Narrative:

The MEL required testing of the right wing anti-ice valve prior to the first flight of the day because of an inoperative wing anti-ice light. While taxiing to the runway, the F/east double checked the maintenance log and discovered that maintenance had not performed this test. He also concluded that he would not be able to perform the test himself (as per the directive in the MEL) due to an inoperative #3 pneumatic pressure gauge and advised the captain of that fact. Instead of returning to the gate and calling maintenance, the captain elected to depart west/O verifying valve operation. No icing conditions were forecast. Upon arrival at the destination, the F/east asked if he should enter the discrepancy in the log book or at least notify the oncoming crew. The captain responded, 'that's their problem.' if maintenance had checked the valve operation as they had the day before, or had the open maintenance items log reflected the fact that the F/east would not be able to perform the test, or had the F/east been more forceful while advising the captain to return to the gate, the proper corrective actions could have been taken.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB WITH MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST ITEM DEPARTED WITHOUT PROPER PRE DEP PROC BEING ACCOMPLISHED. PIC THEN FAILED TO ENTER DISCREPANCY IN ACFT LOG BOOK.

Narrative: THE MEL REQUIRED TESTING OF THE RIGHT WING ANTI-ICE VALVE PRIOR TO THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY BECAUSE OF AN INOP WING ANTI-ICE LIGHT. WHILE TAXIING TO THE RWY, THE F/E DOUBLE CHKED THE MAINT LOG AND DISCOVERED THAT MAINT HAD NOT PERFORMED THIS TEST. HE ALSO CONCLUDED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PERFORM THE TEST HIMSELF (AS PER THE DIRECTIVE IN THE MEL) DUE TO AN INOP #3 PNEUMATIC PRESSURE GAUGE AND ADVISED THE CAPT OF THAT FACT. INSTEAD OF RETURNING TO THE GATE AND CALLING MAINT, THE CAPT ELECTED TO DEPART W/O VERIFYING VALVE OPERATION. NO ICING CONDITIONS WERE FORECAST. UPON ARR AT THE DEST, THE F/E ASKED IF HE SHOULD ENTER THE DISCREPANCY IN THE LOG BOOK OR AT LEAST NOTIFY THE ONCOMING CREW. THE CAPT RESPONDED, 'THAT'S THEIR PROB.' IF MAINT HAD CHKED THE VALVE OPERATION AS THEY HAD THE DAY BEFORE, OR HAD THE OPEN MAINT ITEMS LOG REFLECTED THE FACT THAT THE F/E WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PERFORM THE TEST, OR HAD THE F/E BEEN MORE FORCEFUL WHILE ADVISING THE CAPT TO RETURN TO THE GATE, THE PROPER CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.