Narrative:

On a visual approach to the runway I was the pilot flying and asked for flaps 5 and landing gear down to begin configuring for the approach. The captain moved the flap lever and I began to slow from 210 KTS. Almost immediately; the captain noticed the flap gauge was not indicating any movement of the flaps. I maintained speed above the flap maneuvering speed and stopped the descent at the final approach fix altitude. At the time we were approaching the FAF. The captain began running the QRH. I flew the airplane and took the radios. When we reached the FAF we elected to go around and were given runway heading and a climb to 7;500 ft. We asked for vectors in the airport area while we worked the problem. I continued to fly the airplane and handle the radios while the captain talked to dispatch and ran the QRH for trailing edge flaps non-normal. The checklist calls for using the alternate flap system to configure for a flaps 15 landing. We completed the checklist and review; computed the performance data and asked for a ten mile final for a straight in to the runway. We continued the approach and landed with no additional issues.I credit the captain with recognizing the failure almost immediately; checking the flap gauge every time the flap lever moves is critical. I think task division played an important role: as the pilot flying; there can be powerful urge to help work the problem and run the checklist. It does take some discipline to resist that temptation and not be distracted from flying the airplane. This can be especially critical in situations where terrain and non-normal flight control are added threats.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-700 flight crew performed a go around when the flaps failed to extend as they approached the FAF. They performed the QRH procedure; obtained 15 degrees of flaps using the alternate system and landed without incident.

Narrative: On a visual approach to the runway I was the pilot flying and asked for flaps 5 and landing gear down to begin configuring for the approach. The Captain moved the flap lever and I began to slow from 210 KTS. Almost immediately; the Captain noticed the flap gauge was not indicating any movement of the flaps. I maintained speed above the flap maneuvering speed and stopped the descent at the final approach fix altitude. At the time we were approaching the FAF. The Captain began running the QRH. I flew the airplane and took the radios. When we reached the FAF we elected to go around and were given runway heading and a climb to 7;500 FT. We asked for vectors in the airport area while we worked the problem. I continued to fly the airplane and handle the radios while the Captain talked to Dispatch and ran the QRH for Trailing Edge Flaps Non-Normal. The checklist calls for using the alternate flap system to configure for a flaps 15 landing. We completed the checklist and review; computed the performance data and asked for a ten mile final for a straight in to the runway. We continued the approach and landed with no additional issues.I credit the Captain with recognizing the failure almost immediately; checking the Flap gauge every time the flap lever moves is critical. I think task division played an important role: As the pilot flying; there can be powerful urge to help work the problem and run the checklist. It does take some discipline to resist that temptation and not be distracted from flying the airplane. This can be especially critical in situations where terrain and non-normal flight control are added threats.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.