Narrative:

Just after rotation on takeoff; as I was watching for a positive rate of climb; the aircraft seemed to sink slightly (perhaps 10 feet) and require more aileron and rudder input to stay on runway heading. I thought this must have been due to mechanical turbulence associated with the gusty winds (approximately 150 degrees) coming over the terminal. Achieving positive rate of climb; I made the 'positive rate; gear up' call out; and the captain raised the gear. We immediately began to hear a thumping-type noise; followed by a noise that sounded to me like a spinning tire rubbing against the aircraft fuselage; on the right side of the airplane. The aircraft began to demand unusual control inputs to maintain our clearance to climb on runway heading. The noise continued; and a strong vibration was felt. I looked at the EICAS and observed the engine #2 N1 value was drastically reduced; and the itt had well exceeded limits with the dial filled in red. I said to the captain that we had an 'engine failure; right side'. The aircraft was climbing well; at approximately V2. He declared an emergency with ATC; as they were trying to hand us off to departure control. I reached up to the flight guidance panel and selected heading and bank mode myself; while the captain was busy on the radio. As there were thunderstorms at our 12 o'clock; we requested and were given a heading of 180 degrees. I called for 'heading; bank' even though I'd already selected it; to get us on the proper sequence of events in line with sopa/smac for an engine failure. Thus; when the captain pressed the heading and bnk buttons; the flight director switched to roll mode; and took the bank protections off. I immediately re-armed heading/bnk modes myself. Just past acceleration altitude I called for flch and we began to accelerate to vfs; and retracted the flaps on schedule. We requested and were cleared to maintain 3;000 ft. Upon reaching; I selected the speed to 210 KTS and called for 'con; bank'. The captain selected max continuous thrust and we both confirmed that the engine #1 had appropriately changed N1. I selected the autopilot on; and told the captain I had the radios; and to reference the 'engine failure qrc/QRH'. The flight attendants called over the intercom; and reported to the captain that sparks had been seen flying out of the right engine. ATC queried us as to our intentions; and I told them we'd be returning to [departure airport]. We were given vectors to the west; and then circled south of the approach end to [runway]. The engine failure qrc/QRH was completed. Prior to fully shutting down engine 2; I observed the respective itt reach approximately 1300 degrees; both igniters a and B on; and the engine wind-milling icon displayed. The captain thoroughly completed the QRH procedures; including the single engine landing checklist. We discussed that we would be landing a few hundred pounds over max landing weight (the FMS estimated approximately 75;600 pounds); and agreed based off the overweight landing procedure referenced in the QRH that this was acceptable and necessary. He also briefed the flight attendants with the test items. We did not expect an evacuation after landing; but would have the crash/fire/rescue trucks standing by. I reprogrammed the FMS for our return; and loaded the approach for the ILS. Once we were fully ready; we advised ATC. They gave us a heading to intercept the final and cleared us for a visual. The captain completed the descent and the approach checklists. Approximately five to seven miles outside the final approach fix I began slowing the aircraft and calling for flaps. Upon intercepting the glideslope and beginning to descend I called for the gear down; the flaps 5; and the landing check. At approximately 1;000 ft I turned the autopilot off. The gusty winds made airspeed control difficult (150 degrees gusting to +25 KTS). I called for an extra 10 KTS on vapp. The landing was made normally; with minimum reverse (to avoid control issues with asymmetric reverse thrust) and maximum braking. Stopping on the runway; the captain set the parking brake and advised ATC of our intentions to stop there and assess the situation with coordination with the fire department. He began the emergency evacuation checklist in line with SOP. We were given another frequency to speak directly with the fire department. They informed us that there were no signs of fire; and no signs of damage to the aircraft; with exception to the failed engine. I made a quick PA to calm the passengers and assure them there was no immediate danger; inform them to remain in their seats with seat belts fastened; and that we would be taxiing clear of the runway and to a gate; where they would be given more information. We then taxied clear of the runway and to the gate; with the emergency personnel following close behind. With the parking check completed at the gate; the passengers were safely deplaned using the jetbridge. The crew then went out to observe the damage and meet with ground personnel; whereupon we were informed by maintenance personnel that the failed engine had ingested a large bird. As the root cause of this incident was an act of nature outside pilots' direct control; proffering my suggestions as to bird strike mitigation would be outside the purview of this report. One thing to help pilots in the future handle this type of emergency would be engine failure scenarios in the simulator that occurred at more random times; as opposed to the traditional 'V1 cut'. Though I do think that practicing multiple V1 cuts in simulator sessions in my past training greatly helped me handle this incident; the fact that this engine failure occurred as the landing gear was being retracted was disorienting at first. Recognizing the engine failure; and being able to make the cognitive switch to the appropriate procedure to handle it; can take time when each second is critical. So perhaps in future recurrent training in the simulator; pilots could be given an engine failure/fire/etc. Soon after takeoff; but not precisely at V1.the opportunity to practice flying the actual aircraft; not a simulator; single-engine (like the air force trains) would give pilots a huge step up in proficiency in how to handle the real aircraft in such an emergency. Though I expect this suggestion will be viewed as cost-prohibitive; I would be remiss if I did not address it. The natural stress and fear of handling the aircraft while down to one engine cannot be replicated in the simulator; where a pilot's confidence in his abilities; owing in part to past successes; easily overcomes the psychological stress of a 'jeopardy' training event. In the real emergency; I found my brain tending toward a tunnel vision fixated strictly on flying the airplane; much more so than when I've been drilled on similar scenarios in the simulator; and it was thanks in part to real world experiences that helped me fight this 'brain lock'.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ERJ-170 flight crew ingested a bird and suffered engine failure shortly after liftoff. They ran the QRH; secured the engine; and returned to departure airport.

