Narrative:

I checked the weather and notams for my flight. There were no notams stating there would be any personnel or equipment working on or in the vicinity of any airport surface. The freight arrived and it weighed just over 2;800 pounds putting me 100 to 200 pounds under gross takeoff weight. It was loaded and I blocked out after the tower had closed. I made all appropriate taxi calls on tower frequency stating that I was taxiing to runway 33 for an east departure. My colleague was returning from another flight so I announced I was holding short of runway 33. Immediately after my colleague made his radio call that he was clear of all runways I made my radio announcement of my intentions to take off of runway 33 and do a left turn out for an east departure. My colleague said later that he heard my radio call and wished me a good flight; which was the only other radio transmission that I heard other than my own. The weather was such that I did not need to use cawi [continuous water alcohol injection]; but being just under gross takeoff weight and having up sloping terrain off the departure end of 33 and cawi was available to me; I opted to use it anyway. Upon taking the runway and putting the propeller speeds to high I didn't notice anything unusual except for a lighted airport maintenance truck parked off to the right of runway 33 safety area which remained stationary throughout my takeoff roll. My first indication of a problem occurred just after reaching V1. As I neared the intersection of the crossing runway; a person in the middle of the active runway that I was using shined his flashlight at me. Without hesitation I pulled back aggressively on the yoke to clear the obstacle. As I passed approximately 25-30 ft above the obstacle I saw there was an unlit truck parked on the active runway with three people (all wearing vests) one on the nose of the truck; one on the tail; and one just outside the door of the truck. After completing my after takeoff and climb checklists; I transmitted my departure to the east. Upon my return I reported the incident to my dispatcher and followed up later by reporting it to our chief pilot. I did clearly see at least one truck with their beacons lit out of the runway safety area in the grass. I didn't know there were three trucks until the following morning when I was discussing the incident with my colleague who was also flying that night. If I would have heard them transmit their intentions or if I would have seen a beacon on the active runway prior to entering it or prior to starting my take off roll or prior to passing the point of being committed to the take off; I would have not taken off. There were no notams informing me that I should have been looking for personnel or equipment on or near the runway. I believe a contributing factor was timing in that we may have both transmitted our intentions at the same time blocking each other and neither of us was aware of the other's intentions of taking the runway. Posting a NOTAM would have made a large difference. The only sure way of preventing this occurrence is to have a 24 hour operational control tower.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SA227 pilot reports narrowly missing an unlighted truck parked on his departure runway at night; after the Tower had closed.

Narrative: I checked the weather and NOTAMs for my flight. There were no NOTAMs stating there would be any personnel or equipment working on or in the vicinity of any airport surface. The freight arrived and it weighed just over 2;800 LBS putting me 100 to 200 LBS under gross takeoff weight. It was loaded and I blocked out after the Tower had closed. I made all appropriate taxi calls on Tower frequency stating that I was taxiing to Runway 33 for an east departure. My colleague was returning from another flight so I announced I was holding short of Runway 33. Immediately after my colleague made his radio call that he was clear of all runways I made my radio announcement of my intentions to take off of Runway 33 and do a left turn out for an east departure. My colleague said later that he heard my radio call and wished me a good flight; which was the only other radio transmission that I heard other than my own. The weather was such that I did not need to use CAWI [Continuous Water Alcohol Injection]; but being just under gross takeoff weight and having up sloping terrain off the departure end of 33 and CAWI was available to me; I opted to use it anyway. Upon taking the runway and putting the propeller speeds to high I didn't notice anything unusual except for a lighted airport maintenance truck parked off to the right of Runway 33 safety area which remained stationary throughout my takeoff roll. My first indication of a problem occurred just after reaching V1. As I neared the intersection of the crossing runway; a person in the middle of the active runway that I was using shined his flashlight at me. Without hesitation I pulled back aggressively on the yoke to clear the obstacle. As I passed approximately 25-30 FT above the obstacle I saw there was an unlit truck parked on the active runway with three people (all wearing vests) one on the nose of the truck; one on the tail; and one just outside the door of the truck. After completing my after takeoff and climb checklists; I transmitted my departure to the east. Upon my return I reported the incident to my Dispatcher and followed up later by reporting it to our Chief Pilot. I did clearly see at least one truck with their beacons lit out of the runway safety area in the grass. I didn't know there were three trucks until the following morning when I was discussing the incident with my colleague who was also flying that night. If I would have heard them transmit their intentions or if I would have seen a beacon on the active runway prior to entering it or prior to starting my take off roll OR prior to passing the point of being committed to the take off; I would have not taken off. There were no NOTAMs informing me that I should have been looking for personnel or equipment on or near the runway. I believe a contributing factor was timing in that we may have both transmitted our intentions at the same time blocking each other and neither of us was aware of the other's intentions of taking the runway. Posting a NOTAM would have made a large difference. The only sure way of preventing this occurrence is to have a 24 hour operational Control Tower.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.