Narrative:

The company had put out a couple of messages related to new opd's [optimized profile descent] into iad recently; but neither of us had studied the messages at length. Basically; from what I had read; was that sometimes the descents could get away from you quick; so you have to stay on top of things. They even suggested a 'dive-and-drive' approach to the new procedures. We identified this as a threat when we were issued the new clearance enroute; for this arrival. We both looked at the arrival and briefed it thoroughly. I told the relatively new first officer that all he would need to do is pretty much just fly; and monitor his descent progression. I told him that I would brief his next crossing restrictions in a set manner. I would say; 'the next fix is xxxxx; cross between (or at) flxxx and flxxx. The lowest altitude for this fix is flxxx.' I did it in this manner because we both identified the advantage of being on the lower side of the crossing; than the higher side. As we started down; the vpi [vertical path indicator] came in view; and we pretty quickly got high on that. I pointed that out; and made sure he was correcting. He did correct some; but apparently not enough. Honestly; I think that he may have gotten two of the points confused; as far as the crossing restrictions. Coupled with this; his inexperience in this aircraft showed by his reluctance to descend at much more than 2;500 FPM or so (which I can understand; if you're not used to it). We identified the crossing error; and then corrected more; and made every other altitude and speed restriction on the arrival. Nothing was said by ATC. The first officer did a good job of recovering from this deviation and did not let it fluster him; including a nice landing!we were going in to a new arrival that had been presented to the pilot group; by the company; as a potential threat due to multiple crossing restrictions primarily. There were both altitude and speed restrictions; but the altitudes restriction far outnumber the speeds. The first officer's inexperience in our particular aircraft did not help the situation; with reference to his uncertainty as to what an acceptable rate of descent would be. I think that I got a little focused on what was the next point; just a little ahead of the current waypoint; and by the time I realized that we were too high; it was too late. I do appreciate the company putting out a message about the potential threat of this arrival. A little more advanced notice to allow time to review a training module that is being put together would be nice; but I understand the FAA did not allow more notice. Especially when I am with a newer first officer; especially on an arrival like this; I need to speed my scan just a little bit. We didn't have any real weather to deal with in this scenario; but we were not filed via this arrival but were issued the change in the air. If there had been some weather; or other increased work load factors; getting this change in the air; only a few minutes out; is going to lead to more deviations. We need to be filed via this arrival; if it's what they're going to be using.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB145 Captain describes the factors that resulted in missing a crossing restriction during the GIBBZ1 RNAV arrival to IAD.

Narrative: The company had put out a couple of messages related to new OPD's [Optimized Profile Descent] into IAD recently; but neither of us had studied the messages at length. Basically; from what I had read; was that sometimes the descents could get away from you quick; so you have to stay on top of things. They even suggested a 'Dive-and-Drive' approach to the new procedures. We identified this as a threat when we were issued the new clearance enroute; for this arrival. We both looked at the arrival and briefed it thoroughly. I told the relatively new First Officer that all he would need to do is pretty much just fly; and monitor his descent progression. I told him that I would brief his next crossing restrictions in a set manner. I would say; 'The next fix is XXXXX; cross between (or at) FLXXX and FLXXX. The lowest altitude for this fix is FLXXX.' I did it in this manner because we both identified the advantage of being on the lower side of the crossing; than the higher side. As we started down; the VPI [Vertical Path Indicator] came in view; and we pretty quickly got high on that. I pointed that out; and made sure he was correcting. He did correct some; but apparently not enough. Honestly; I think that he may have gotten two of the points confused; as far as the crossing restrictions. Coupled with this; his inexperience in this aircraft showed by his reluctance to descend at much more than 2;500 FPM or so (which I can understand; if you're not used to it). We identified the crossing error; and then corrected more; and made every other altitude and speed restriction on the arrival. Nothing was said by ATC. The First Officer did a good job of recovering from this deviation and did not let it fluster him; including a nice landing!We were going in to a new arrival that had been presented to the pilot group; by the company; as a potential threat due to multiple crossing restrictions primarily. There were both altitude and speed restrictions; but the altitudes restriction far outnumber the speeds. The First Officer's inexperience in our particular aircraft did not help the situation; with reference to his uncertainty as to what an acceptable rate of descent would be. I think that I got a little focused on what was the next point; just a little ahead of the current waypoint; and by the time I realized that we were too high; it was too late. I do appreciate the company putting out a message about the potential threat of this arrival. A little more advanced notice to allow time to review a training module that is being put together would be nice; but I understand the FAA did not allow more notice. Especially when I am with a newer First Officer; especially on an arrival like this; I need to speed my scan just a little bit. We didn't have any real weather to deal with in this scenario; but we were not filed via this arrival but were issued the change in the air. If there had been some weather; or other increased work load factors; getting this change in the air; only a few minutes out; is going to lead to more deviations. We need to be filed via this arrival; if it's what they're going to be using.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.