37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 101074 |
Time | |
Date | 198812 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : gbn |
State Reference | AZ |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 31000 msl bound upper : 31000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zla artcc : zab |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Large Transport, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | cruise other |
Route In Use | enroute : direct enroute airway : j2 |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : radar |
Qualification | controller : radar |
ASRS Report | 101074 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : radar |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | faa : investigated |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Inter Facility Coordination Failure Intra Facility Coordination Failure Operational Deviation |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | other physical facility |
Narrative:
Air carrier X was issued a clearance from over gbn direct to ipl (which had been coordinated for the duration of the watch between ZLA and ZAB). The handoff had been accepted by ZLA sector 31-11.25 NM east of R2307. The aircraft involved was changed to sector 31's frequency 8.1 NM east of R2307. I believed (as the radar controller) the area was open to aircraft as I had worked the sector earlier. I and ZLA controllers had cleared aircraft through R2307. When I gave the direct ipl clearance, the manual controller (fpl) also made the mistake of looking at the status board which showed ipl-gbn coordination in effect. There are more than 13 restr areas and 9 MOA's and atacc's immediately adjacent to this airspace I was working. The following day watch I observed 9 changes to various restr areas within a 7 hour period. With the close proximity of these areas, the frequency of when they go hot or cold, I recommend a more standard means of noting this on the pvd (some controllers write on the scope in grease pen, others start limited data blocks, and others rely on strips). Data systems should and could adapt a program that indicates with diagonal lines (closely spaced) those areas restr from ATC use. The incident probably would not have happened nor would it likely occur in the future if these areas were adapted to alert controllers, as does the C/a function, that these aircraft are about to enter restr airspace. This alert function could activate when aircraft penetrate a 2 min parameter, for example. Additionally, the area supervisor signed on at the time of this incident was seated at a desk with his back to this combined sector, not observing. Furthermore, this supervisor is working an operational position and is not certified on all sectors in the specialty, as are his peers. It is his responsibility to be certified, current and then be responsible to supervise the specialty.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: UNCOORDINATED PENETRATION OF RESTRICTED AREA BY ACR ACFT. OPERATIONAL DEVIATION. INFORMATION DISSEMINATION PROC SUGGESTION BY REPORTER.
Narrative: ACR X WAS ISSUED A CLRNC FROM OVER GBN DIRECT TO IPL (WHICH HAD BEEN COORDINATED FOR THE DURATION OF THE WATCH BTWN ZLA AND ZAB). THE HDOF HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY ZLA SECTOR 31-11.25 NM E OF R2307. THE ACFT INVOLVED WAS CHANGED TO SECTOR 31'S FREQ 8.1 NM E OF R2307. I BELIEVED (AS THE RADAR CTLR) THE AREA WAS OPEN TO ACFT AS I HAD WORKED THE SECTOR EARLIER. I AND ZLA CTLRS HAD CLRED ACFT THROUGH R2307. WHEN I GAVE THE DIRECT IPL CLRNC, THE MANUAL CTLR (FPL) ALSO MADE THE MISTAKE OF LOOKING AT THE STATUS BOARD WHICH SHOWED IPL-GBN COORD IN EFFECT. THERE ARE MORE THAN 13 RESTR AREAS AND 9 MOA'S AND ATACC'S IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THIS AIRSPACE I WAS WORKING. THE FOLLOWING DAY WATCH I OBSERVED 9 CHANGES TO VARIOUS RESTR AREAS WITHIN A 7 HR PERIOD. WITH THE CLOSE PROX OF THESE AREAS, THE FREQ OF WHEN THEY GO HOT OR COLD, I RECOMMEND A MORE STANDARD MEANS OF NOTING THIS ON THE PVD (SOME CTLRS WRITE ON THE SCOPE IN GREASE PEN, OTHERS START LIMITED DATA BLOCKS, AND OTHERS RELY ON STRIPS). DATA SYSTEMS SHOULD AND COULD ADAPT A PROGRAM THAT INDICATES WITH DIAGONAL LINES (CLOSELY SPACED) THOSE AREAS RESTR FROM ATC USE. THE INCIDENT PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED NOR WOULD IT LIKELY OCCUR IN THE FUTURE IF THESE AREAS WERE ADAPTED TO ALERT CTLRS, AS DOES THE C/A FUNCTION, THAT THESE ACFT ARE ABOUT TO ENTER RESTR AIRSPACE. THIS ALERT FUNCTION COULD ACTIVATE WHEN ACFT PENETRATE A 2 MIN PARAMETER, FOR EXAMPLE. ADDITIONALLY, THE AREA SUPVR SIGNED ON AT THE TIME OF THIS INCIDENT WAS SEATED AT A DESK WITH HIS BACK TO THIS COMBINED SECTOR, NOT OBSERVING. FURTHERMORE, THIS SUPVR IS WORKING AN OPERATIONAL POS AND IS NOT CERTIFIED ON ALL SECTORS IN THE SPECIALTY, AS ARE HIS PEERS. IT IS HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO BE CERTIFIED, CURRENT AND THEN BE RESPONSIBLE TO SUPERVISE THE SPECIALTY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.