Narrative:

We pulled into the pad and shutdown engine two just short of the runway to wait for our 3rd reroute to come from ATC. Just as we pulled into the pad and set the brake; ATC gave us the reroute and said we could depart right away. I then asked to start the number two engine; and began to copy down a clearance; but forgot that we had shut the APU down after we started engine two for the first time. The first officer was distracted for a split second during the engine start and the itt hit 818 for 1 second (confirmed by maintenance). We both noticed it at the same time and executed the engine abnormal start memory items. The itt was not excessive and I did not believe we needed to clear fuel as we were not going to attempt another start. Engine exceedance had appeared on the EICAS. This message renders the engine not acceptable for dispatch and we returned to the gate to summon maintenance. The aircraft was inspected and engine 2 was run-up and then returned to service. 1. This event was following a continuous duty overnight and I believe the industry acceptance of this practice allows for flight crews to think they are awake enough to complete a flight segment; but it increases the chance of human error when other complications are thrown into play. 2. To follow up with number one; here are the contributing factors: 20 minute van ride to and from hotel. Less than 6 hours of sleep. First officer's first trip off of IOE (I needed to maintain a higher level of vigilance). Maintenance write up upon first arrival at gate; this caused us to depart late. Added time pressure 3 ATC routes [and] coordination with dispatch relying on my memory to start the APU. I could have used some kind of external reminder. By the end of the day we had 6 amendments to our release; it was a busy morning. I believe that there were a lot of distractions; internal and external; that were enough to divert my attention from the APU and bleed pressure status. I will always check the bleed pressure before starting an engine. I also think a verbal crosscheck between the pilots on bleed pressure before starting an engine could save an engine. I should have been more vigilant with a newer first officer and should have somehow reminded myself to verify bleed pressure. I should have waited to copy down the clearance until the engine started normally. If both our eyes were on the EICAS we would have been ok.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB170 Captain describes the circumstances leading up to a hot start and return to the gate for maintenance.

Narrative: We pulled into the pad and shutdown engine two just short of the runway to wait for our 3rd reroute to come from ATC. Just as we pulled into the pad and set the brake; ATC gave us the reroute and said we could depart right away. I then asked to start the number two engine; and began to copy down a clearance; but forgot that we had shut the APU down after we started engine two for the first time. The First Officer was distracted for a split second during the engine start and the ITT hit 818 for 1 second (confirmed by Maintenance). We both noticed it at the same time and executed the ENG ABNORMAL START memory items. The ITT was not excessive and I did not believe we needed to clear fuel as we were not going to attempt another start. ENG EXCEEDANCE had appeared on the EICAS. This message renders the engine not acceptable for dispatch and we returned to the gate to summon Maintenance. The aircraft was inspected and Engine 2 was run-up and then returned to service. 1. This event was following a continuous duty overnight and I believe the industry acceptance of this practice allows for flight crews to think they are awake enough to complete a flight segment; but it increases the chance of human error when other complications are thrown into play. 2. To follow up with number one; here are the contributing factors: 20 minute van ride to and from hotel. Less than 6 hours of sleep. First Officer's first trip off of IOE (I needed to maintain a higher level of vigilance). Maintenance write up upon first arrival at gate; this caused us to depart late. Added time pressure 3 ATC routes [and] coordination with Dispatch relying on my memory to start the APU. I could have used some kind of external reminder. By the end of the day we had 6 amendments to our release; it was a busy morning. I believe that there were a lot of distractions; internal and external; that were enough to divert my attention from the APU and bleed pressure status. I will always check the bleed pressure before starting an engine. I also think a verbal crosscheck between the pilots on bleed pressure before starting an engine could save an engine. I should have been more vigilant with a newer First Officer and should have somehow reminded myself to verify bleed pressure. I should have waited to copy down the clearance until the engine started normally. If both our eyes were on the EICAS we would have been OK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.