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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1029673 |
Time | |
Date | 201208 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Pressurization Outflow Valve |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
Our day started approximately 2 hours late due to delays of the inbound flight. We did our best to get off the gate as quick as possible so that we could get our passengers to their destination. When I contacted ATC they advised me of a 45 minute delay to our destination. Once we were nearing our departure time; the captain started the #1 engine and we got a 'hung start'. We ran the QRH procedures then the captain called local maintenance. We were advised to try starting again and the engine started normal and we were advised we were ok to go. Halfway on our flight we got an 'APU oil' message. Once again we ran the QRH and shutdown the APU. While enroute to our destination we sent an ACARS message to maintenance about the APU and in-range message to our destination advising of the additional services we would need on arrival. When we arrived in our destination we pulled up to gate only to find that the ground crew was slowly making their way out to the ramp. The marshallers were in position but the left wing walker was very slow in reaching his position. Once in position the wing walker turned his back to the plane and was not watching the plane. We had to stop the aircraft until he would turn around and face us and clear us into the gate. Once we were parked both the captain and myself made separate radio calls to operations about needing ground air conditioning. It took them quiet some time to finally hook up the air. The cabin temperature at that time with an empty plane was 28 degrees celsius (30 minutes later with ground air it would reach 29 degrees). We knew that once we had 50 passengers on board and no APU the temperatures would raise to a dangerous level. The captain; flight attendant and I made the decision to delay the outbound flight until the cabin temperature dropped to a safe and comfortable temperature. During this delay we were also waiting on maintenance to MEL the APU. The maintenance guy said that he had been having problems with the APU on the aircraft all week. He also kept saying that he had been begging local maintenance to get him the parts so that the APU could be properly repaired. As time passed the cabin temperature rose to 29 degrees celsius. It was so hot and humid that I started to exit the aircraft when a ramp supervisor came onto the plane and noticed the kinks in the supply hose from the ground air conditioning. We simply did not have enough air flow. The ground supervisor immediately walked down to the ramp and asked the ramp personnel to take the kinks out of the hose. Approximately 5 minutes later the ramp worker who had originally connected the ground air boarded the plane to tell me 'there is nothing wrong with the air hose'. I explained that with the kinks in the hose it did not supply enough airflow to cool the plane. Finally he went back out; straitened the hose and reconnected the ground air. By this time the cabin has become unbearable. My captain once again called operations requesting a portable ground air conditioning cart which they brought out approximately 15 minutes later. At that time we had a steady flow of cool air and the cabin temperature started to drop. Since things were cooling down and maintenance had completed the APU MEL we decided to board passengers. The passengers were very happy to board and they were also very understanding and patient considering the long delay. The captain did a great job of keeping the passengers informed as to why were delayed. We started to run our checklists and talk about starting procedures when we realized that the APU door indication on ED2 said APU door inhibit/open. We called maintenance again and the same guy came out to try and get the message to change to APU door inhibit/closed. This took him several trips between the flight deck and the aft equipment bay. He tried resetting several circuit breakers and even removing and replacing the cannon plug to the APU ecu. Eventually he was able to get the correct message. Once again thecaptain made announcements updating the passengers. The captain asked me to go outside and confirm that the APU door was closed. At that time I did another complete walk around. At that time I saw that the high pressure air was hooked to the left side of the aircraft so that we could do a ground air start since the APU was disabled. When I walked back onto the jet bridge there were 3 passengers waiting with their valet checked bags. I asked them to leave their bags and take their seats. The ladies refused saying that they could not let their bags out of their sight as they contained computers with sensitive material. I told them they could take the computers onboard but they also refused to do that. They finally agreed to take their seats if I would personally watch their bags until they were taken off the jet bridge to which I agreed. I then assisted the gate agent in taking all the valet bags off the jetway. Once those ladies were aboard; they realized that one of the ladies seats had already been assigned. At that point the flight attendant worked