Narrative:

During climb at 15;000 ft MSL we received a hydraulic 1 lo press master caution message. We looked at the hydraulic system synoptic that showed hydraulic system 1 with zero quantity and zero pressure. I was PF and took over the radios while the captain complied with the QRH and declared an emergency. He then tried unsuccessfully to contact company flight control on VHF and ACARS. The captain; using emergency authority; decided to divert to a nearby airport. Just past the FAF we received a flight splrs caution message. The captain complied with QRH and also tried disarming spoilers with no success. Together we decided the best course of action was to get the aircraft on the ground. ACARS said we would be ok for landing weight. After verifying our weight on the ground we realized we had landed overweight. The captain notified dispatch and maintenance of our problems and our reasoning for diverting.our concerns were systems loss when hydraulic 1 lost pressure. Also; the QRH indicated some spoilers would be lost; but not that they might pop up sometime during the flight. Also; trying to contact the company on other frequencies may have been more successful. We; however; felt complying with the QRH was more important for the safety of the flight. We did not want to lose another hydraulic system. Also; having the flight spoilers popping out earlier or later right above touchdown could have made the landing much worse.updating the QRH about the chance of the spoilers popping up should be added if it is associated with this hydraulic 1 lo press master caution.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-200 flight crew opted to divert and landed overweight at a nearby airport when they lost the Number 1 Hydraulic system and were concerned about subsequent system failures. They were unable to contact Dispatch or Maintenance for support despite efforts on VHF and ACARS.

Narrative: During climb at 15;000 FT MSL we received a HYD 1 LO PRESS master caution message. We looked at the HYD system synoptic that showed Hydraulic System 1 with zero quantity and zero pressure. I was PF and took over the radios while the Captain complied with the QRH and declared an emergency. He then tried unsuccessfully to contact company flight control on VHF and ACARS. The Captain; using emergency authority; decided to divert to a nearby airport. Just past the FAF we received a FLT SPLRS caution message. The Captain complied with QRH and also tried disarming spoilers with no success. Together we decided the best course of action was to get the aircraft on the ground. ACARS said we would be OK for landing weight. After verifying our weight on the ground we realized we had landed overweight. The Captain notified Dispatch and Maintenance of our problems and our reasoning for diverting.Our concerns were systems loss when HYD 1 lost pressure. Also; the QRH indicated some spoilers would be lost; but not that they might pop up sometime during the flight. Also; trying to contact the company on other frequencies may have been more successful. We; however; felt complying with the QRH was more important for the safety of the flight. We did not want to lose another hydraulic system. Also; having the Flight Spoilers popping out earlier or later right above touchdown could have made the landing much worse.Updating the QRH about the chance of the spoilers popping up should be added if it is associated with this HYD 1 LO PRESS master caution.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.