Narrative:

We taxied for takeoff with two crew members and two qualified 767 jumpseaters. During the taxi out we smelled something unusual and asked each other if we smelled something burning. One of the jumpseaters indicated that it was just the galley oven as they had preflighted it on arrival at the plane. Just to make sure; he went aft to check the oven and then yelled up to us that yes; it was indeed the oven. That being the case we were confident that the smell would go away with the extra airflow during the flight. Should we have returned to the ramp? In retrospect; of course; but in the real world we experience things like this from time to time and the explanation that it was from the oven which the riders had turned on for a bit seemed quite plausible to all of us. Nobody suggested otherwise. We departed and all was normal; but during the climb out the smell did not go away and may have intensified. The first officer was the pilot flying and he commented around the top of climb that it smelled really bad. A few more minutes went by and he brought to my attention that not only was there an odor; but now the center pedestal near his leg was hot. I felt around on the pedestal and it did seem warm compared to my side. We decided to try and switch packs to identify if that was the source of the smell. As we were doing that we noticed a bunch of warning lights illuminate on the overhead panel including all of the HF/SELCAL lights; loss of equipment cooling; and cabin altitude. Just then one of the jumpseat riders pointed to the VHF 2 radio area and said 'there's your problem look at the smoke!' I looked over and saw a grayish smoke pouring out at a pretty good rate. At this point I told everyone to put on their goggles and oxygen masks; although that command really wasn't necessary; everybody was already in that process. The first officer asked if we should declare an emergency and I said; 'yes; tell them we are declaring an emergency and want to divert.' during this time we ran the smoke checklist up to the establishment of crew communications. After the first officer declared the emergency I thought it would be a good idea to remind everyone of their roles. I told him that he was still flying the airplane and he should begin the descent and tighten up the turn towards the divert airport flying as fast as he could. I told the jumpseater in the relief pilot seat that he and I would work the checklists. At this point; the fire bell started an intermittent ringing and we looked down to see additional warning lights; rt engine oheat; APU fire bottle disch; and the big one; cargo fire along with the associated main deck cargo fire EICAS message. I directed that with the limited time available; we ignore most of the warnings and concentrate on the possibility of the main deck cargo fire. We ran that checklist and then I asked the jumpseater to run as much of the smoke removal check as he could. I then turned my attention back to the plane. Shortly thereafter; the smoke stopped flowing and the smell dissipated a bit. There was never a smoke filled cockpit; we were always able to see each other but the smell lingered.backing up a bit; during all of this the other jumpseater had gone aft; felt the main deck cargo door for high temperature; determined that there was none and opened it to check for smoke or fire. I cannot express strongly enough how much it helped having the extra bodies on the aircraft. As the pilot flying and I were getting the plane turned around and started down; one jumpseater was trying to ACARS a divert message while the other reminded him to use the satcom. He was able to get off a very quick satcom call with the dispatcher explaining what was going on. It seemed as though these guys were doing this almost out of muscle memory; without direction from me. Later when I asked that it be done; I was told it already had been. This was a well functioning team. During the descent I was very busy mentally considering things such as aircraft evacuation and fuel dump. In the simulator you almost act by script calling for evacuation but now it was for real. Should I command that and run the risk of people getting hurt on the escape reels? What if we are sitting on the plane and something does ignite? It's easy to respond by rote in training; there are no real right or wrong answers. Here; a wrong decision would hurt people. We were prepared for an evacuation with maximum automatic brakes being set; but once we were on the runway; with the knowledge from the jumpseater that there was no problem in the back; based on the best information available to me as the captain; I announced we would not have to evacuate. I considered the fuel dump question when it was raised by one of the jumpseaters; but I felt that with the short amount of time left and only 10;000 pounds or so in the center tank; would it make a difference? Did we want to dump fuel if we were on fire? We checked weight and opted for the overweight landing at 365;000 pounds. Once again; I exercised captain's authority based on the situation. At around 10;000 ft I determined it was time to start setting up for the landing. We were still coming down at 3;000 ft per minute or so which meant that we were only 3 or 4 minute away from the runway. I asked the rear jumpseater to get the approach plates and he immediately handed the book forward to me; open to the airport. He had taken the initiative to look them up as soon as he heard we were going to divert. Again; having him there to help with that very simple task saved a minute or two when seconds counted. Later I reflected on how much help an electronic flight bag type device would have been in terms of giving us access to information very quickly compared with digging paper charts out of a book. The jumpseater working the checklists told me that he actually had a hard time finding the smoke removal checklist and was eventually just doing what he thought should be done based on his training and experience. I imagine that this