Narrative: Just after rotation on takeoff; as I was watching for a positive rate of climb; the aircraft seemed to sink slightly (perhaps 10 feet) and require more aileron and rudder input to stay on runway heading. I thought this must have been due to mechanical turbulence associated with the gusty winds (approximately 150 degrees) coming over the terminal. Achieving positive rate of climb; I made the 'positive rate; gear up' call out; and the Captain raised the gear. We immediately began to hear a thumping-type noise; followed by a noise that sounded to me like a spinning tire rubbing against the aircraft fuselage; on the right side of the airplane. The aircraft began to demand unusual control inputs to maintain our clearance to climb on runway heading. The noise continued; and a strong vibration was felt. I looked at the EICAS and observed the Engine #2 N1 value was drastically reduced; and the ITT had well exceeded limits with the dial filled in red. I said to the Captain that we had an 'engine failure; right side'. The aircraft was climbing well; at approximately V2. He declared an emergency with ATC; as they were trying to hand us off to Departure Control. I reached up to the flight guidance panel and selected HDG and BANK mode myself; while the Captain was busy on the radio. As there were thunderstorms at our 12 o'clock; we requested and were given a heading of 180 degrees. I called for 'Heading; Bank' even though I'd already selected it; to get us on the proper sequence of events in line with SOPA/SMAC for an engine failure. Thus; when the Captain pressed the HDG and BNK buttons; the flight director switched to ROLL mode; and took the bank protections off. I immediately re-armed HDG/BNK modes myself. Just past acceleration altitude I called for FLCH and we began to accelerate to VFS; and retracted the flaps on schedule. We requested and were cleared to maintain 3;000 FT. Upon reaching; I selected the speed to 210 KTS and called for 'CON; BANK'. The Captain selected max continuous thrust and we both confirmed that the Engine #1 had appropriately changed N1. I selected the autopilot on; and told the Captain I had the radios; and to reference the 'Engine failure QRC/QRH'. The flight attendants called over the intercom; and reported to the Captain that sparks had been seen flying out of the right engine. ATC queried us as to our intentions; and I told them we'd be returning to [departure airport]. We were given vectors to the west; and then circled south of the approach end to [runway]. The engine failure QRC/QRH was completed. Prior to fully shutting down engine 2; I observed the respective ITT reach approximately 1300 degrees; both igniters A and B ON; and the engine wind-milling icon displayed. The Captain thoroughly completed the QRH procedures; including the Single Engine Landing checklist. We discussed that we would be landing a few hundred pounds over Max Landing Weight (the FMS estimated approximately 75;600 LBS); and agreed based off the overweight landing procedure referenced in the QRH that this was acceptable and necessary. He also briefed the flight attendants with the TEST items. We did not expect an evacuation after landing; but would have the crash/fire/rescue trucks standing by. I reprogrammed the FMS for our return; and loaded the approach for the ILS. Once we were fully ready; we advised ATC. They gave us a heading to intercept the final and cleared us for a visual. The Captain completed the Descent and the Approach checklists. Approximately five to seven miles outside the final approach fix I began slowing the aircraft and calling for flaps. Upon intercepting the glideslope and beginning to descend I called for the gear down; the flaps 5; and the landing check. At approximately 1;000 FT I turned the autopilot off. The gusty winds made airspeed control difficult (150 degrees gusting to +25 KTS). I called for an extra 10 KTS on VAPP. The landing was made normally; with minimum reverse (to avoid control issues with asymmetric reverse thrust) and maximum braking. Stopping on the runway; the Captain set the parking brake and advised ATC of our intentions to stop there and assess the situation with coordination with the Fire Department. He began the Emergency Evacuation checklist in line with SOP. We were given another frequency to speak directly with the Fire Department. They informed us that there were no signs of fire; and no signs of damage to the aircraft; with exception to the failed engine. I made a quick PA to calm the passengers and assure them there was no immediate danger; inform them to remain in their seats with seat belts fastened; and that we would be taxiing clear of the runway and to a gate; where they would be given more information. We then taxied clear of the runway and to the gate; with the emergency personnel following close behind. With the Parking Check completed at the gate; the passengers were safely deplaned using the jetbridge. The crew then went out to observe the damage and meet with ground personnel; whereupon we were informed by Maintenance personnel that the failed engine had ingested a large bird. As the root cause of this incident was an act of nature outside pilots' direct control; proffering my suggestions as to bird strike mitigation would be outside the purview of this report. One thing to help pilots in the future handle this type of emergency would be engine failure scenarios in the simulator that occurred at more random times; as opposed to the traditional 'V1 cut'. Though I do think that practicing multiple V1 cuts in simulator sessions in my past training greatly helped me handle this incident; the fact that this engine failure occurred as the landing gear was being retracted was disorienting at first. Recognizing the engine failure; and being able to make the cognitive switch to the appropriate procedure to handle it; can take time when each second is critical. So perhaps in future recurrent training in the simulator; pilots could be given an engine failure/fire/etc. soon after takeoff; but not precisely at V1.The opportunity to practice flying the actual aircraft; not a simulator; single-engine (like the Air Force trains) would give pilots a huge step up in proficiency in how to handle the real aircraft in such an emergency. Though I expect this suggestion will be viewed as cost-prohibitive; I would be remiss if I did not address it. The natural stress and fear of handling the aircraft while down to one engine cannot be replicated in the simulator; where a pilot's confidence in his abilities; owing in part to past successes; easily overcomes the psychological stress of a 'jeopardy' training event. In the real emergency; I found my brain tending toward a tunnel vision fixated strictly on flying the airplane; much more so than when I've been drilled on similar scenarios in the simulator; and it was thanks in part to real world experiences that helped me fight this 'brain lock'.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.