Narrative:

While training we had two aircraft; two T45s; both returning from the MOA at altitude 8;000 ft. The airport was landing to the south on runway 19L. The first T45 checked on first; about 30 NM west of the airport; requesting the overhead with the ATIS information. The trainee descended the first T45 to 3;000 ft and did not put the aircraft on a vector as the aircraft at the time was number one to the airport. Then we took a hand off on the second T45; about 30 NM north of the airport; who also had the ATIS information also requesting the overhead. The trainee had descended the second T45 to 3;000 ft and put the aircraft on a short vector for weather. Meanwhile; the first T45 was about 10 NM west of the airport and reported the airport in sight. The trainee then told the aircraft to proceed to the initial and told the aircraft to contact tower which terminated the aircraft's IFR flight plan per our local orders. The first T45's airspeed indicated 260 KTS. Shortly after; the second T45 was clear of the weather and the trainee vectored the aircraft back to the initial point. The second T45 then reported the airport in sight. The trainee then issued traffic for the first T45 inbound from the west; and then switched the aircraft to the tower also terminating their IFR flight plan per the local order. The second T45 airspeed indicated 320 KTS. At the time of the second T45 being switched to the tower; both aircraft had about 8 NM to fly prior to reaching the initial point. When both aircraft were first returning to the airport; I had asked the trainee what the sequence was going to be and he responded that the first T45 was going to be number one because he was closer to the airport; not taking into account that the second T45 was more straight in for the approach and the aircraft was at a speed of 320 KTS; which was about 60 KTS faster. I knew that the second T45 should have been first; but for training and to teach the trainee a lesson; I had let the trainee go and let him set a bad sequence. As the situation was developing and realizing that the aircraft were going to be in close proximity to each other; I had contact the tower and said that if they need to spin one of the aircraft approaching the initial; that it was approved on our end. The tower did not give either aircraft a 360 and both aircraft would come to be at the initial point for the overhead at the same altitude and it was reported that the aircraft were 1 NM laterally and that the second T45 climbed to 3;500 ft to avoid the first T45. The pilot of the first T45 would then later call the facility claiming that it was a near midair collision. To avoid this situation it the future was to not let that trainee make those bad decisions and let them set a bad sequence without challenging it. Also; to make the trainee keep positive control over the situation and keeping communications with at least one of the aircraft until the situation was resolved or traffic was in sight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TRACON Controller providing OJT described a reported NMAC when two military aircraft were directed to proceed to the 'initial point' for an 'overhead' arrival simultaneously; the reporter acknowledging a failure to intercede.

Narrative: While training we had two aircraft; two T45s; both returning from the MOA at altitude 8;000 FT. The airport was landing to the south on Runway 19L. The first T45 checked on first; about 30 NM west of the airport; requesting the overhead with the ATIS information. The trainee descended the first T45 to 3;000 FT and did not put the aircraft on a vector as the aircraft at the time was number one to the airport. Then we took a hand off on the second T45; about 30 NM north of the airport; who also had the ATIS information also requesting the overhead. The trainee had descended the second T45 to 3;000 FT and put the aircraft on a short vector for weather. Meanwhile; the first T45 was about 10 NM west of the airport and reported the airport in sight. The trainee then told the aircraft to proceed to the initial and told the aircraft to contact Tower which terminated the aircraft's IFR flight plan per our local orders. The first T45's airspeed indicated 260 KTS. Shortly after; the second T45 was clear of the weather and the trainee vectored the aircraft back to the initial point. The second T45 then reported the airport in sight. The trainee then issued traffic for the first T45 inbound from the west; and then switched the aircraft to the Tower also terminating their IFR flight plan per the local order. The second T45 airspeed indicated 320 KTS. At the time of the second T45 being switched to the Tower; both aircraft had about 8 NM to fly prior to reaching the initial point. When both aircraft were first returning to the airport; I had asked the trainee what the sequence was going to be and he responded that the first T45 was going to be number one because he was closer to the airport; not taking into account that the second T45 was more straight in for the approach and the aircraft was at a speed of 320 KTS; which was about 60 KTS faster. I knew that the second T45 should have been first; but for training and to teach the trainee a lesson; I had let the trainee go and let him set a bad sequence. As the situation was developing and realizing that the aircraft were going to be in close proximity to each other; I had contact the Tower and said that if they need to spin one of the aircraft approaching the initial; that it was approved on our end. The Tower did not give either aircraft a 360 and both aircraft would come to be at the initial point for the overhead at the same altitude and it was reported that the aircraft were 1 NM laterally and that the second T45 climbed to 3;500 FT to avoid the first T45. The pilot of the first T45 would then later call the facility claiming that it was a NMAC. To avoid this situation it the future was to not let that trainee make those bad decisions and let them set a bad sequence without challenging it. Also; to make the trainee keep positive control over the situation and keeping communications with at least one of the aircraft until the situation was resolved or traffic was in sight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.