Narrative:

I took control of aircraft from the first officer during an approach breakout. This was the second intervention that occurred in the flight. In addition; he had had difficulty with communications on the ground at origin which I attributed to rustiness. He was just one month into a return to flying following a 1 year medical leave. This was my first pairing with the first officer although I had worked with our relief pilot on a previous trip.first intervention was a verbal correction to a high pitch induced speed decay on initial climb. This was caused by a slow takeoff rotation resulting in approximately V2 + 20 at liftoff which caused the command bars to direct a higher pitch to drop speed. The first officer lagged flight director commands. I directed a pitch down verbally and visually; response was slow so speed decayed into low speed foot. This situation was complicated by an altitude capture and the speed window opened low at 157 KTS. All was corrected and the flight continued with a greatly increased attention to detail. En route; I found a lack of crew coordination evident in a cost index set at 300 vice 60 called for in the flight release. I corrected the index because the flight was short; the planned cruise altitude is never achieved (FL290 is the norm); and because traffic on this segment often requires speed reductions. I also modified descent speeds to be consistent with slow arrivals experienced in previous arrivals to this destination. I asked first officer about this - he admitted an independent and arbitrary selection of cost index 300.on arrival; traffic required a speed reduction to 220 KTS on a descending downwind. Drag was needed to accomplish the speed reduction and he was slow in providing it. Traffic then required a speed reduction to 180 KTS and; again; the response was delayed. I prompted the use of speedbrakes and slats. The closure problem was not being solved. We reverted to level change on base to assist in the speed reduction; this caused a slight above path condition. Approach control gave a point out to preceding traffic and assigned 'normal speed.' the pilot flying selected prof and FMS then asked for flaps 15. FMS speed commanded an increased speed in order to achieve the altitude profile - this complicated the closure problem.I prompted the landing gear then extended it without a command to help slow the aircraft. The pilot flying then commanded flaps 28 above the speed limit; I belayed his request. I then advised him we might be broken out of this approach to prepare him. Approach control sent us around moments later. Breakout instructions: turn right heading 240; climb to 3;000 ft immediately amended to 4;000 ft. The pilot flying elected to hand fly the breakout and was slow to accomplish the turn and climb. He commanded flaps up and leveled the aircraft at 2;800 ft with a high power setting and airspeed increasing to 245.at this point; we were not complying with the controller's instructions. I perceived a task overload so I took the aircraft; selected autopilot; speed 200 KTS; level change to 4;000; and our assigned heading. I think the cause of this event was a lack of effective training for the first officer following his long break from flying. I debriefed the event and discovered a lack of knowledge and understanding as to what went wrong; when it went wrong; and the causes. I solicited comments from the relief pilot and invited rebuttal from the first officer. I was hesitant to correct deviations early in the flight because we had a long day ahead of us and I wanted to be tolerant of his lack of currency. My hesitancy contributed to a situation that caused an approach breakout and subsequent trauma. The bottom line is that I flew with an inadequately trained crew member whose poor performance exceeded my capacity to manage from a pilot not flying standpoint.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The inability of the First Officer to utilize manual and/or FMS directed flight path management of attitude and airspeed resulted in a traffic conflict requiring a go around directed by Approach Control. The Captain of the MD-11 believed his First Officer's poor flight performance was the result of the airline's failure to train him/her to proficiency following a lengthy medical leave.

Narrative: I took control of aircraft from the First Officer during an approach breakout. This was the second intervention that occurred in the flight. In addition; he had had difficulty with communications on the ground at origin which I attributed to rustiness. He was just one month into a return to flying following a 1 year medical leave. This was my first pairing with the First Officer although I had worked with our Relief Pilot on a previous trip.First intervention was a verbal correction to a high pitch induced speed decay on initial climb. This was caused by a slow takeoff rotation resulting in approximately V2 + 20 at liftoff which caused the command bars to direct a higher pitch to drop speed. The First Officer lagged flight director commands. I directed a pitch down verbally and visually; response was slow so speed decayed into low speed foot. This situation was complicated by an altitude capture and the speed window opened low at 157 KTS. All was corrected and the flight continued with a greatly increased attention to detail. En route; I found a lack of crew coordination evident in a cost index set at 300 vice 60 called for in the flight release. I corrected the index because the flight was short; the planned cruise altitude is never achieved (FL290 is the norm); and because traffic on this segment often requires speed reductions. I also modified descent speeds to be consistent with slow arrivals experienced in previous arrivals to this destination. I asked First Officer about this - he admitted an independent and arbitrary selection of cost index 300.On arrival; traffic required a speed reduction to 220 KTS on a descending downwind. Drag was needed to accomplish the speed reduction and he was slow in providing it. Traffic then required a speed reduction to 180 KTS and; again; the response was delayed. I prompted the use of speedbrakes and slats. The closure problem was not being solved. We reverted to level change on base to assist in the speed reduction; this caused a slight above path condition. Approach Control gave a point out to preceding traffic and assigned 'normal speed.' The pilot flying selected PROF and FMS then asked for flaps 15. FMS speed commanded an increased speed in order to achieve the altitude profile - this complicated the closure problem.I prompted the landing gear then extended it without a command to help slow the aircraft. The pilot flying then commanded flaps 28 above the speed limit; I belayed his request. I then advised him we might be broken out of this approach to prepare him. Approach Control sent us around moments later. Breakout instructions: turn right heading 240; climb to 3;000 FT immediately amended to 4;000 FT. The pilot flying elected to hand fly the breakout and was slow to accomplish the turn and climb. He commanded flaps up and leveled the aircraft at 2;800 FT with a high power setting and airspeed increasing to 245.At this point; we were not complying with the Controller's instructions. I perceived a task overload so I took the aircraft; selected autopilot; speed 200 KTS; level change to 4;000; and our assigned heading. I think the cause of this event was a lack of effective training for the First Officer following his long break from flying. I debriefed the event and discovered a lack of knowledge and understanding as to what went wrong; when it went wrong; and the causes. I solicited comments from the Relief Pilot and invited rebuttal from the First Officer. I was hesitant to correct deviations early in the flight because we had a long day ahead of us and I wanted to be tolerant of his lack of currency. My hesitancy contributed to a situation that caused an approach breakout and subsequent trauma. The bottom line is that I flew with an inadequately trained crew member whose poor performance exceeded my capacity to manage from a pilot not flying standpoint.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.