Narrative:

After landing we were assigned a gate in lax. Both the first officer and I noticed a train of three baggage carts close to the area where the right wing-tip would pass. The marshaller was signaling to proceed; and even appeared to glance at the carts in question. The first officer was closely observing the distance between our wing and the carts; and assured me we had adequate clearance. There was no wing-walker on the right side. I proceeded very slowly. At about 25 feet prior to the gate; we were jolted by a moderate bump; as the marshaller simultaneously signaled 'emergency stop.' I immediately stopped the aircraft. The first officer saw the carts jolt and commented with surprise that we had made contact with the carts. I then announced to the passengers that we had struck a cart; and asked them to stay seated. We completed the engine shutdown and associated checklist. Operations / ramp soon deplaned the passengers via the ramp and stairs. The right winglet had struck the second of the three carts. The aircraft was damaged on the right winglet leading edge about one-third to one-half the way up; with paint scratches and markings on the navigation light and the outside of the winglet. I thought about stopping; but instead I elected to proceed on the basis of the marshaller's signals and the first officer's assurance we had wingtip clearance. I was at first somewhat confused by the two lead-in lines (one was for larger jets; and the other; dashed line was for rj's). I was focused on the marshaller and being on the correct lead-in line and didn't see that the carts were in the safety diamond. The ramp was very busy; there was no wing-walker on the right side; and the visibility out of the side windows is limited and possibly distorted by the thick; angled window glass. The environment was very fast-changing and dynamic; requiring extra vigilance. The marshaller was possibly distracted by the busy ramp; and he did not see the impending collision until it was happening. The cart we struck was turned at an odd angle with reference to the other two carts on either side of it; so it's corner was protruding further out than it appeared; making the distance from the wing harder to judge. My first officer and I simply mis-judged the distance from the wings to the carts. I should have refused to proceed until the carts were moved. I relied on the judgment of others to keep moving at a time when prudence should have dictated that I stop. Captains should be extra conservative when taxiing in busy and congested areas. When in doubt; stop and make people move things or assure adequate clearance at each point of potential collision. All flight crewmembers should be warned and educated about the apparent and potential visual distortions and illusions which can occur; and when in doubt; either crew-member should use the brakes to avoid collisions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ Captain struck the right winglet on a baggage cart at LAX after the First Officer and Marshaller both signaled to continue.

Narrative: After landing we were assigned a gate in LAX. Both the First Officer and I noticed a train of three baggage carts close to the area where the right wing-tip would pass. The Marshaller was signaling to proceed; and even appeared to glance at the carts in question. The First Officer was closely observing the distance between our wing and the carts; and assured me we had adequate clearance. There was no wing-walker on the right side. I proceeded very slowly. At about 25 feet prior to the gate; we were jolted by a moderate bump; as the Marshaller simultaneously signaled 'emergency stop.' I immediately stopped the aircraft. The First Officer saw the carts jolt and commented with surprise that we had made contact with the carts. I then announced to the passengers that we had struck a cart; and asked them to stay seated. We completed the engine shutdown and associated checklist. Operations / ramp soon deplaned the passengers via the ramp and stairs. The right winglet had struck the second of the three carts. The aircraft was damaged on the right winglet leading edge about one-third to one-half the way up; with paint scratches and markings on the navigation light and the outside of the winglet. I thought about stopping; but instead I elected to proceed on the basis of the Marshaller's signals and the First Officer's assurance we had wingtip clearance. I was at first somewhat confused by the two lead-in lines (one was for larger jets; and the other; dashed line was for RJ's). I was focused on the Marshaller and being on the correct lead-in line and didn't see that the carts were in the safety diamond. The ramp was very busy; there was no wing-walker on the right side; and the visibility out of the side windows is limited and possibly distorted by the thick; angled window glass. The environment was very fast-changing and dynamic; requiring extra vigilance. The Marshaller was possibly distracted by the busy ramp; and he did not see the impending collision until it was happening. The cart we struck was turned at an odd angle with reference to the other two carts on either side of it; so it's corner was protruding further out than it appeared; making the distance from the wing harder to judge. My First Officer and I simply mis-judged the distance from the wings to the carts. I should have refused to proceed until the carts were moved. I relied on the judgment of others to keep moving at a time when prudence should have dictated that I stop. Captains should be extra conservative when taxiing in busy and congested areas. When in doubt; stop and make people move things or assure adequate clearance at each point of potential collision. All flight crewmembers should be warned and educated about the apparent and potential visual distortions and illusions which can occur; and when in doubt; either crew-member should use the brakes to avoid collisions.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.