Narrative:

On climb out we were leveled off at FL320 for traffic; that is when we received our first EICAS message; hydraulic 1 low quantity. I was the flying pilot and the captain was the pilot not flying. The captain proceeded with the QRH; which told us to monitor the system and quantity. I believe the fluid was at the top of the amber range at that time. We continued on and eventually finished our climb to FL360. Roughly 20 minutes later we received our second EICAS message of E1 hydraulic pump fail. The captain then ran the QRH procedure for that which told us to continue and monitor the system. After some discussion we decided to contact dispatch and maintenance. The captain had some trouble via ACARS; so [he] proceeded to call using [commercial communication system]. I believe he was having trouble communicating via that as well. We then started to discuss what would come next in worst case; and both agreed that next we would get a full hydraulic failure. After discussing this we decided that continuing on was not in our best interest; and we contacted dispatch via ACARS; they at that point asked if we could make it back to [departure airport].the captain and I looked over a few options; and decided that was too far and narrowed it down to [several other airports]. So after agreeing on [the most suitable] we then advised ATC of our intentions; and they gave us a turn towards [the new destination]. The controller had asked if we wanted to declare an emergency; and we advised her not at this time. The captain then called the flight attendant to inform him of what was going on; and I commenced the turn. We were then cleared down to FL240 and given a heading and direct when able. I started the descent; and within minutes we got the EICAS message that we were afraid of; hydraulic system 1 fail. The captain then declared an emergency with ATC; and asked for assistance on the ground. We then proceeded with the appropriate QRH; and continued down with the descent which we were then cleared to FL190. During the planning and review of the QRH we both decided it would be necessary and best if we transferred controls of the airplane. So; the captain became pilot flying; and I was then pilot not flying. I continued running the QRH and checklist within. After leveling off at 10;000 ft we then thought it would be appropriate to continue the QRH and get the gear down. I continued the checklist and pulled the handle. The gear seemed to deploy without any problems. We were then turned left for a right extended downwind; and told to advise when ready for an inbound turn. We finished all the QRH checklists; and we were turned inbound and cleared for the ILS. The rollout was lengthy and the captain did an excellent job landing the plane. Tower then advised us of a frequency to talk to the fire crew that was swarming the plane. We established communications with them; and they commenced driving around with the trucks. We then shut down both engines; and they then did a full walk around of the plane telling us everything seemed ok. Operations then hooked us up to the tug; and we had difficulty communicating with them due to a faulty headset they brought. I advised ground control of this issue and they sent the airport authority to marshal us to [the gate]. The captain then called maintenance; and wrote everything up while on the phone with them. We left the airplane without moving anything hydraulic such as flaps and manual gear extension lever per maintenance request.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145XR flight crew reported loss of #1 hydraulic system; so after running the procedure and declaring an emergency they diverted to nearest suitable. Communications proved difficult; complicating the divert.

Narrative: On climb out we were leveled off at FL320 for traffic; that is when we received our first EICAS message; HYD 1 LOW QUANTITY. I was the flying pilot and the Captain was the pilot not flying. The Captain proceeded with the QRH; which told us to monitor the system and quantity. I believe the fluid was at the top of the amber range at that time. We continued on and eventually finished our climb to FL360. Roughly 20 minutes later we received our second EICAS message of E1 HYD PUMP FAIL. The Captain then ran the QRH procedure for that which told us to continue and monitor the system. After some discussion we decided to contact Dispatch and Maintenance. The Captain had some trouble via ACARS; so [he] proceeded to call using [commercial communication system]. I believe he was having trouble communicating via that as well. We then started to discuss what would come next in worst case; and both agreed that next we would get a full hydraulic failure. After discussing this we decided that continuing on was not in our best interest; and we contacted Dispatch via ACARS; they at that point asked if we could make it back to [departure airport].The Captain and I looked over a few options; and decided that was too far and narrowed it down to [several other airports]. So after agreeing on [the most suitable] we then advised ATC of our intentions; and they gave us a turn towards [the new destination]. The Controller had asked if we wanted to declare an emergency; and we advised her not at this time. The Captain then called the Flight Attendant to inform him of what was going on; and I commenced the turn. We were then cleared down to FL240 and given a heading and direct when able. I started the descent; and within minutes we got the EICAS message that we were afraid of; HYD SYS 1 FAIL. The Captain then declared an emergency with ATC; and asked for assistance on the ground. We then proceeded with the appropriate QRH; and continued down with the descent which we were then cleared to FL190. During the planning and review of the QRH we both decided it would be necessary and best if we transferred controls of the airplane. So; the Captain became pilot flying; and I was then pilot not flying. I continued running the QRH and checklist within. After leveling off at 10;000 FT we then thought it would be appropriate to continue the QRH and get the gear down. I continued the checklist and pulled the handle. The gear seemed to deploy without any problems. We were then turned left for a right extended downwind; and told to advise when ready for an inbound turn. We finished all the QRH checklists; and we were turned inbound and cleared for the ILS. The rollout was lengthy and the Captain did an excellent job landing the plane. Tower then advised us of a frequency to talk to the fire crew that was swarming the plane. We established communications with them; and they commenced driving around with the trucks. We then shut down both engines; and they then did a full walk around of the plane telling us everything seemed ok. Operations then hooked us up to the tug; and we had difficulty communicating with them due to a faulty headset they brought. I advised Ground Control of this issue and they sent the airport authority to marshal us to [the gate]. The Captain then called Maintenance; and wrote everything up while on the phone with them. We left the airplane without moving anything hydraulic such as flaps and manual gear extension lever per Maintenance request.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.