Narrative:

The malfunction began roughly 30 minutes into the flight. We received a hydraulic system 1 overheat; we ran the appropriate QRH. After reviewing all information at the time we knew a diversion was needed. After speaking to dispatch and maintenance; they wanted us to continue; with what I quote as 'you should be fine to continue to destination [1;000 NM].' after following the QRH I turned hydraulic system 1 back on; which lead to the same caution warning again. During this I realized what was really going on. We had lost the engine driven pump; and the electric pump could not handle the load and was overheating and failing. We knew a diversion was needed. We coordinated with the company and local operations; declared the emergency with ATC. We needed to burn roughly 2;500 pounds to get below landing weight so we held. During this time we began running through systems we would loose if hydraulic system 1 would not come back online. I decided that this would be a good time to see if the electric pump would be able to lower the gear normally and it would help us burn more fuel. We also agreed that this would be a better time to become aware if the system would work rather then on final approach; especially since we would be down on fuel. A go around followed by more checklists would get us into a worse position fuel wise. We turned on hydraulic system 1 following the QRH; and lowered the gear in the hold. Everything worked properly; and we turned the hydraulic system back off. Got to the appropriate landing weight and began our approach. Continued to follow the QRH and turned hydraulic system 1 back on during approach. I noticed the airplane wasn't handling normally and once we touched down hydraulic system one failed. We lost half the braking and everything else on hydraulic system one. We came to a complete stop on the runway and were tugged back to the terminal. We knew we would not be able to taxi per the QRH; so this was already coordinated with operations and ATC.after landing we were notified by scheduling that we would have a new airplane 3 1/2 hours from then; for a three hour flight to destination. After experiencing our emergency some people would have called it a day. The crew and I wanted to get our passengers to their destination. Scheduling and I spoke that us continuing to our original overnight would not be best considering we would land very early. Instead scheduling thought us landing would be a better idea. I expressed my concerns of us flying at all after this leg; after our emergency divert; 3 1/2 hour sit; and the 3 hour leg to destination. They didn't seem to care about my concerns and told us to call when we got there. After getting to destination we were just drained. The emergency event was mentally fatiguing; obviously we talked about it for the rest of the day. We monday morning quarterbacked the event to see if we did everything correctly; what we could have done better; etc... After calling out fatigued we waited 2 hours to receive a hotel; it was 2 1/2 hours until we got to our rooms and scheduling wanted to give us a reduced rest overnight which was ridiculous. We received at 9 hour overnight from the time we got our rooms until our show time the next morning. I forgot to mention above that the flight attendant and passengers were briefed on all situations and kept up to date. I included everything for the day because these events lead to a fatigue call.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Embraer 145 Captain experiences a Hydraulic System 1 overheat in cruise and elects to divert; although the company suggested they continue to destination. After landing and waiting three and a half hours for a replacement aircraft the crew flies three hours to destination. A fatigue call is used to prevent flying another two hour leg departing after midnight.

Narrative: The malfunction began roughly 30 minutes into the flight. We received a Hydraulic system 1 overheat; we ran the appropriate QRH. After reviewing all information at the time we knew a diversion was needed. After speaking to Dispatch and Maintenance; they wanted us to continue; with what I quote as 'You should be fine to continue to destination [1;000 NM].' After following the QRH I turned Hydraulic System 1 back on; which lead to the same caution warning again. During this I realized what was really going on. We had lost the engine driven pump; and the electric pump could not handle the load and was overheating and failing. We knew a diversion was needed. We coordinated with the company and Local Operations; declared the emergency with ATC. We needed to burn roughly 2;500 LBS to get below landing weight so we held. During this time we began running through systems we would loose if Hydraulic System 1 would not come back online. I decided that this would be a good time to see if the electric pump would be able to lower the gear normally and it would help us burn more fuel. We also agreed that this would be a better time to become aware if the system would work rather then on final approach; especially since we would be down on fuel. A go around followed by more checklists would get us into a worse position fuel wise. We turned on Hydraulic System 1 following the QRH; and lowered the gear in the hold. Everything worked properly; and we turned the Hydraulic System back off. Got to the appropriate landing weight and began our approach. Continued to follow the QRH and turned Hydraulic System 1 back on during approach. I noticed the airplane wasn't handling normally and once we touched down Hydraulic System one failed. We lost half the braking and everything else on Hydraulic System One. We came to a complete stop on the runway and were tugged back to the terminal. We knew we would not be able to taxi per the QRH; so this was already coordinated with Operations and ATC.After landing we were notified by Scheduling that we would have a new airplane 3 1/2 hours from then; for a three hour flight to destination. After experiencing our emergency some people would have called it a day. The crew and I wanted to get our passengers to their destination. Scheduling and I spoke that us continuing to our original overnight would not be best considering we would land very early. Instead Scheduling thought us landing would be a better idea. I expressed my concerns of us flying at all after this leg; after our emergency divert; 3 1/2 hour sit; and the 3 hour leg to destination. They didn't seem to care about my concerns and told us to call when we got there. After getting to destination we were just drained. The emergency event was mentally fatiguing; obviously we talked about it for the rest of the day. We Monday morning quarterbacked the event to see if we did everything correctly; what we could have done better; etc... After calling out fatigued we waited 2 hours to receive a hotel; it was 2 1/2 hours until we got to our rooms and Scheduling wanted to give us a reduced rest overnight which was ridiculous. We received at 9 hour overnight from the time we got our rooms until our show time the next morning. I forgot to mention above that the Flight Attendant and passengers were briefed on all situations and kept up to date. I included everything for the day because these events lead to a fatigue call.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.