Narrative:

C90 SOP requires aircraft to be on the monitor frequency to 16 NM from the runway threshold or the established 'capture points' when running triple monitors. During this session; a vast majority of the aircraft were shipped later than that; much less reported on local frequency. Each time it was a separation issue; I informed the person vectoring the runway by leaving my position; walking over to his position (2W; west arrival); and quietly informing him the aircraft was not on frequency. I did it in exactly the same manner at least 10 different times observed by numerous management personnel. I informed him in this manner because we were informed by management to do it this way because if they 'heard' us verbally coordinating; they'd have to do 'something' about it. I made the low side monitor aware of each situation but there was no action they could have taken to avoid a loss of separation. Had I been able to spend more time focusing on the final spacing; I could have prevented at least two go-around's I was forced to initiate to maintain separation since I didn't notice spacing was deteriorating until it was too late to do anything but send the second aircraft around. This isn't the first one of these I've been forced to fill out.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C90 Controller observed multiple technical separation problems when monitor controller's were not insuring the required frequency transfer stipulations.

Narrative: C90 SOP requires aircraft to be on the monitor frequency to 16 NM from the runway threshold or the established 'capture points' when running triple monitors. During this session; a vast majority of the aircraft were shipped later than that; much less reported on local frequency. Each time it was a separation issue; I informed the person vectoring the runway by leaving my position; walking over to his position (2W; West Arrival); and quietly informing him the aircraft was not on frequency. I did it in exactly the same manner at LEAST 10 different times observed by numerous management personnel. I informed him in this manner because we were informed by management to do it this way because if they 'heard' us verbally coordinating; they'd have to do 'something' about it. I made the low side monitor aware of each situation but there was no action they could have taken to avoid a loss of separation. Had I been able to spend more time focusing on the final spacing; I could have prevented at least two go-around's I was forced to initiate to maintain separation since I didn't notice spacing was deteriorating until it was too late to do anything but send the second aircraft around. This isn't the first one of these I've been forced to fill out.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.