patiently with the gate agent to resolve the matter so that we could get the flight underway. Finally everything is falling into place and we are ready to have the jet bridge removed when we realize that they cannot move the jetway so that we could close the main cabin door so that we could start the engines. This is because the ground power unit was attached to the jetway. We then had to request a stand alone ground power unit. We were concerned about transferring the power with passengers aboard so the captain contacted dispatch and they advised us to use the emergency lights during the brief power transfer. The captain made an announcement that the planes lights would slightly dim for a few seconds and to not be alarmed. The captain once again gave me the departure brief and briefed me on ground air starts and the procedures we would take in the event of a no starter cutout. At this time we have recovered ground power and the jetway had been retracted. The captain gave the command 'clear to close' and the flight attendant closes the main cabin door and starts to make her announcement when immediately I feel the most excruciating pain in my ears and my face that I have ever felt. My vision became blurry. I recall looking at the cabin altitude indication and it looked like the numbers on a slot machine. The cabin altitude was decreasing extremely fast. At one point I believe I saw -11;000 ft (11;000 ft below sea level!) I wanted to reach for the emergency depress button but could not reach it so I yelled to my captain 'emergency depress; emergency depress; emergency depress' (the landing elevation had been preset to 800 ft). The captain pressed the emergency/depress button there was a little relief in the pain and the cabin altitude started slowly coming back up to sea level. The captain was also frantic in commanding the ramp crew using the ICAO hand signals to remove all external air from the plane. The ramp crew was very slow in responding to his commands. Once the pressure had returned to an almost normal level we knew it would be safe for the flight attendant to open the main cabin door. At that time the captain had the crew reconnect the jetway and asked the passengers to de-board the plane. My ears and the sides of my face were hurting and I had a very severe 'dull' headache. The flight attendant and captain had similar symptoms. I also had an ache in my neck and back. The captain called to operations and we were advised to go get checked out at the hospital. At that time we were taken to the hospital emergency room.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CRJ200 First Officer reports uncontrolled pressurization of the the aircraft when the main cabin door is closed in preparation for engine start. The APU was inoperative and jetway preconditioned air was supplying the cabin. The emergency depressurization button is pushed to regain control but the damage is done and the crew requires medical attention.
Narrative: Our day started approximately 2 hours late due to delays of the inbound flight. We did our best to get off the gate as quick as possible so that we could get our passengers to their destination. When I contacted ATC they advised me of a 45 minute delay to our destination. Once we were nearing our departure time; The Captain started the #1 engine and we got a 'Hung Start'. We ran the QRH Procedures then the Captain called Local Maintenance. We were advised to try starting again and the engine started normal and we were advised we were ok to go. Halfway on our flight we got an 'APU Oil' message. Once again we ran the QRH and shutdown the APU. While enroute to our destination we sent an ACARS message to Maintenance about the APU and IN-Range message to our destination advising of the additional services we would need on arrival. When we arrived in our destination we pulled up to gate only to find that the ground crew was slowly making their way out to the ramp. The marshallers were in position but the left wing walker was very slow in reaching his position. Once in position the Wing Walker turned his back to the plane and was not watching the plane. We had to stop the aircraft until he would turn around and face us and clear us into the gate. Once we were parked both the Captain and myself made separate radio calls to Operations about needing ground air conditioning. It took them quiet some time to finally hook up the air. The cabin temperature at that time with an empty plane was 28 degrees Celsius (30 minutes later with ground air it would reach 29 degrees). We knew that once we had 50 passengers on board and no APU the temperatures would raise to a dangerous level. The Captain; Flight Attendant and I made the decision to delay the outbound flight until the cabin temperature dropped to a safe and comfortable temperature. During this delay we were also waiting on Maintenance to MEL the APU. The maintenance guy said that he had been having problems with the APU on the aircraft all week. He also kept saying that he had been begging Local Maintenance to get him the parts so that the APU could be properly repaired. As time passed the cabin temperature rose to 29 degrees Celsius. It was so hot and humid that I started to exit the aircraft when a Ramp Supervisor came onto the plane and noticed the kinks in the supply