling. In complete IMC and what seemed like MODERATE rain; the thought occurred to annunciate 'GO AROUND'. However it was my immediate opinion that we were above glide slope; and the change in configuration that would result would only further complicate the process of stabilizing the aircrafts approach. At this point continuing to descend was in our best interest for speed recovery and controllability. Captain realized the AUTOPILOT had failed to disengage; and he disengaged it. At this point the dynamics of the recovery began to work in our favor; and although the recovery continued in IMC conditions. Moments later we 'broke out'. Gaining visual recognition of the runway PAPI I noticed all white with the far right light trending to pink. It was then that we both agreed to continue the approach. The approach was continued in a stable fashion and resulted in a safe landing and many thoughts transpired following this flight; notably the disappointment at not recognizing ALTITUDE ACQUIRE; and AUTOPILOT engagement during stabilization effort. Here are some thoughts on details that may have contributed: entering IMC conditions at or near glide slope intercept; accomplishing checklist duties and frequency management averting my attention from the NAV display during glide slope. My basic concern for pitch attitude; airspeed; and localizer tracking averted my attention from noticing AUTOPILOT annunciation during event. Captain and I both agreed that perhaps hand flying approach would have prevented ALTITUDE CAPTURE and subsequent speed degradation. My recommendation would be that both pilot flying and pilot not flying be required to call out 'GLIDE SLOPE CAPTURE' during single engine procedures. It's just too critical a juncture to allow checklist completion or frequency management to avert attention away from its recognition. IN CONCLUSION CRM between the Captain and myself was exceptional. I am grateful to the Check Airmen who conducted my last checkride. His interest in making that training events Single Engine work extremely non routine and challenging without a doubt attributed to my performance capabilities and safe completion of this flight today. Also I would gladly and without hesitation look forward to joining this Captain in Flight Operations duties at anytime in the future.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.