A B737-800 flight crew had some internal confusion on how to deal with an intermittent wheel well fi...

Narrative:

On departure; somewhere near FL250; we experienced the illumination of the wheel well fire warning light and the fire warning bell sounded. The initial indication lasted approximately four seconds; extinguished briefly; sounded [again] briefly; and then extinguished with no further indications. Though the pilots immediately reached for the QRH; the indications extinguished prior to the accomplishment of step 1 in the procedure section of the wheel well fire checklist. There was a disagreement as to whether the checklist items applied to this specific situation (was there any relief from the procedures); as a result of the indications extinguishing prior to the accomplishment of the first step in the procedural section of the checklist. After voicing his opinion; the first officer asked the captain to confirm his decisions with someone outside of the flight deck. Upon reaching the cruise altitude of FL340; the captain called company. After a bit of coordination and discussion via radio and ACARS; it was suggested that we land as soon as possible. We complied with no further complications. Note: the new dispatch release appears to have taken off the operations frequencies associated with points along the route. This was a distraction.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-800 Flight Crew had some internal confusion on how to deal with an intermittent wheel well fire warning. They decided to divert as a precaution.

Narrative: On departure; somewhere near FL250; we experienced the illumination of the WHEEL WELL Fire Warning light and the fire warning bell sounded. The initial indication lasted approximately four seconds; extinguished briefly; sounded [again] briefly; and then extinguished with no further indications. Though the pilots immediately reached for the QRH; the indications extinguished prior to the accomplishment of Step 1 in the Procedure section of the Wheel Well Fire Checklist. There was a disagreement as to whether the checklist items applied to this specific situation (was there any relief from the procedures); as a result of the indications extinguishing prior to the accomplishment of the first step in the procedural section of the checklist. After voicing his opinion; the First Officer asked the Captain to confirm his decisions with someone outside of the flight deck. Upon reaching the cruise altitude of FL340; the Captain called Company. After a bit of coordination and discussion via radio and ACARS; it was suggested that we land as soon as possible. We complied with no further complications. Note: The new Dispatch Release appears to have taken off the Operations frequencies associated with points along the route. This was a distraction.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	1020502
Time
Date	201206
Local Time Of Day	0601-1200
Place
Locale Reference	ZZZ.Airport
State Reference	US
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	B737-800
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Climb
Component
Aircraft Component	Fire/Overheat Warning
Person 1
Function	First Officer
Experience	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 145
Events
Anomaly	Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A B737-800 flight crew had some internal confusion on how to deal with an intermittent wheel well fire warning. They decided to divert as a precaution.