problem would also be fixed with a searchable electronic checklist versus our bound and somewhat unwieldy quick reference handbook.as an aside; I also had a problem when I was transitioning from my duty of managing the emergency procedures as to my duty in helping the pilot flying fly the plane. I tried to do a quick approach briefing as he flew; but when I put my reading glasses on I could not see a thing. I was pretty confused about that for a bit and after we landed and turned on the lights I realized that I had reached for my reading glasses on the center pedestal and picked up the other pilots prescription glasses which he had removed due to difficulty wearing them with the smoke goggles. Somehow I was able to tune up the radio and direct a quick approach brief and approach checklist. Between the four of us we had some very rapid; concise discussions and it was great to have people bringing things up to ensure that nothing was overlooked. I am convinced that had it just been the two of us; we would have been able to get our equipment on; but would have been far too busy to run anything more than the most basic main cargo deck fire check and would not have been able to get the valuable information that the warning was benign. As it was; I was able to direct tasks as the pilot in command and largely sit back and lead the orchestra as these well trained people did their assigned tasks so well. I hope that I am able to convey my main impression from this which was the rapidity at which everything happened. From the first puff of visible smoke until we were on the runway was only 13 minutes. When you take off a few minutes of that time to get equipment on and establish intercom communications among the crew; subtract a few more minutes at the end where terminal flying procedures are accomplished; and you just don't have a lot of time to do much else with two people. With one flying the plane; youwould be largely operating alone. I think we broke out at 2;000 ft while slowing and descending with a 15 KT tailwind. Everything from the gear on was being extended on speed and when we broke out into the visual illusion of a black hole approach over water with only approach and runway lights visible off the nose; but not really having any visual cues of speed or altitude; I decided to take advantage of the blowback feature of the 767's flaps and went from flaps 20 to 30 without worrying about the speed. The forward jumpseater asked; 'are we going to make it?' as we were still fast; I thought of a go around and how badly I did not want to have to do one. We did get the speed down on time and landed in the proper configuration close to our V ref. Calculated V ref was 161 KTS so our ref +5 was 166 KTS. Soon after touchdown I realized that the maximum auto brakes were kicking in and I did not have my shoulder harness on. I went forward pretty hard; but stopped myself with my arm. As we slowed; we realized that a rapid deceleration wasn't necessary and a normal roll out to the end would suffice.we parked and were instantly met by the fire equipment who communicated with us over the tower frequency; conducted an infrared scan of the aircraft for hot spots and said they found none; although the right landing gear was smoking and registered a temperature of 300 degrees centigrade. We consulted the charts and determined that we were well into the danger zone for the fuse plugs melting and reminded the crash fire rescue equipment team to stay clear of the wheels and that the airplane would have to sit for an hour. Brake temperatures on the right gear was all 7's; the left slightly cooler.with the situation stabilized; the airport brought steps up and crash fire rescue equipment and maintenance crews entered the aircraft. They scanned the interior with the ir equipment and they asked if they could enter the east and east compartment. Later; one of the firemen identified himself to me and told me that he had been training on our aircraft quite a bit as part of a joint company program. He commented as to how that familiarity with the 767 freighter had helped them all in their duties that night; a good illustration of the team work and training involved that night. Disparate well trained groups from our cockpit; air traffic control; and the airport's fire team doing as they were trained and interacting with each other is what in retrospect I feel was a very impressive fashion.some final thoughts; even though I had recently practiced the task; I had to spend an inordinate amount of time fussing with the oxygen mask and smoke goggles; getting it all to fit right; figuring out how to wear my glasses; etc. I found that with the oxygen turned up to 100% the amount of flow was much greater than I had expected. It was very difficult to speak against the rush of air through the mask. Any time I tried to speak with ATC with the mask on and oxygen at 100%; they would say that they could not understand me; with the exception of the times when I would lift the mask from my face an inch or so. That would not be good in a cabin filled with toxic smoke. The jumpseater I was working with seemed to have the same trouble and when he would try to talk to me most of what I got was a loud wind noise over the speaker. At several points it was easier to just point to checklist pages and switches rather than try to talk. I honestly never got the goggles to fit properly and as we neared 10;000 ft I got very frustrated and threw the whole thing on the floor. We all determined that it was safe at this point and; as I recall; completed the rest of the flight with no oxygen masks or goggles. The new one piece systems can not get here soon enough for my taste.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 experienced smoke and fumes in flight followed by numerous EICAS messages and warning lights associated with system anomalies that would contribute to the physical evidence. They declared an emergency and made a rapid descent and overweight landing at a nearby enroute airport.

