Narrative:

Inbound to iah at FL330; the houston center controller issued a clearance to cross hammu at 10;000 ft and 280 KIAS. According to the FMS; the aircraft was about 13 minutes away from hammu when the clearance was given. The clearance was accepted; read back by the pm; verbalized by the PF and entered into the FMS and pfd and confirmed by both pilots. A descent was not initiated at this point. About 7 minutes away from hammu the controller queried us about whether we were going to be able to comply with our clearance. The pm indicated that we probably could; the PF immediately initiated a descent at just below mmo/vmo with the speed brakes deployed and the thrust levers at idle. About 3 or 4 minutes from hammu the controller queried us again and the pm indicated that we were doing our best. We were instructed to contact the next controller and given a new frequency. We checked in with new controller and crossed hammu at about 10;800 ft and 290 KIAS. In this case the sole cause of this deviation was the PF; me; not paying close enough attention to the task at hand. The pm and I were engaged in a conversation and I allowed myself to become distracted from my primary responsibility...flying the airplane. Normally when given a clearance like this; with a delayed initiation of the descent; I pull the tray out from the glareshield and articulate to the pm how many minutes it will be when the descent will be initiated and; sometimes; at what descent rate. In this case I did none of that and the result was an altitude and speed deviation. It could be articulated that the pm could have 'monitored' more closely; and that likely that is true; but ultimately it is my responsibility to do my job. If I had done that this would not have occurred.suggestions: in the future; I will be more diligent in ensuring that I comply with the company's SOP; suggested best practices; as well as my own standards of conduct to ensure that this never happens again. There is no conversation that is that interesting that it can't be delayed until we are safely at the gate with the parking brake set. Lesson learned.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145 flight crew missed a crossing restriction issued by ATC. First Officer; Pilot Flying; attributed the error to distraction caused by a conversation with the Captain.

Narrative: Inbound to IAH at FL330; the Houston Center Controller issued a clearance to cross HAMMU at 10;000 ft and 280 KIAS. According to the FMS; the aircraft was about 13 minutes away from HAMMU when the clearance was given. The clearance was accepted; read back by the PM; verbalized by the PF and entered into the FMS and PFD and confirmed by both pilots. A descent was not initiated at this point. About 7 minutes away from HAMMU the Controller queried us about whether we were going to be able to comply with our clearance. The PM indicated that we probably could; the PF immediately initiated a descent at just below MMO/VMO with the speed brakes deployed and the thrust levers at idle. About 3 or 4 minutes from HAMMU the Controller queried us again and the PM indicated that we were doing our best. We were instructed to contact the next Controller and given a new frequency. We checked in with new Controller and crossed HAMMU at about 10;800 ft and 290 KIAS. In this case the sole cause of this deviation was the PF; me; not paying close enough attention to the task at hand. The PM and I were engaged in a conversation and I allowed myself to become distracted from my primary responsibility...flying the airplane. Normally when given a clearance like this; with a delayed initiation of the descent; I pull the tray out from the glareshield and articulate to the PM how many minutes it will be when the descent will be initiated and; sometimes; at what descent rate. In this case I did none of that and the result was an altitude and speed deviation. It could be articulated that the PM could have 'monitored' more closely; and that likely that is true; but ultimately it is my responsibility to do my job. If I had done that this would not have occurred.Suggestions: In the future; I will be more diligent in ensuring that I comply with the company's SOP; suggested best practices; as well as my own standards of conduct to ensure that this never happens again. There is no conversation that is that interesting that it can't be delayed until we are safely at the gate with the parking brake set. Lesson learned.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.