37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1007414 |
Time | |
Date | 201204 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Main Gear Tire |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Commercial |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
On pushback we were cleared for pushback and the tug driver called to say the left inboard tire appeared low. Erring on the side of caution; I canceled our pushback; and had my first officer go back out to inspect the tire. He said that viewed from the front it looked slightly lower than the outboard tire; but he crawled under the wing and kicked on it multiple times as well as viewed it again from behind. He said from behind it doesn't even draw attention to itself and he felt strongly that it was well within limitation. With his experience of around 5 years; I took him at his word and elected to continue. I notified dispatch of the gate return message and why; and that we were continuing on. The aircraft had just previously diverted with a flap fail. The reset procedure was accomplished by maintenance as well as operating and inspecting the flaps prior to the signoff and continuing the flight here. I admittedly thought to myself that the tire had not drawn anyone else's attention in the day; and it was more of one individual's perception. The aircraft taxied completely normal and never raised additional concern. Upon landing I viewed the left main landing gear from the jetway and could see the slightest hint of a rounding on the inboard tire; but honestly almost every tire on every aircraft I fly would have to be inspected by maintenance at what I was viewing; i.e. It appeared completely normal. The first officer again completed his walkaround and again said it appeared normal. I did mention to the flight attendant that it was slight lower than the outboard tire; but that I was not concerned with it being of any potential threat or warrant of further inspection. On takeoff just as we were rotating we heard a lound thud and the first officer reported a slight shimmy feel. I even questioned do you think the tire blew; but both of us were unsure. I elected to raise the gear and everything seemed quite normal. On climbout at around 10;000 ft I was still uneasy so I gave communication 1 to the first officer and I called tower. He said no one had reported any debris; so I asked for a runway sweep to help in our determination. After about 10 minutes they did confirm debris on the runway. We were approximately 35 minutes from destination at this point so we elected to continue. I declared an emergency with center and told them no special handling was required other than the longest runway for landing. I spent a great deal of time discussing with my first officer the possible scenarios that we may face. One being just the inboard tire was blown; in which case a normal landing with cautious braking would apply. Two; that both mains on a side had blown and that we would face a gear collapse upon landing. Three; than any possible tire; could have blown and we would prepare for a skidding event. I went through all the scenarios with the flight attendant and told her very clearly upon a normal landing that we would probably be towed into the gate. I told her in the event of a collapse or skidding event to give us 30 seconds by her watch from the time the aircraft stopped for instructions and to evacuate if she had heard nothing. I contacted our dispatcher and she said she would relay all of the information. I also asked for operations to be contacted for a potential tow in to the gate. I notified the passengers of our condition and clearly asked them to stay in their seats and follow our instructions upon landing. I sugar coated the scenarios that we faced and told them we were preparing for the worst case scenario; but I assured them that it was highly unlikely that both tires on any one side would have blown and that I was anticipating a normal landing with a precautionary tow into the gate. I opted to conduct the landing for the greatest risk management. The touchdown was very smooth; and as the weight settled I knew we had a main on each side intact. It almost appeared with the shimmy that a nose wheel had blown as well; but that proved to not be thecase. I smoothly decelerated the airplane and felt at an extremely slow speed I could clear the runway. At the point we came to a complete stop I requested an outside inspection from the ground personnel. They confirmed the blown inside left main tire and the fire department said all looked ok from a fire risk perspective. At that point I opted for a tow into the gate. I had my first officer communicate with the flight attendant and make a quick PA to the passengers that all was ok and that we would be towed in for precaution. All was accomplished seamlessly from the ground perspective and I believe we were on the gate 5 minutes ahead of schedule. I thanked all the passengers for their cooperation and for remaining calm. I apologized for the possible scare; but that I was erring on the side of precaution. Everyone deplaned and no one seemed upset with the incident or the course of actions. As far as threats; I feel in hindsight that I wish I would have had maintenance come out to view the tire prior to leaving. I feel that over experience on both of our parts; myself and the first officer may have contributed to a slight over confidence. I feel a previous experience of mine of an inboard tire that was flat after boarding and putting weight on the aircraft that was noticed by the pushback team; where the aircraft was leaning contributed to an overconfidence that this tire was completely within limitations. In retrospect of this event I wished I had just called maintenance from the start to view the tire.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CRJ200 flight crew describe the circumstances surrounding a tire failure on takeoff and the emergency landing that follows.