hose from the ground air conditioning. We simply did not have enough air flow. The ground Supervisor immediately walked down to the ramp and asked the ramp personnel to take the kinks out of the hose. Approximately 5 minutes later the Ramp Worker who had originally connected the ground air boarded the plane to tell me 'There is nothing wrong with the air hose'. I explained that with the kinks in the hose it did not supply enough airflow to cool the plane. Finally he went back out; straitened the hose and reconnected the ground air. By this time the cabin has become unbearable. My Captain once again called Operations requesting a portable ground air conditioning cart which they brought out approximately 15 minutes later. At that time we had a steady flow of cool air and the cabin temperature started to drop. Since things were cooling down and Maintenance had completed the APU MEL we decided to board passengers. The passengers were very happy to board and they were also very understanding and patient considering the long delay. The Captain did a great job of keeping the passengers informed as to why were delayed. We started to run our checklists and talk about starting procedures when we realized that the APU door indication on ED2 said APU Door Inhibit/Open. We called Maintenance again and the same guy came out to try and get the message to change to APU Door Inhibit/Closed. This took him several trips between the flight deck and the aft equipment bay. He tried resetting several circuit breakers and even removing and replacing the cannon plug to the APU ECU. Eventually he was able to get the correct message. Once again theCaptain made announcements updating the passengers. The Captain asked me to go outside and confirm that the APU door was closed. At that time I did another complete walk around. At that time I saw that the High Pressure air was hooked to the left side of the aircraft so that we could do a Ground Air Start since the APU was disabled. When I walked back onto the jet bridge there were 3 passengers waiting with their valet checked bags. I asked them to leave their bags and take their seats. The ladies refused saying that they could not let their bags out of their sight as they contained computers with sensitive material. I told them they could take the computers onboard but they also refused to do that. They finally agreed to take their seats if I would personally watch their bags until they were taken off the jet bridge to which I agreed. I then assisted the gate agent in taking all the valet bags off the jetway. Once those ladies were aboard; they realized that one of the ladies seats had already been assigned. At that point the Flight Attendant worked patiently with the Gate Agent to resolve the matter so that we could get the flight underway. Finally everything is falling into place and we are ready to have the jet bridge removed when we realize that they cannot move the jetway so that we could close the main cabin door so that we could start the engines. This is because the Ground Power Unit was attached to the jetway. We then had to request a stand alone Ground Power Unit. We were concerned about transferring the power with passengers aboard so the Captain contacted Dispatch and they advised us to use the Emergency lights during the brief power transfer. The Captain made an announcement that the planes lights would slightly dim for a few seconds and to not be alarmed. The Captain once again gave me the departure brief and briefed me on Ground Air Starts and the procedures we would take in the event of a No Starter Cutout. At this time we have recovered ground power and the jetway had been retracted. The Captain gave the command 'Clear To Close' and the Flight Attendant closes the main cabin door and starts to make her announcement when immediately I feel the most excruciating pain in my ears and my face that I have ever felt. My vision became blurry. I recall looking at the cabin altitude indication and it looked like the numbers on a slot machine. The cabin altitude was decreasing extremely fast. At one point I believe I saw -11;000 FT (11;000 FT below sea level!) I wanted to reach for the Emergency Depress button but could not reach it so I yelled to my Captain 'Emergency Depress; Emergency Depress; Emergency Depress' (The landing elevation had been preset to 800 FT). The Captain pressed the Emergency/Depress button there was a little relief in the pain and the cabin altitude started slowly coming back up to sea level. The Captain was also frantic in commanding the ramp crew using the ICAO Hand Signals to remove all external air from the plane. The ramp crew was very slow in responding to his commands. Once the pressure had returned to an almost normal level we knew it would be safe for the Flight Attendant to open the main cabin door. At that time The Captain had the crew reconnect the jetway and asked the passengers to de-board the plane. My ears and the sides of my face were hurting and I had a very severe 'Dull' headache. The Flight Attendant and Captain had similar symptoms. I also had an ache in my neck and back. The Captain called to Operations and we were advised to go get checked out at the hospital. At that time we were taken to the Hospital Emergency Room.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.