Narrative:

Soon after selection of navigation at 400 AGL; (approximate altitude of 500-800 ft AGL) [I] experienced pronounced and very loud metallic bang/boom/shudder with multiple cockpit cautions. Hand flown on southerly heading; [I] communicated [my] emergency aircraft status with engine failure to ATC. Right engine parameters at zero/near zero; no fire light illuminated. AC crosstie lockout with apparent loss of right side electrical bus; first officer flight displays dark/blank/un-powered. Apparent loss of flight guidance panel functions: autothrottle/autopilot/altitude set not functional. Aircraft configured clean; shallow left climbing turn to north downwind commenced. Immediate action items for engine fire/damage/separation initiated. Souls on board and fuel onboard communicated to ATC during vectors. Unable to converse with flight attendants after chiming; related to electrical difficulties. [I] communicated emergency landing item specifics verbally through cockpit door to number one flight attendant. APU started. Checklists continued. Performed cabin PA to passengers describing emergency return in ten minutes; with reassurance. Flight attendants informed of anticipated quick recovery to the airport with no planned evacuation. Some; or all; right side electrical bus apparently restored via APU power. On downwind; discussion over whether fire bottle should be discharged with no fire light. Handle/bottle left as is; without discharging agent. [I] realized after landing that it was per the checklist to fire bottle; even though fire light not illuminated. [I was] reluctant to fire bottle; based on past aircraft procedure/experience and not double-checking QRH due to time remaining. My error in hindsight; short VMC turn to base leg offered and accepted. Emergency checklist; single engine checklist and mechanical landing checklist work continued. [I] turned final configuring for 28 degree single engine visual approach to the runway with ILS backup tuned. Normal touchdown slightly overweight at approximately 131;000 pounds. Exited runway and parked aircraft on high speed taxiway. Communicated via PA for passengers to remain seated and calm; as crash fire rescue (crash fire rescue equipment) vehicles approached. Inspected by crash fire rescue equipment and given all clear over VHF radio with respect to fire and/or potential remaining aircraft hot spots. [I] resumed taxi to open gate. Approximate airborne time estimated at 12 minutes. Out/in time of approximately 30 minutes. Important matters - my take away: a. Difficult to overestimate the dramatic and startling nature of the apparent hard engine seizure. B. Loss of bus with crosstie lockout problematic due to loss of flight guidance panel; and one pilot's displays. Should we practice? Is this common? C. Loss of displays and functions take you quickly out of our 'litany' and normal procedure flow suffers. D. Alternate means of communicating with our flight attendants beyond chime/interphone possibly needs to be practiced/discussed. East. Finally; the loss of an engine in the simulator; leads to one thing; single engine approach and landing; period. The sudden unexplained somewhat violent loss airborne of an engine; forces the crew to consider if collateral damage exists to structure/passengers/or to the other engine and to decide the safest course of action; balancing thoroughness with timeliness. First officer [was] exceptional. Flight attendants performance throughout [was] outstanding. My crew instrumental in the prompt secure recovery and safety of our passengers; I salute them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Captain and Flight Attendant describe their experience during an MD-80 catastrophic engine failure after takeoff with an emergency return.

Narrative: Soon after selection of NAV at 400 AGL; (approximate altitude of 500-800 FT AGL) [I] experienced pronounced and very loud metallic bang/boom/shudder with multiple cockpit cautions. Hand flown on southerly heading; [I] communicated [my] emergency aircraft status with engine failure to ATC. Right engine parameters at zero/near zero; no fire light illuminated. AC crosstie lockout with apparent loss of right side electrical bus; First Officer flight displays dark/blank/un-powered. Apparent loss of flight guidance panel functions: Autothrottle/Autopilot/Altitude Set not functional. Aircraft configured clean; shallow left climbing turn to north downwind commenced. Immediate action items for Engine Fire/Damage/Separation initiated. Souls on board and fuel onboard communicated to ATC during vectors. Unable to converse with Flight Attendants after chiming; related to electrical difficulties. [I] communicated emergency landing item specifics verbally through cockpit door to number one Flight Attendant. APU started. Checklists continued. Performed cabin PA to passengers describing emergency return in ten minutes; with reassurance. Flight Attendants informed of anticipated quick recovery to the airport with no planned evacuation. Some; or all; right side electrical bus apparently restored via APU power. On downwind; discussion over whether fire bottle should be discharged with no fire light. Handle/bottle left as is; without discharging agent. [I] realized after landing that it was per the checklist to fire bottle; even though fire light not illuminated. [I was] reluctant to fire bottle; based on past aircraft procedure/experience and not double-checking QRH due to time remaining. My error in hindsight; short VMC turn to base leg offered and accepted. Emergency checklist; Single Engine checklist and mechanical Landing Checklist work continued. [I] turned final configuring for 28 degree Single Engine visual approach to the runway with ILS backup tuned. Normal touchdown slightly overweight at approximately 131;000 LBS. Exited runway and parked aircraft on high speed taxiway. Communicated via PA for passengers to remain seated and calm; as Crash Fire Rescue (CFR) vehicles approached. Inspected by CFR and given all clear over VHF radio with respect to fire and/or potential remaining aircraft hot spots. [I] resumed taxi to open gate. Approximate airborne time estimated at 12 minutes. OUT/IN time of approximately 30 minutes. Important matters - my take away: a. Difficult to overestimate the dramatic and startling nature of the apparent hard engine seizure. b. Loss of bus with crosstie lockout problematic due to loss of flight guidance panel; and one pilot's displays. Should we practice? Is this common? c. Loss of displays and functions take you quickly out of our 'litany' and normal procedure flow suffers. d. Alternate means of communicating with our flight attendants beyond chime/interphone possibly needs to be practiced/discussed. e. Finally; the loss of an engine in the simulator; leads to one thing; single engine approach and landing; period. The sudden unexplained somewhat violent loss airborne of an engine; forces the crew to consider if collateral damage exists to structure/passengers/or to the other engine and to decide the safest course of action; balancing thoroughness with timeliness. First Officer [was] exceptional. Flight Attendants performance throughout [was] outstanding. My crew instrumental in the prompt secure recovery and safety of our passengers; I salute them.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.