Narrative: On pushback we were cleared for pushback and the tug driver called to say the left inboard tire appeared low. Erring on the side of caution; I canceled our pushback; and had my First Officer go back out to inspect the tire. He said that viewed from the front it looked slightly lower than the outboard tire; but he crawled under the wing and kicked on it multiple times as well as viewed it again from behind. He said from behind it doesn't even draw attention to itself and he felt strongly that it was well within limitation. With his experience of around 5 years; I took him at his word and elected to continue. I notified dispatch of the gate return message and why; and that we were continuing on. The aircraft had just previously diverted with a flap fail. The reset procedure was accomplished by maintenance as well as operating and inspecting the flaps prior to the signoff and continuing the flight here. I admittedly thought to myself that the tire had not drawn anyone else's attention in the day; and it was more of one individual's perception. The aircraft taxied completely normal and never raised additional concern. Upon landing I viewed the left main landing gear from the jetway and could see the slightest hint of a rounding on the inboard tire; but honestly almost every tire on every aircraft I fly would have to be inspected by maintenance at what I was viewing; i.e. it appeared completely normal. The first officer again completed his walkaround and again said it appeared normal. I did mention to the flight attendant that it was slight lower than the outboard tire; but that I was not concerned with it being of any potential threat or warrant of further inspection. On takeoff just as we were rotating we heard a lound thud and the F/O reported a slight shimmy feel. I even questioned do you think the tire blew; but both of us were unsure. I elected to raise the gear and everything seemed quite normal. On climbout at around 10;000 FT I was still uneasy so I gave COM 1 to the First Officer and I called Tower. He said no one had reported any debris; so I asked for a runway sweep to help in our determination. After about 10 minutes they did confirm debris on the runway. We were approximately 35 minutes from destination at this point so we elected to continue. I declared an emergency with Center and told them no special handling was required other than the longest runway for landing. I spent a great deal of time discussing with my First Officer the possible scenarios that we may face. One being just the inboard tire was blown; in which case a normal landing with cautious braking would apply. Two; that both mains on a side had blown and that we would face a gear collapse upon landing. Three; than any possible tire; could have blown and we would prepare for a skidding event. I went through all the scenarios with the Flight Attendant and told her very clearly upon a normal landing that we would probably be towed into the gate. I told her in the event of a collapse or skidding event to give us 30 seconds by her watch from the time the aircraft stopped for instructions and to evacuate if she had heard nothing. I contacted our Dispatcher and she said she would relay all of the information. I also asked for operations to be contacted for a potential tow in to the gate. I notified the passengers of our condition and clearly asked them to stay in their seats and follow our instructions upon landing. I sugar coated the scenarios that we faced and told them we were preparing for the worst case scenario; but I assured them that it was highly unlikely that both tires on any one side would have blown and that I was anticipating a normal landing with a precautionary tow into the gate. I opted to conduct the landing for the greatest risk management. The touchdown was very smooth; and as the weight settled I knew we had a main on each side intact. It almost appeared with the shimmy that a nose wheel had blown as well; but that proved to not be thecase. I smoothly decelerated the airplane and felt at an extremely slow speed I could clear the runway. At the point we came to a complete stop I requested an outside inspection from the ground personnel. They confirmed the blown inside left main tire and the fire department said all looked ok from a fire risk perspective. At that point I opted for a tow into the gate. I had my First Officer communicate with the Flight Attendant and make a quick PA to the passengers that all was ok and that we would be towed in for precaution. All was accomplished seamlessly from the ground perspective and I believe we were on the gate 5 minutes ahead of schedule. I thanked all the passengers for their cooperation and for remaining calm. I apologized for the possible scare; but that I was erring on the side of precaution. Everyone deplaned and no one seemed upset with the incident or the course of actions. As far as threats; I feel in hindsight that I wish I would have had maintenance come out to view the tire prior to leaving. I feel that over experience on both of our parts; myself and the first officer may have contributed to a slight over confidence. I feel a previous experience of mine of an inboard tire that was flat after boarding and putting weight on the aircraft that was noticed by the pushback team; where the aircraft was leaning contributed to an overconfidence that this tire was completely within limitations. In retrospect of this event I wished I had just called maintenance from the start to view the tire.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.