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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1019634 |
Time | |
Date | 201206 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | JLN.Airport |
State Reference | MO |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Small Aircraft Low Wing 1 Eng Fixed Gear |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Small Aircraft High Wing 1 Eng Retractable Gear |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Route In Use | Visual Approach |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Single Pilot |
Qualification | Flight Crew Private |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8 Flight Crew Total 1077 Flight Crew Type 1077 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Conflict Ground Conflict Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Clearance Ground Incursion Runway |
Narrative:
While taxiing on taxiway east to runway 31; I saw signage and verified the feature on the airport diagram as the ILS hold position. From the positioning of the other taxiway/runway hold position lines; I expected the hold position signage to be around the corner of the taxiway. I stopped the aircraft on the corner when no hold position signage was visually identified between the taxiway corner and runway 13. I may have over-ran the hold position signage while checking the airport diagram to verify the ILS hold; aircraft instruments or watching for the traffic in the pattern since I do not remember passing one feature (signage) prior to rounding the corner. The aircraft was stopped in a position; more or less; in line with the taxiway where it was no hazard to aircraft in the pattern or on the runway. ATC waved off the aircraft in the pattern that had turned on final per policy. ATC reported the stopped aircraft was in-line with the church across the highway which verifies the location on the corner at the end of the taxiway. Contributing factors [were]: pilot performance; failure to see signage most likely due to other piloting related tasks; i.e.; checking airport diagrams; instrument scans; and visual identification of traffic in pattern -- distraction. Corrective action: better scanning technique [and] familiarity with airport quirks (non-standard items). Pilot performance: good judgment in stopping aircraft in a safe location after identification that the hold position line was not where it was expected to be in the standard configuration. Contributing factor: taxiway/runway hold position and signage not in a standardized (expected) location compared to other runways/taxiways. Corrective action: maintain standardized taxi/runway configurations as much as possible. Publish non-standard configurations in facility directories/publications.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A pilot reported a runway incursion at JLN Runway 31 after failing to recognize the runway critical hold line because of the line's distance from the runway approach end.
Narrative: While taxiing on Taxiway E to Runway 31; I saw signage and verified the feature on the airport diagram as the ILS hold position. From the positioning of the other taxiway/runway hold position lines; I expected the hold position signage to be around the corner of the taxiway. I stopped the aircraft on the corner when no hold position signage was visually identified between the taxiway corner and Runway 13. I may have over-ran the hold position signage while checking the airport diagram to verify the ILS hold; aircraft instruments or watching for the traffic in the pattern since I do not remember passing one feature (signage) prior to rounding the corner. The aircraft was stopped in a position; more or less; in line with the taxiway where it was no hazard to aircraft in the pattern or on the runway. ATC waved off the aircraft in the pattern that had turned on final per policy. ATC reported the stopped aircraft was in-line with the church across the highway which verifies the location on the corner at the end of the taxiway. Contributing factors [were]: pilot performance; failure to see signage most likely due to other piloting related tasks; i.e.; checking airport diagrams; instrument scans; and visual ID of traffic in pattern -- distraction. Corrective action: better scanning technique [and] familiarity with airport quirks (non-standard items). Pilot performance: good judgment in stopping aircraft in a safe location after identification that the hold position line was not where it was expected to be in the standard configuration. Contributing factor: Taxiway/runway hold position and signage not in a standardized (expected) location compared to other runways/taxiways. Corrective action: Maintain standardized taxi/runway configurations as much as possible. Publish non-standard configurations in facility directories/publications.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.