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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 999336 |
Time | |
Date | 201203 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Fire/Overheat Warning |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60 Flight Crew Total 15000 Flight Crew Type 500 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
On walk around I located several maintenance items. Both fire indicator lights were inoperative on the nose gear and I also questioned several holes that appeared to be missing rivets. They were entered into ACARS per fom/FAA procedures. I was asked by local maintenance to show rivet location and both of us were unsure what the holes were for. While walking back toward the jetway a maintenance supervisor; aggressively questioned the timing of the write ups so close to departure. I asked him if I was supposed to 'overlook' items; especially fire suppression indicators. He yelled 'I guess you don't care about on time departure' dismissing the importance of the maintenance issues. The mechanic and I were both speechless that a supervisor was indicating that we should not write up fire suppression items that are found close to departure time. He asked me if I cared about on time and yelled 'nice attitude.' supervisors intimidating pilots about write-ups are inappropriate and against company policy and I would imagine against FAA policy as well. It is unsafe and against everything safety stands for. The reason for my concern and extra vigilance of the fire panel stems from IOE where the lca stressed that there had been a 777 found to have the entire fire panel of the nose gear to be either faulted or unpowered until a first officer pressed and tested the lights. The aircraft had believed to been operated for an extended period of time with no fire indication and potentially no suppression. It was stressed that it's my responsibility to check the lights and integrity of the system and I am the final check of the integrity of the system. On the cowl rivets; I noticed that several were threaded and looked suspect. The local maintenance person agreed that they should be inspected. They did not appear to be drain holes.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B777 First Officer reports discovering that both fire indicator lights were inoperative on the nose gear during preflight. A Maintenance Supervisor states to the First Officer that finding the discrepancies so close to departure time indicate that the First Officer does not care about on time departures.
Narrative: On walk around I located several maintenance items. Both fire indicator lights were inoperative on the nose gear and I also questioned several holes that appeared to be missing rivets. They were entered into ACARS per FOM/FAA procedures. I was asked by Local Maintenance to show rivet location and both of us were unsure what the holes were for. While walking back toward the jetway a Maintenance Supervisor; aggressively questioned the timing of the write ups so close to departure. I asked him if I was supposed to 'overlook' items; especially fire suppression indicators. He yelled 'I guess you don't care about on time departure' dismissing the importance of the Maintenance issues. The mechanic and I were both speechless that a Supervisor was indicating that we should not write up fire suppression items that are found close to departure time. He asked me if I cared about on time and yelled 'nice attitude.' Supervisors intimidating pilots about write-ups are inappropriate and against company policy and I would imagine against FAA policy as well. It is unsafe and against everything safety stands for. The reason for my concern and extra vigilance of the fire panel stems from IOE where the LCA stressed that there had been a 777 found to have the entire fire panel of the nose gear to be either faulted or unpowered until a First Officer pressed and tested the lights. The aircraft had believed to been operated for an extended period of time with no fire indication and potentially no suppression. It was stressed that it's my responsibility to check the lights and integrity of the system and I am the final check of the integrity of the system. On the cowl rivets; I noticed that several were threaded and looked suspect. The local Maintenance person agreed that they should be inspected. They did not appear to be drain holes.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.