Narrative: We taxied for takeoff with two crew members and two qualified 767 jumpseaters. During the taxi out we smelled something unusual and asked each other if we smelled something burning. One of the jumpseaters indicated that it was just the galley oven as they had preflighted it on arrival at the plane. Just to make sure; he went aft to check the oven and then yelled up to us that yes; it was indeed the oven. That being the case we were confident that the smell would go away with the extra airflow during the flight. Should we have returned to the ramp? In retrospect; of course; but in the real world we experience things like this from time to time and the explanation that it was from the oven which the riders had turned on for a bit seemed quite plausible to all of us. Nobody suggested otherwise. We departed and all was normal; but during the climb out the smell did not go away and may have intensified. The First Officer was the pilot flying and he commented around the top of climb that it smelled really bad. A few more minutes went by and he brought to my attention that not only was there an odor; but now the center pedestal near his leg was hot. I felt around on the pedestal and it did seem warm compared to my side. We decided to try and switch packs to identify if that was the source of the smell. As we were doing that we noticed a bunch of warning lights illuminate on the overhead panel including all of the HF/SELCAL lights; loss of equipment cooling; and cabin altitude. Just then one of the jumpseat riders pointed to the VHF 2 radio area and said 'there's your problem look at the smoke!' I looked over and saw a grayish smoke pouring out at a pretty good rate. At this point I told everyone to put on their goggles and oxygen masks; although that command really wasn't necessary; everybody was already in that process. The First Officer asked if we should declare an emergency and I said; 'Yes; tell them we are declaring an emergency and want to divert.' During this time we ran the smoke checklist up to the establishment of crew communications. After the First Officer declared the emergency I thought it would be a good idea to remind everyone of their roles. I told him that he was still flying the airplane and he should begin the descent and tighten up the turn towards the divert airport flying as fast as he could. I told the jumpseater in the Relief Pilot seat that he and I would work the checklists. At this point; the fire bell started an intermittent ringing and we looked down to see additional warning lights; RT ENG OHEAT; APU Fire bottle DISCH; and the big one; CARGO FIRE along with the associated MAIN DECK CARGO FIRE EICAS message. I directed that with the limited time available; we ignore most of the warnings and concentrate on the possibility of the main deck cargo fire. We ran that checklist and then I asked the jumpseater to run as much of the smoke removal check as he could. I then turned my attention back to the plane. Shortly thereafter; the smoke stopped flowing and the smell dissipated a bit. There was never a smoke filled cockpit; we were always able to see each other but the smell lingered.Backing up a bit; during all of this the other jumpseater had gone aft; felt the main deck cargo door for high temperature; determined that there was none and opened it to check for smoke or fire. I cannot express strongly enough how much it helped having the extra bodies on the aircraft. As the pilot flying and I were getting the plane turned around and started down; one jumpseater was trying to ACARS a divert message while the other reminded him to use the SATCOM. He was able to get off a very quick SATCOM call with the Dispatcher explaining what was going on. It seemed as though these guys were doing this almost out of muscle memory; without direction from me. Later when I asked that it be done; I was told it already had been. This was a well functioning team. During the descent I was very busy mentally considering things such as aircraft evacuation and fuel dump. In the simulator you almost act by script calling for evacuation but now it was for real. Should I command that and run the risk of people getting hurt on the escape reels? What if we are sitting on the plane and something does ignite? It's easy to respond by rote in training; there are no real right or wrong answers. Here; a wrong decision would hurt people. We were prepared for an evacuation with MAX AUTO brakes being set; but once we were on the runway; with the knowledge from the jumpseater that there was no problem in the back; based on the best information available to me as the Captain; I announced we would not have to evacuate. I considered the fuel dump question when it was raised by one of the jumpseaters; but I felt that with the short amount of time left and only 10;000 LBS or so in the center tank; would it make a difference? Did we want to dump fuel if we were on fire? We checked weight and opted for the overweight landing at 365;000 LBS. Once again; I exercised Captain's authority based on the situation. At around 10;000 FT I determined it was time to start setting up for the landing. We were still coming down at 3;000 FT per minute or so which meant that we were only 3 or 4 minute away from the runway. I asked the rear jumpseater to get the approach plates and he immediately handed the book forward to me; open to the airport. He had taken the initiative to look them up as soon as he heard we were going to divert. Again; having him there to help with that very simple task saved a minute or two when seconds counted. Later I reflected on how much help an Electronic Flight Bag type device would have been in terms of giving us access to information very quickly compared with digging paper charts out of a book. The jumpseater working the checklists told me that he actually had a hard