Narrative:

My day started early [morning] in july; 2012. My task [as a maintenance supervisor] was to get aircraft X; a B767-300 aircraft; in service and ready to fly on a test flight with the assist of my assigned crew members. We achieved that task; and upon crew arrival; the flight crew made inquiries about a possible leak at the #4 brake. I had [assigned] a technician to check the brake and to provide a report to the crew and to clear the item in the logbook. The aircraft made the flight and returned with several repairable items; along with the #4 brake change. The aircraft returned from it's [test] flight approximately two and a half hours later and there was no assigned supervisor to the 2nd or 3rd shift; so I was asked to stay to get the aircraft back in service for a re-fly the following morning. The 2nd shift crew performed the brake replacement [later that night] and short-signed the discrepancy/non-routine an hour later on his way off-shift; to which he stated: 'removed and replaced (right/right) #4 main landing gear (medium large transport) brake assembly per B767 aircraft maintenance manual (amm) up to and including step #15.' I was reviewing all 'open' items left on the maintenance planning sheet and noticed that the non-routine was left incomplete. I got a copy of the maintenance manual 32-41-08 and read it down to step #15; and it appeared to me that step #16 was at the point of installing the wheel assembly. At that point I did not read any further cause I knew that we had assigned the main gear tire/wheel assembly installation [rii] critical items card 32-96-52 and that card was completed and signed-off. I closed and audited the non-routine in an effort to rush and get the aircraft back in service and ready for the next day's flight schedule. I [had] accepted the challenge of taking on additional [work] shifts to get the aircraft back in service for a re-fly the following morning. I closed and audited the non-routine; [but] in this case; a third set of eyes could have prevented the incident. [I] missed rii for brake rod connection; [found during] paperwork audit. Rii was accomplished at a later station. [Company should] provide adequate staffing to address all shifts; read the entire applicable instructions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Maintenance Supervisor reports he missed an RII requirement for the inspection of a Main Landing Gear (MLG) #4 Brake Rod connection on a B767-300 aircraft; when he closed-out a Brake Non-Routine write-up. He had worked three shifts in twenty-four hours.

Narrative: My day started early [morning] in July; 2012. My task [as a Maintenance Supervisor] was to get Aircraft X; a B767-300 aircraft; in service and ready to fly on a Test Flight with the assist of my assigned crew members. We achieved that task; and upon crew arrival; the flight crew made inquiries about a possible leak at the #4 Brake. I had [assigned] a Technician to check the brake and to provide a report to the crew and to clear the item in the logbook. The aircraft made the flight and returned with several repairable items; along with the #4 Brake change. The aircraft returned from it's [test] flight approximately two and a half hours later and there was no assigned Supervisor to the 2nd or 3rd shift; so I was asked to stay to get the aircraft back in service for a re-fly the following morning. The 2nd shift crew performed the brake replacement [later that night] and short-signed the Discrepancy/Non-Routine an hour later on his way off-shift; to which he stated: 'Removed and Replaced (R/R) #4 Main Landing Gear (MLG) Brake Assembly per B767 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) up to and including Step #15.' I was reviewing all 'Open' items left on the Maintenance Planning Sheet and noticed that the Non-Routine was left incomplete. I got a copy of the Maintenance Manual 32-41-08 and read it down to Step #15; and it appeared to me that Step #16 was at the point of installing the Wheel Assembly. At that point I did not read any further cause I knew that we had assigned the Main Gear Tire/Wheel Assembly Installation [RII] Critical Items Card 32-96-52 and that card was completed and signed-off. I closed and audited the Non-Routine in an effort to rush and get the aircraft back in service and ready for the next day's flight schedule. I [had] accepted the challenge of taking on additional [work] shifts to get the aircraft back in service for a re-fly the following morning. I closed and audited the Non-Routine; [but] in this case; a third set of eyes could have prevented the incident. [I] missed RII for brake rod connection; [found during] paperwork audit. RII was accomplished at a later station. [Company should] provide adequate staffing to address all shifts; read the entire applicable instructions.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.