Narrative:

We were delayed 70 minutes at the gate due to thunderstorms and intermittent ramp closures. With what seemed to be a significant gap in the series of thunderstorms approaching the airport; the ramp opened; bag loading was being completed; and I informed the first officer and our jumpseater to return to the cockpit. When seated the first officer retrieved the new ATIS and reloaded performance data into the opc. We had not; at this point; accomplished the before start checklist. The loadsheet then arrived and within maybe one minute; the pushback crew banged on the side of the plane to get my attention told me the ramp had just closed and they would push us; but it had to be right away. My thought was to get the plane off the gate safely; set the brake; and run all checklists once we were out on the ramp with the brake set. The first officer called for and received push clearance. I checked door annunciator lights; ground power; hydraulic pumps; and gave the 'brakes released clear to push' hand signals. We pushed back; set brakes; cleared the push crew and they left. We ran all checklists unhurried and in sequence started engines; taxied; and flew uneventfully to our destination. The problem was our pushback was not per fom procedures and the engines were started with no personnel outside to direct and monitor the start. Looking back; I feel that an elevated level of professionalism on my part would have eliminated our non-standard procedure. I should have kept my mind on the fact that the ramp could close again at any time and should have directed completion of cockpit tasks a little sooner than I did. I should have communicated with the tug driver earlier and let him know how we were progressing in the cockpit. At the time; performing the actions that seemed reasonable and I believed that there was no safety hazard or jeopardy to the aircraft. However; shortly after; I realized these are the circumstances which start a chain of events that lead to errors. I believe in the value of our ground school training; identifying situations as 'condition green; yellow and red' and I should have applied that here; identifying our environment as condition 'yellow' well in advance. I also have given thought to the fact that I would not consciously violate fom policy; yet I chose to prematurely push off the gate; thinking I could make it right by performing all checklists and required procedures after push with the brake set. I also chose to start engines with nobody outside directing the start; thinking that if we can do it that way when experiencing delays on taxiways; we can do it here. I realize that this is the kind of thinking that can lead to serious problems. If we were not able to prepare for push as per fom; I should not have allowed the push. If we were unable to start engines exactly as per fom; we should not have done it. I have learned through this experience that a situation can exist where you know that you are not following exact fom guidance; but have justified in your mind that you are not really violating the fom. I do not think that this is acceptable; especially as it relates to preflight procedures. I also understand better that this way of thinking can be insidious and can have serious results.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-700 flight crew allowed themselves to be pushed back and depart without following SOP while the airport was being struck by thunderstorms; which were causing the ramp to be closed to ground personnel for their own safety.

Narrative: We were delayed 70 minutes at the gate due to thunderstorms and intermittent ramp closures. With what seemed to be a significant gap in the series of thunderstorms approaching the airport; the ramp opened; bag loading was being completed; and I informed the First Officer and our Jumpseater to return to the cockpit. When seated the First Officer retrieved the new ATIS and reloaded performance data into the OPC. We had not; at this point; accomplished the Before Start Checklist. The loadsheet then arrived and within maybe one minute; the pushback crew banged on the side of the plane to get my attention told me the ramp had just closed and they would push us; but it had to be right away. My thought was to get the plane off the gate safely; set the brake; and run all checklists once we were out on the ramp with the brake set. The First Officer called for and received push clearance. I checked door annunciator lights; ground power; hydraulic pumps; and gave the 'brakes released clear to push' hand signals. We pushed back; set brakes; cleared the push crew and they left. We ran all checklists unhurried and in sequence started engines; taxied; and flew uneventfully to our destination. The problem was our pushback was not per FOM procedures and the engines were started with no personnel outside to direct and monitor the start. Looking back; I feel that an elevated level of professionalism on my part would have eliminated our non-standard procedure. I should have kept my mind on the fact that the ramp could close again at any time and should have directed completion of cockpit tasks a little sooner than I did. I should have communicated with the Tug Driver earlier and let him know how we were progressing in the cockpit. At the time; performing the actions that seemed reasonable and I believed that there was no safety hazard or jeopardy to the aircraft. However; shortly after; I realized these are the circumstances which start a chain of events that lead to errors. I believe in the value of our ground school training; identifying situations as 'condition green; yellow and red' and I should have applied that here; identifying our environment as condition 'yellow' well in advance. I also have given thought to the fact that I would not consciously violate FOM policy; yet I chose to prematurely push off the gate; thinking I could make it right by performing all checklists and required procedures after push with the brake set. I also chose to start engines with nobody outside directing the start; thinking that if we can do it that way when experiencing delays on taxiways; we can do it here. I realize that this is the kind of thinking that can lead to serious problems. If we were not able to prepare for push as per FOM; I should not have allowed the push. If we were unable to start engines exactly as per FOM; we should not have done it. I have learned through this experience that a situation can exist where you know that you are not following exact FOM guidance; but have justified in your mind that you are not really violating the FOM. I do not think that this is acceptable; especially as it relates to preflight procedures. I also understand better that this way of thinking can be insidious and can have serious results.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.