time finding the smoke removal checklist and was eventually just doing what he thought should be done based on his training and experience. I imagine that this problem would also be fixed with a searchable electronic checklist versus our bound and somewhat unwieldy Quick Reference Handbook.As an aside; I also had a problem when I was transitioning from my duty of managing the emergency procedures as to my duty in helping the pilot flying fly the plane. I tried to do a quick approach briefing as he flew; but when I put my reading glasses on I could not see a thing. I was pretty confused about that for a bit and after we landed and turned on the lights I realized that I had reached for my reading glasses on the center pedestal and picked up the other pilots prescription glasses which he had removed due to difficulty wearing them with the smoke goggles. Somehow I was able to tune up the radio and direct a quick approach brief and approach checklist. Between the four of us we had some very rapid; concise discussions and it was great to have people bringing things up to ensure that nothing was overlooked. I am convinced that had it just been the two of us; we would have been able to get our equipment on; but would have been far too busy to run anything more than the most basic MAIN CARGO DECK fire check and would not have been able to get the valuable information that the warning was benign. As it was; I was able to direct tasks as the Pilot in Command and largely sit back and lead the orchestra as these well trained people did their assigned tasks so well. I hope that I am able to convey my main impression from this which was the rapidity at which everything happened. From the first puff of visible smoke until we were on the runway was only 13 minutes. When you take off a few minutes of that time to get equipment on and establish intercom communications among the crew; subtract a few more minutes at the end where terminal flying procedures are accomplished; and you just don't have a lot of time to do much else with two people. With one flying the plane; youwould be largely operating alone. I think we broke out at 2;000 FT while slowing and descending with a 15 KT tailwind. Everything from the gear on was being extended on speed and when we broke out into the visual illusion of a black hole approach over water with only approach and runway lights visible off the nose; but not really having any visual cues of speed or altitude; I decided to take advantage of the blowback feature of the 767's flaps and went from flaps 20 to 30 without worrying about the speed. The forward jumpseater asked; 'Are we going to make it?' as we were still fast; I thought of a go around and how badly I did not want to have to do one. We did get the speed down on time and landed in the proper configuration close to our V Ref. Calculated V Ref was 161 KTS so our Ref +5 was 166 KTS. Soon after touchdown I realized that the maximum auto brakes were kicking in and I did not have my shoulder harness on. I went forward pretty hard; but stopped myself with my arm. As we slowed; we realized that a rapid deceleration wasn't necessary and a normal roll out to the end would suffice.We parked and were instantly met by the fire equipment who communicated with us over the Tower frequency; conducted an infrared scan of the aircraft for hot spots and said they found none; although the right landing gear was smoking and registered a temperature of 300 degrees Centigrade. We consulted the charts and determined that we were well into the danger zone for the fuse plugs melting and reminded the CFR team to stay clear of the wheels and that the airplane would have to sit for an hour. Brake temperatures on the right gear was all 7's; the left slightly cooler.With the situation stabilized; the airport brought steps up and CFR and maintenance crews entered the aircraft. They scanned the interior with the IR equipment and they asked if they could enter the E and E compartment. Later; one of the firemen identified himself to me and told me that he had been training on our aircraft quite a bit as part of a joint company program. He commented as to how that familiarity with the 767 freighter had helped them all in their duties that night; a good illustration of the team work and training involved that night. Disparate well trained groups from our cockpit; Air Traffic Control; and the airport's fire team doing as they were trained and interacting with each other is what in retrospect I feel was a very impressive fashion.Some final thoughts; even though I had recently practiced the task; I had to spend an inordinate amount of time fussing with the oxygen mask and smoke goggles; getting it all to fit right; figuring out how to wear my glasses; etc. I found that with the oxygen turned up to 100% the amount of flow was much greater than I had expected. It was very difficult to speak against the rush of air through the mask. Any time I tried to speak with ATC with the mask on and Oxygen at 100%; they would say that they could not understand me; with the exception of the times when I would lift the mask from my face an inch or so. That would not be good in a cabin filled with toxic smoke. The jumpseater I was working with seemed to have the same trouble and when he would try to talk to me most of what I got was a loud wind noise over the speaker. At several points it was easier to just point to checklist pages and switches rather than try to talk. I honestly never got the goggles to fit properly and as we neared 10;000 FT I got very frustrated and threw the whole thing on the floor. We all determined that it was safe at this point and; as I recall; completed the rest of the flight with no oxygen masks or goggles. The new one piece systems can not get here soon enough for my taste.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.